AL fWAR leaders among pitchers since May 22: 1. Dylan Cease-TOR (2.7 fWAR) T2. LOGAN GILBERT-SEA (2.3) T2. Drew Rasmussen-TB (2.3) T4. Shane Baz-BAL (2.2) T4. Trevor Rogers-BAL (2.2) ⚾️ 6:45 p.m. PT (vs. Rays) 📺 @AppleTV 📻 @SeattleSports 📝

Tesla is still dominating. In the first half of 2026, they secured over 52% of the U.S. EV market. 1. Tesla: 52.3% — 242,100 units sold 2. Chevrolet: 6.1% — 28,267 3. Hyundai: 5.8% — 26,936 4. Cadillac: 4.7% — 21,855 5. Rivian : 4.7% — 21,770 6. Toyota: 4.7% — 21,767 7. Ford: 3.6% — 16,606 8. Kia: 2.7% — 12,627 9. BMW: 2.4% — 10,790 10. Subaru: 2.2% — 10,064 11. Honda: 1.8% — 8,407 12. Lexus: 1.7% — 7,814 13. GMC: 1.4% — 6,645 14. Lucid: 1.1% — 5,208 15. Volvo: 0.9% — 3,964 16. VW: 0.8% — 3,768 17. Mercedes: 0.6% — 3,010 18. Porsche: 0.6% — 2,967 19. Other Brands: 0.6% — 2,596 20. Nissan: 0.4% — 1,774 21. Audi: 0.4% — 1,697 22. Genesis: 0.1% — 560 23. Dodge: 0.1% — 534 24. Jeep: 0.1% — 418 25. Mini: 0.1% — 307 26. Acura: 0.0% — 108 (Data Via Cox Automotive Q2 2026 EV sales)

CHUBB $CB Q3’26 EARNINGS HIGHLIGHTS 🔹 P&C Premiums Written: $13.18B (Est. $13.45B) 🔴 🔹 Adj. EPS: $7.66 (Est. $6.81) 🟢; +0.8% YoY 🔹 Core Operating Income: $2.98B; -2.2% YoY 🔹 P&C Combined Ratio: 84.1%; vs 81.8% LY P&C Net Premiums Written by Segment: 🔹 North America Commercial: $5.51B; -2.7% YoY 🔹 North America Personal: $1.91B; +5.3% YoY 🔹 North America Agricultural: $1.53B; +5.1% YoY 🔹 Overseas General: $3.94B; +6.7% YoY 🔹 Global Reinsurance: $287M; -5.6% YoY Other Q3 Metrics: 🔹 P&C Underwriting Income: $2.06B; -8.8% YoY 🔹 CAY Combined Ratio ex-Cat: 82.6%; vs 82.5% LY 🔹 Catastrophe Losses: $705M; vs $285M LY 🔹 Adj. Net Investment Income: $1.89B; +6.3% YoY 🔹 Life Net Premiums Written: $1.96B; +1.4% YoY 🔹 Life Segment Income: $369M; +11.4% YoY 🔹 Core Operating ROE: 14.9% 🔹 Core Operating ROTE: 21.6% 🔹 Net Income: $2.84B; +1.5% YoY 🔹 GAAP EPS: $7.30; +4.4% YoY Capital Return: 🔹 Total Capital Returned: $1.57B 🔹 Buybacks: $1.18B 🔹 Dividends: $393M Key Updates: 🔹 Total pre-tax net catastrophe losses: $705M; vs $285M LY 🔹 Net income to core operating income, net of tax: adjusted net realized (gains) losses, net of tax $94M; integration expenses and severance, net of tax $8M; market risk benefits (gains) losses, net of tax $55M; amortization of deferred tax asset from Bermuda law ($60M); amortization of fair value adjustments, net of tax $39M 🔹 Favorable prior period development: $511M pre-tax, vs $361M LY 🔹 Book value per share: $191.43, +5.1% YoY; tangible book value per share $126.96, +5.7% YoY Comments: 🔸 “I fully expect North America commercial growth to improve in future quarters.”

Swaps Say Cut. Treasury Auctions Say Demand Is Fine. The bond vigilantes argue that America has too much debt, Treasury buyers are disappearing, and yields must therefore remain high. No. The auction data shows ample demand for U.S. government debt. The real reason yields remain elevated is monetary: markets expect the Fed to keep policy too tight because it refuses to distinguish supply-led growth from inflationary excess demand. A SOFR swap exchanges a fixed interest rate for floating overnight SOFR, which closely tracks Fed policy. A negative swap spread means the fixed SOFR rate is below the yield on a Treasury of the same maturity. The two-year SOFR swap spread is minus 14.55 basis points. The five-year spread is minus 29.10 basis points. Investors are willing to lock in future Fed-linked rates below the yields available on comparable Treasuries. That is a vote for lower policy rates. If there is no liquidity crisis. The Treasury auction data undermines the claim that buyers are disappearing. The 10-year sale drew a 2.71 bid-to-cover ratio, 79.2% indirect demand, just 4.3% dealer absorption, and stopped through the when-issued yield. The 30-year auction drew a 2.61 cover, roughly 79% indirect demand, only 2.2% dealer absorption, and stopped through by 2.7 basis points. There is no buyers’ strike! High Treasury yields reflect a term premium and, more importantly, a market expectation that the Fed will keep policy too restrictive because it mistakes investment, productivity, and supply-side expansion for inflation. AI investment, data centers, energy infrastructure, automation, and capital deepening expand productive capacity. They permit stronger growth without sustained inflation. The Fed should cut rates as disinflation continues rather than treating supply-driven growth as a reason to preserve an unnecessarily restrictive policy stance. The conclusion is simple: debt has not made rate cuts impossible. Treasury demand remains ample. The swaps market is positioned for easier policy. The obstacle is not the bond market. It is the Fed’s unwillingness to recognize that supply-side growth is not inflation.