🚨🇷🇺 UKRAINE IN PANIC: RUSSIA’S KA-52 ATTACK HELICOPTER BECOMES DRONE HUNTER Russia has turned the Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopter’s Vikhr anti-tank missile into an air-to-air weapon for destroying drones. Kalashnikov CEO Alan Lushnikov says the modified missile is already being used in combat, although he did not disclose the number of helicopters or units involved. 🔸 The Vikhr missile was built as an air-to-surface tank killer carried principally by Ka-52 helicopters. Engineers added a non-contact target sensor so the warhead can detonate close to a drone instead of requiring a direct hit. 🔸 Kalashnikov says the missile can strike targets out to 10 km and travels at more than 600 m/s. That gives crews a fast shot against larger fixed-wing drones before they reach the facility or city being defended. 🔸 The missile rides a laser beam projected by the helicopter rather than relying on radio commands or satellite navigation. Many forms of electronic jamming therefore cannot simply divert it, although the crew must keep the target tracked throughout the engagement. 🔸 The Ka-52 already has an electro-optical targeting system and laser designator for guided weapons. Its coaxial rotors also provide strong low-speed control and rapid turns, useful when crews must follow a slow target that changes direction. 🔸 Lushnikov argues helicopters are more practical than large interceptor drones for protecting Russian territory. They can patrol suspected approach routes, chase targets that bypass a fixed battery and reposition as the attack develops. 🔸 That mobility matters as Ukrainian drones reach deeper into Russia. The Financial Times reported in July that U.S. and French intelligence had helped map Russian air-defense deployments and select routes around them. The modified Vikhr does not replace ground air defenses. It gives Russia a mobile layer that can close temporary gaps, intercept drones away from their targets and engage them with a missile Lushnikov says costs less than a surface-to-air interceptor. Will Ka-52 drone hunters force Ukraine to rethink its long-range strike campaign?

An engaged reporter, a soon-to-retire pilot and a young tourist. Instead of celebrating their next chapters, loved ones of the three killed in a helicopter crash in Los Angeles are grieving their loss. Here's what we know about the victims:

🇺🇸 JP Morgan CEO: "Iran has been engaged in rápe, kílling, and muŕder for 47 years. The West allowed proxy wars to continue. We’ve learned our lesson. We should have targeted the head of the snake years ago." Translation: When a $2B banking CEO openly pushes for war, it says a lot about who benefits.

🚨 JUST IN: Stephen Miller breaks it down PERFECTLY "The Democrat Party has become a party of Marxist, communist, socialist, violent extremists, and violent revolutionaries who support the policies that are getting Americans KILLED en masse historically for many years now by criminal illegal aliens!" "This is a party that supports violence against ICE officers, supports violence against federal law enforcement, and engages in conduct and rhetoric and behavior that leads to repeated assassination attempts against President Trump, against President Trump supporters, and against Republican elected officeholders." "It is a terrifying reality, but one we cannot turn away from, ignore, we cannot put our heads in the sand, and pretend the Democrat Party of the 90s or the 80s or the 70s exists anymore, because it is gone! It is gone, and it is not coming back!" This is why we need to nuke the filibuster and PASS IT ALL. SAVE AMERICA 🇺🇸 @StephenM

In 2008, the failure to deliver collateral cascaded into everything else. The unwind took more than a decade. Our Chief Content Officer, @mikejcasey, sat down with Dan Doney, MD, CTO, Digital Assets at @The_DTCC, last week, ahead of Dan taking the stage in Brooklyn this September. His case: Blockchain's killer use is preventing the systemic risk that nearly brought down global markets by making collateral portable and automatic. It's the same force behind "the other RWA," the risk-weighted assets that drive most of the $5 quadrillion DTCC settles a year. "If you're a bank and you're not engaged in the efficient movement of collateral, thanks to blockchain, you're gonna be at a serious competitive disadvantage to those who are." Catch Doney live at the Real-World Asset Summit Brooklyn 2026.

