🚨USE THIS GUIDE TO PROTECT YOUR COMPUTER FROM NPM HACKS THAT STEAL EVERYTHING IN ONE INSTALL TanStack, a code library used in millions of web apps, got hacked on Monday one install steal every password, key, and credential on your computer this is far not the first hack this month and definitely just the beginning Here's how to protect your machine: [ 1. lock down npm with a 7-day cooldown ]: open ~/.npmrc. keep all existing lines (auth tokens, registry config). append: """ min-release-age=7 minimum-release-age=10080 save-exact=true """ this makes npm refuse any package version published in the last 7 days. attack windows are usually under 24 hours, you skip them entirely [ 2. same cooldown for bun ]: open ~/.bunfig.toml (create if missing). append: """ [install] minimumReleaseAge = 604800 """ 7 days in seconds, same protection in bun's config format [ 3. pin every npm dependency in your projects ]: open package.json. strip every ^ and ~ from versions under: - dependencies - devDependencies - peerDependencies exact versions only. commit your lockfile (bun.lock / package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml) to git so the resolved tree is frozen [ 4. same discipline for python ]: if you use uv (the modern default): commit uv.lock, run `uv sync` to restore if you use pip: requirements.txt with pinned versions, run `pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt` if you use poetry: commit poetry.lock, use `poetry install --no-update` never trust `>=` or `~=` ranges in production projects [ 5. pin GitHub Actions to commit SHAs ]: stop using `actions/checkout@v4`. switch to: ```yaml uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11 ``` every third-party action runs in your CI with access to repo secrets. pinning the SHA means a compromised maintainer cannot push malicious code into your pipeline [ 6. audit your IDE extensions ]: Cursor, VSCode, Windsurf, every extension is code running with full access to your filesystem, clipboard, and open files - review installed extensions monthly - remove anything you haven't actively used in 30 days - check the publisher, install count, last update, GitHub source before installing - never install extensions that ask for permissions they shouldn't need [ 7. lock down API tokens and credentials ]: - never commit .env to git (add to .gitignore on every project, no exceptions) - use minimum-scope tokens: one repo, one bucket, one workspace - rotate API keys every 90 days, force expiry on critical ones - separate tokens by environment (dev / staging / prod) - enable 2FA on every developer account: GitHub, npm, PyPI, Cloudflare, AWS, OpenAI, Anthropic - never paste secrets into Claude / ChatGPT / any AI chat, they're logged [ 8. set up continuous monitoring ]: - enable Dependabot alerts on every repo (free, takes 2 minutes) - install or Snyk for live vulnerability scanning - subscribe to the npm and PyPI security advisory feeds - follow @snyksec, @socketsecurity, @stepsecurity for early warnings [ 9. how to detect if you got the TanStack payload ]: if you installed any @tanstack/* package between 19:20 and 19:30 UTC on Monday, May 11, treat the host as compromised the detection signature: a malicious manifest contains "optionalDependencies": { "@tanstack/setup": "github:tanstack/router#79ac49ee#..." } any version with this entry is compromised. the payload is delivered via the git-resolved optionalDependency, whose prepare script runs router_init.js (~2.3 MB, smuggled into the tarball root) how to check fast: - search your lockfile for `@tanstack/setup` references - search node_modules for any `router_init.js` file - if either shows up, jump to section 10 immediately future attacks will use the same trick: malicious code hidden in optionalDependencies or postinstall/prepare scripts. add `grep -r "postinstall\|prepare" node_modules/*/package.json | grep -iE "curl|wget|eval|base64"` to your weekly audit routine [ 10. emergency response if you're already compromised ]: ran an install during a suspected attack window? do this in this exact order: - rotate every cloud credential: AWS, GCP, Kubernetes service accounts, Vault tokens - rotate GitHub personal access tokens, OAuth tokens, SSH keys - revoke active sessions on GitHub, npm, PyPI, all cloud providers - audit AWS / GCP / Kubernetes / Vault audit logs for the last several hours, look for unauthorized API calls - pin to the last known-good version of every @tanstack package and reinstall from a clean lockfile - check ~/.npm, ~/.config, browser cookie stores for tampered files - wipe ~/.bash_history, ~/.zsh_history, local AI chat logs that might have secrets - if you ran the install as root or with sudo: nuke the machine, reinstall from scratch, restore code from git only [ why this matters right now ]: attack chains in supply chain hacks usually only last a few hours before the malicious package gets caught and yanked. during those hours, every developer running `npm install` becomes a victim worse: npm couldn't even UNPUBLISH most of the TanStack malicious versions because of third-party dependencies. the registry's own safeguards are part of the problem. you can't rely on the platform, you have to protect yourself the patterns from the last 18 months: - npm: TanStack on May 11 (42 packages, AWS/GCP/Vault credentials), Shai-Hulud worm hit Nx packages, chalk/debug/ansi-styles worm hit qix maintainer - GitHub Actions: tj-actions/changed-files compromise exposed thousands of repos' secrets - PyPI: ongoing typosquatting campaigns targeting AI/ML packages - IDE extensions: VSCode marketplace caught hosting credential stealers the frequency is rising because the payoff is massive one compromised package lands on millions of machines in hours if you don't lock this down tonight, you're exposed to the next one. and there will be one 30 minutes tonight, or wait for the next attack to clean out your machine Full TanStack breakdown:

We combed through the full attack chain behind the Shai-Hulud / Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attacks since May 2026. From the collapse of TanStack’s CI/CD trust boundary, to the malicious Nx Console VS Code extension, and later the @antv, PyPI durabletask, and GitHub internal private repository breach incidents, the attackers completed coordinated lateral expansion across npm, PyPI, IDE extensions, and cloud environments within roughly a week. ⚠️This was not a series of isolated incidents, but a mature attack pipeline built around “trusted release channels → credential harvesting → lateral propagation.” Read the full analysis and incident breakdown 🔎

🚨 MistEye TI Alert 🚨 MistEye has detected a highly sophisticated npm worm, "Mini Shai-Hulud," spreading through trusted developer projects like TanStack, UiPath, and DraftLab. The attackers hijacked GitHub credentials to publish malicious, yet seemingly legitimate, package updates. The malware injects a heavily disguised hidden script (router_init.js) that runs silently in the background of CI/CD environments (like GitHub Actions). It is specifically designed to harvest highly sensitive data, including CI/CD secrets, cloud infrastructure keys, and cryptocurrency wallets. The stolen data is then stealthily smuggled out using GitHub's own infrastructure. We have synchronized these critical IOCs with our clients. If your projects utilize the affected packages, immediate action is required: please audit your CI/CD pipelines for the presence of the router_init.js file, rotate all exposed GitHub, cloud, and crypto credentials, and closely monitor your development environments for any unauthorized background activity. As always, stay vigilant!

🚨 ACTIVE INCIDENT: The Mini Shai-Hulud worm is back, and it just compromised dozens of official @tanstack npm packages This is the first documented self-spreading npm worm that carries valid SLSA provenance attestations. Let that sink in. Our OSS Package Security Feed detected the compromised releases and we're tracking the spread in real time. Here's what happened: The attacker staged an obfuscated 2.3 MB credential-stealing payload in a fork of TanStack/router, then used hijacked OIDC tokens to publish malicious versions through TanStack's own legitimate GitHub Actions release pipeline. The compromised packages include @tanstack/react-router, @tanstack/router-core, @tanstack/react-start, and 40+ other packages. Millions of weekly downloads across the ecosystem. If you installed any affected version in CI, assume all secrets in that environment are compromised. Rotate tokens immediately. Full technical analysis, IOCs, compromised version list, and recovery steps on our blog. The list of affected packages is still growing.