Transfer ETH + ERC20s on Ethereum from 0zk address to 0zk address completely privately without protocol fees. No bridges, no rollups, just fully sealed value transfer on crypto's most decentralized settlement layer.

LBank will support the addition of the ERC20 chain for NES, and will support deposit and withdrawal on this chain. @nesaorg New ERC20 chain contract address: Start Deposit: 2026.07.20 09:00 (UTC) Start Withdrawal: 2026.07.20 09:00 (UTC) Thank you for your support!

🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 💸 @nimiq Loss: ~$50,463 🔍 Root Cause: ERC20PermitHTLCHandler's `execute()` discards all five calldata parameters (including signature & nonce) and performs no EIP-712 signature, nonce, or business pre-check. The only signature/nonce validation lived in its `preRelayedCall()`, but GSN RelayHub calls `preRelayedCall` on the attacker-specified paymaster. So the attacker set himself as paymaster, fully bypassing that check, used 1 MATIC GSN relay registration to pass `onlyRelayHub` and forged `request.from = victim`, causing `openPrivate()` to call `token.transferFrom(victim, handler, full balance)`. Finally, the attacker directly called the `redeem` function to withdraw these funds using the hosted secret they had crafted. 📌 Attacker: 0x2258491525C21f334c5a2dc22CE55e55023FC45D 📌 Victim: 0x24Cb173Ae221AeA93369f34bdcF0Ddb35b436773 📌 Vulnerable Contract: 0x0cFD862bE942846Cebad797d7c1BC6e47714959b, 0xf615bd7eA00C4Cc7F39fAAD0895Db5f40891359f Powered by Tx:

🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 💸 GaslessReservoirEnabler Loss: ~$23k 🔍 Root Cause: GaslessReservoirEnabler’s erc20WithTransfersAndExecute → _executeInternal checked module addresses but did not bind ERC20 transferFrom instructions to an authorized asset owner, allowing arbitrary callers to spend victims’ existing allowances through whitelisted tokens. 📌 Attacker: 0x46f54c1a86575679fc3d29666c1717e9786279aa 📌 Victim: 997 token-holder addresses, including 0x2f785ef4f514f6b785ab93062e05cfcc937fac96 📌 Vulnerable Contract: 0x9b58fdadc16e30fba313e044bf9e88689c3f163e Impact: Existing WETH and ZED balances were transferred from token holders; proceeds were consolidated and deposited into a bridge on Polygon. Powered by Tx:

AGM on B20 and Coinbase Tokenized Stocks "B20 is a continuation of ERC20 with added functionality for assets like tokenized stocks" "Coinbase Tokenized Stocks are as close as you can get to owning shares onchain. It's like USDC"

📣 New Listing: ethereum:0x58d97b57bb95320f9a05dc918aef65434969c2b2 is coming to HashKey Exchange! @Morpho ✅ Deposits & Withdrawals (ERC20): Open ✅ Trading Pair (Spot) : ethereum:0x58d97b57bb95320f9a05dc918aef65434969c2b2/USD ✅ Listing Time: 16:00 (UTC+8), 28 July 👤 Available to: Professional Investors Register now More Details

🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 💸 $OMNI404 Loss: 2.4 WETH 🔍 Root Cause: In `_transfer()` of OMNI404 (O404), NFT mint/burn counts are derived only from `(balanceOf / units)` integer differences before/after the ERC20 transfer. OMNI404's `transfer(address,uint256)` treats values ≤ 50 as ERC721 token IDs, but also transfers a fixed 1e18 OMNI404 units. Uniswap V3 exact-output swaps calling `transfer(recipient, 1/2/.../21)` received 1e18 OMNI404 per call while the pool accounted only wei-level amounts, enabling flash-loan assisted profit. 📌 Attacker: 0xfb26db4eab18cb50d29ff431888dd643a7e9c9f8 📌 Victim Pool: 0xb3f613b9bc84ddb29d78fa4685b01d98412bba0b 📌 Vulnerable Contract: 0xd5c02bb3e40494d4674778306da43a56138a383e Powered by Tx:

ETHGas ($GWEI) is now available for trading in the App. Purchase $GWEI easily with USD, EUR, and 20+ fiat currencies. Download the App to deposit and withdraw $GWEI via ERC20 now! ➡️ For more details: @ETHGasOfficial

USD Universal ($USDU) is now available for trading in UAE in the App 🔔 Purchase $USDU easily with AED, USD, EUR, and 20+ fiat currencies Download the App to deposit and withdraw $USDU via ERC20 now! 👉 For more details: @Universal_USDU