🚨 JUST IN: President Trump just posted Stephen Miller dropping this TRUTH NUKE for every American to hear He nailed it: “The Democrat Party has become a party of Marxist, communist, socialist, violent extremists, and violent revolutionaries who support the policies that are getting Americans KILLED en masse historically for many years now by criminal illegal aliens!" "This is a party that supports violence against ICE officers, supports violence against federal law enforcement, and engages in conduct and rhetoric and behavior that leads to repeated assassination attempts against President Trump, against President Trump supporters, and against Republican elected officeholders." "It is a terrifying reality, but one we cannot turn away from, ignore, we cannot put our heads in the sand, and pretend the Democrat Party of the 90s or the 80s or the 70s exists anymore, because it is gone! It is gone, and it is not coming back!" @StephenM

Houthi-Saudi Escalation, Current Situation, and Forecast (General Access) ICOD-0900, 09/08/2026 BLUF The years-long running conflict between Yemen's Houthi movement and Saudi Arabia has entered its most significant period of escalation since the 2022 ceasefire. The Houthis are increasingly targeting Saudi military, energy and maritime interests while Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces have engaged the Houthis in the most serious internal fighting seen since the ceasefire. The immediate escalation began in July after Saudi Arabia struck the runway at Sana'a International Airport as an Iranian aircraft carrying Houthi officials attempted to land. The Houthis subsequently launched missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia and announced a naval blockade against Saudi-linked shipping. The conflict has since developed along two interconnected fronts. The Houthis are attacking Saudi territory and Saudi linked shipping while also increasing attacks against Saudi backed forces inside Yemen. Saudi Arabia has conducted retaliatory strikes against Houthi military targets, while fighting inside Yemen has intensified around Marib, Taiz and Hodeidah. On September 8, the Houthis conducted their largest reported attack against Saudi Arabia during the current escalation, striking areas around Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran. Saudi authorities reported 73 people wounded and said several energy facilities temporarily suspended operations following fires and damage. Key Points • The Houthis are an Iran-aligned Yemeni movement that seized Sana'a in 2014 and established control over much of northern and western Yemen. Saudi Arabia intervened militarily in 2015 in support of Yemen's internationally recognized government. Major Saudi Houthi fighting declined substantially after the 2022 truce, although the underlying conflict was never resolved. • The immediate trigger for the current escalation was the July 13 Saudi strike on Sana'a International Airport. The strike disabled the runway and prevented an Iranian aircraft carrying a Houthi delegation from landing. The Houthis responded with missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia. • On July 20, the Houthis announced a naval blockade against Saudi linked shipping. On July 22, the Saudi flagged tanker *Encelia* was struck in the Red Sea. The incident was the first confirmed attack on a Saudi ship during the current escalation and marked a shift from threats against Saudi Arabia to sustained attacks on Saudi commercial interests. • Saudi energy infrastructure has become a major component of the Houthi campaign. ACLED recorded 16 Houthi attacks against Saudi assets between July 13 and August 14, including attacks involving seven oil facilities and six oil tankers. Some individual Houthi claims remain unconfirmed, but the broader pattern of attacks against Saudi energy and maritime infrastructure is established. • The Houthis have simultaneously increased attacks against Saudi backed Yemeni government forces. On August 6, Houthi attacks against government military camps in Hadramawt and Marib killed at least 30 soldiers, according to ACLED. On August 9, the Houthis launched a large combined drone, missile and unmanned explosive boat attack against the government held port of Mocha, killing seven people and damaging the port and other infrastructure. • Fighting inside Yemen has intensified further in September. Government forces have reported advances against the Houthis in parts of Hodeidah and Taiz, while fighting has also occurred in Marib and other areas. The available reporting indicates a significant increase in violence, but the conflict has not yet clearly returned to the large scale territorial warfare seen before the 2022 truce. • The September 8 attack represents the most significant Saudi homeland attack reported during the current escalation. Saudi authorities reported attacks affecting Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran, with 73 people wounded and fires at several energy facilities. The Houthis said they used ballistic missiles and drones against Aramco facilities and a Saudi air base. • The conflict therefore now involves three overlapping concerns: attacks against Saudi Arabia, fighting between the Houthis and Saudi backed forces inside Yemen, and threats to Red Sea shipping around Bab al Mandeb. The latter connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and is a major maritime route between the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal. Analyst Comment The current escalation should not yet be characterized as a return to the full scale Saudi Houthi war of 2015 through 2021. The more significant change is the combination of several pressure points that had largely remained dormant since the 2022 truce: attacks against Saudi territory, attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure, attacks against Saudi linked shipping and renewed heavy fighting inside Yemen. The Houthi campaign appears intended to impose costs on Saudi Arabia while constraining the ability of Saudi backed Yemeni forces to increase military pressure against Houthi held territory. The repeated targeting of energy infrastructure and shipping is consistent with an effort to increase the economic and political cost of Saudi involvement. ACLED assesses that the Houthis have calibrated attacks against oil infrastructure to inflict economic damage and pressure Riyadh for concessions. The geography is also becoming increasingly important. Fighting around Hodeidah, Taiz and the western coast places a significant portion of the renewed conflict near the Red Sea and approaches to Bab al Mandeb. At the same time, the Houthis are attacking Saudi infrastructure farther north, including Jazan, Najran and Yanbu. This creates a conflict that extends from the Yemeni battlefield into Saudi economic infrastructure and the maritime routes connecting the Red Sea to global markets. Saudi Arabia's dependence on its Red Sea infrastructure is particularly relevant while maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains disrupted. The Houthis therefore have an opportunity to impose additional costs on Saudi energy exports by threatening an alternative route that has become more important during the current regional crisis. For the United States, the immediate operational implication is likely to be increased demand for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and defensive air and missile defense support. The United States already maintains an integrated regional air defense architecture with Saudi Arabia and other partners, including shared warning mechanisms and U.S. personnel working alongside partner Patriot units. Continued Houthi missile and drone attacks therefore have the potential to increase U.S. requirements for warning, tracking and defensive support without necessarily requiring direct U.S. offensive operations against the Houthis. A significant expansion of direct U.S. strikes should be treated as a separate escalation indicator rather than assumed to be the natural next step. Assessment The current trajectory indicates that the Houthi-Saudi conflict is likely to remain elevated in the near term. Both sides have demonstrated an ability and willingness to continue military operations, while the conditions that supported the relative calm following the 2022 truce have deteriorated substantially. Key Judgements - A continued Houthi campaign against Saudi Arabia is likely in the near term. The group has established a recurring pattern of targeting Saudi military, energy and maritime interests. The September 8 attack demonstrates that the Houthis retain the capability and intent to conduct large missile and drone operations against Saudi territory. - Houthi attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure and shipping are likely to remain central to the campaign. These targets allow the Houthis to impose economic and political costs without having to seize additional territory. The repeated attacks against Saudi linked vessels and energy facilities indicate that maritime and economic pressure has become an established component of the current campaign. - Fighting inside Yemen is likely to remain a major driver of further escalation. Houthi attacks against Saudi backed government forces have increased substantially, while government forces have become more active against Houthi positions. Further increases in government military pressure would provide the Houthis with an additional justification for attacks against Saudi Arabia. - A sustained Houthi effort to disrupt Red Sea shipping is possible, but the current campaign remains narrower than the group's previous campaign against international commercial shipping. The current blockade is primarily directed at Saudi linked shipping, although attacks around Bab al Mandeb could have broader consequences if the campaign expands. - U.S. ISR and defensive air and missile defense requirements are likely to increase if the current tempo continues. The United States already has mechanisms for sharing threat information and supporting partner air defense forces. Continued Houthi attacks would increase the demand for warning, tracking and defensive support. Direct U.S. offensive action against the Houthis should be considered a separate escalation scenario. - The key indicator is whether the conflict remains contained or expands substantially around Bab al Mandeb. Continued attacks against shipping combined with sustained fighting around Hodeidah and the western coast would indicate that the conflict is increasingly becoming a struggle over Yemen's Red Sea coastline and the maritime corridor beyond the immediate Saudi Houthi confrontation. - A return to the relative calm that followed the 2022 truce is currently unlikely without a reduction in military pressure. Each additional Houthi attack creates pressure for a Saudi response, while additional Saudi or government military operations create incentives for further Houthi retaliation. Without a political mechanism capable of interrupting that cycle, the current elevated level of conflict is likely to persist. Sources:

24 hours after the worst massacre in Israel’s history, with Hamas gunmen still in Israel’s south, a former Knesset member thought it was the right time to declare in writing that the massacre was “an important historic event from a military, political and strategic perspective.” Three years later, Balad chairman Sami Abu Shehadeh wants back into the Knesset. The law is clear cut. Section 7A of Basic Law: The Knesset bars any candidate whose actions or statements negate Israel’s existence as a Jewish and democratic state, incite racism, or support the armed struggle of an enemy state or terrorist organization against Israel. Otzma Yehudit has petitioned the Central Elections Committee to disqualify Abu Shehadeh on the first and third grounds. The evidence isn’t exactly conjecture. His column hailed the attack, then drew a lesson from it. Israel and its intelligence services, he wrote, don’t know everything, and “if small and besieged Gaza was able to do this, and at this level, others can do it more effectively and simply.” Abu Shehadeh knows he can’t spin his words, so he isn’t trying. He’s pleading ignorance, claiming he did not know the extent of the massacre at the time of writing. An impressive feat for any person with a working internet connection, let alone a former member of the country’s parliament. Even if Shehadeh produces the rock he apparently spent those 24 hours under, he is caught in a trap of his own writing. Was the day historic at 200 dead but not at 1,200? The achievement he credits to “small and besieged Gaza” only grows with the body count. Nor was the column a lapse. In February 2022, as a sitting MK, he marked the killing of three members of a Nablus cell that had been carrying out shooting attacks on IDF troops by posting their photos with the words “Glory and eternity to the martyrs of our people, the innocent ones.” The committee will likely bar him. Balad has been disqualified four times, in 2003, 2009, 2019 and 2022, as have two of its MKs, Hanin Zoabi and Heba Yazbak. Every time, the Supreme Court, self-appointed guardian of democratic discourse, put them back on the ballot. The court has only ever chosen to read one of the three clauses, repeatedly citing the ban on racism to disqualify Jewish extremists. There are two objections worth answering. The first is that democracies should defeat bad ideas at the ballot box rather than keep them off it. That is right for bad ideas. It is not right for applauding a massacre while it is still under way. In one of the best-known rulings on the subject, Aharon Barak offered an example: a party running on a platform of planting a bomb under the prime minister’s car would not be allowed to run. A country, however democratic, does not have to seat someone opposed to its existence, let alone someone who greeted the massacre of its citizens as a historic achievement. The second objection, raised by Abu Shehadeh himself, is that the petition comes from Itamar Ben Gvir, a man once convicted of supporting a terrorist organization. But justice is blind to plaintiff and defendant alike. The case has to be judged on its merits. The trouble is that the court has always peeked at the defendant. The raison d’être of Balad’s founder, Azmi Bishara, was stripping Israel of its Jewish character. Even when he engaged in his hobby of terror support, praising Hezbollah and, on a visit to Syria, an enemy state, speaking up for “the resistance,” the court protected him. Better, the reasoning went, to keep political enemies inside the tent than drive them toward non-democratic means. Unsurprisingly, no consequences did not incentivize good behavior. In 2007 Bishara left for Qatar under suspicion of passing information to Hezbollah during the Second Lebanon War. Praising Hezbollah in the early 2000s was a puff of wind next to celebrating October 7. Not even a court blind to the law can salvage Abu Shehadeh. Balad, though, will likely emerge from the blast unscathed. Despite the party’s record of terror support and a platform built on rejecting Israel as a Jewish state, the party remains protected by the court’s blind spot for half of Section 7A. Its next leader will likely step far more carefully around supporting terror. One cannot help but wonder what moderation might be possible if the court read the clause in its entirety.