There is a limited universe of listed preferred shares in Japan today. Upon listing, our preferred would be only the seventh in the market, and the first perpetual preferred. We view this as a meaningful contribution to the development of Japan's capital markets, but it is also why the path to listing is necessarily deliberate. In the Japanese market, dividends on preferred shares are expected to be supported by sustainable cash flows generated from underlying operations. The listing review accordingly assesses dividend-paying capacity based on projected financial performance over a multi-year period, including scenarios across different market environments. Metaplanet already has a six-quarter track record in its Bitcoin Income Generation Business, and we believe it is important to continue demonstrating that the business can generate stable, recurring cash flows across both strong and weak Bitcoin market conditions. We are also continuing to articulate the scalability and long-term viability of our related operating businesses that support this cash flow profile. A second consideration is dividend operations. Listed companies in Japan have historically paid dividends once or twice per year. The structure we are designing contemplates more frequent distributions, including monthly dividends. Implementing this requires careful work on record-date procedures, shareholder identification, dividend calculation, and recurring shareholder notice operations. We are working closely with our partners to build and modernize this infrastructure in a manner consistent with Japanese regulatory and market practice. The process has taken longer than we initially anticipated, and we appreciate that this has created uncertainty. We are deliberate about this work because Japan today is one of the most yield-starved major capital markets in the world, and we believe a preferred equity product supported by credible operating cash flows, robust operational infrastructure, and a long-term growth strategy can meaningfully address that need. We are deeply committed to bringing this product to market, and to doing so in a form that earns the long-term trust of investors and market participants.

Today we're announcing new offices in Singapore and Tokyo. Combined with Sydney, @WeAreLegora now covers the full breadth of Asia-Pacific. Here's why: Japan is one of the largest legal services markets in the world by revenue – and it's in the middle of a structural M&A boom that connects directly to the US corridor we already cover. We already have customers there. The Tokyo office puts us at the center of that flow, serving both the international firms advising on outbound Japanese transactions and the domestic firms handling the inbound. Singapore is where the Magic Circle and leading US firms base their APAC headquarters. For global firms doing cross-border legal work across the region, it's the natural entry point – and we already have several of those firms as customers. The APAC legal services fee pool rivals the EU in scale. We've been building here since opening in Sydney in 2025. @minterellison, @AllensLegal, @hsfkramer, and others are already on the platform. Now we're taking the next step. If you want to be part of what we're building –

Most people think Harry Potter is the best selling book series in history at ~615M books. That will likely change this year. It will be overtaken by One Piece, by Eiichiro Oda, regarded as the greatest Japanese manga / graphic novel of all time, which just crossed 600M in March and is projected to surpass HP this year and hit 725M+ when it ends in ~2030-32 (there’s 10-15% left). The story follows Monkey D Luffy, a young boy who has rubber man powers, who assembles a pirate crew and goes on an epic journey to find the legendary “One Piece” treasure. As a voracious reader, I struggled to take manga seriously for most of my life. I’m a hardcore Harry Potter fan, and even thinking of manga in the same breath once disgusted me. I relegated manga to a “niche comic book for nerds” and anime to a “kids cartoon”. “These aren’t real books, it’s just for people who can’t read longform”, I thought. But the past few years have completely changed my mind. I’ve been personally reading and watching (YouTube/Crunchyroll) many manga / anime including One Piece. Aside from the appreciation for the artistry of the characters, the stories strike me as immensely powerful with deep lessons about loyalty, sacrifice, friendship, ambition, justice, power, grief and kindness. Once you get in the flow, it’s far more enjoyable than most non-fiction and rivals anything on my shelf. The storytelling is beautiful. It awakens the child inside you without being juvenile. I highly recommend it to anyone who has previously had reservations like I once did, and doubly so if you want to enjoy something with your kids.

# Practical and Useful Patterns with ADK ⚡ Turn Python functions into tools, wrap agents as tools, and run long tasks without blocking — ADK's Function Tools maximize flexibility in tool definitions. 📌 Title: Function Tools — Functions, Agents, and Async Tasks as Tools 🔗 URL: 🧩 Overview ADK's Function Tools let you use Python/TypeScript functions directly as agent tools. AgentTool wraps an entire agent as a tool accessible to other agents. Long Running Function Tools handle time-consuming tasks like video encoding and batch jobs without blocking the agent's execution flow. 🛠 Usage Basic function tool definitions and AgentTool usage. Import `Agent` and `AgentTool` from `google.adk`. Define a simple function tool `calculate_price` that takes `base_price` (float), `quantity` (int), and `discount_percent` (float, default 0), computes the total with the discount applied, and returns a dict with `total` and `currency`. For wrapping an agent as a tool, create an `analysis_agent` with `name="data_analyst"` and `tools=[query_database]`. Then define `main_agent` with `tools=[calculate_price, AgentTool(agent=analysis_agent)]`, allowing the main agent to call both the pricing function and the data analysis agent as tools. Using Long Running Function Tools. Import `LongRunningFunctionTool` from `google.adk`. Define an async function `encode_video` that takes `video_url` (str) and `format` (str, default "mp4"), starts an encoding job via `start_encoding_job`, and returns the job ID with a processing status. Wrap it with `LongRunningFunctionTool(func=encode_video)` to create `video_tool`, then pass it to an `Agent`'s `tools` list so the agent can trigger long-running tasks without blocking. 🏗 Practical Patterns **Modularization with AgentTool**: Encapsulate complex logic as specialized agents and expose them via AgentTool. This keeps the main agent's instructions simple while each specialist agent maintains its own tools and prompts -- achieving clean separation of concerns. Define a `summarizer` agent (for 3-line summaries) and a `translator` agent (for Japanese translation) as separate `Agent` instances. Then create a `content_manager` agent with `tools=[AgentTool(agent=summarizer), AgentTool(agent=translator)]`, allowing the main agent to invoke these specialists as tools for content management tasks. **When to Use Long Running Tools**: Ideal for batch processing, external API polling, file conversion — anything taking seconds to minutes. The agent receives a job ID and can proceed with other tasks in parallel. **Type Annotations Matter**: Clear parameter types and return types help the LLM call tools accurately. Docstrings serve as tool descriptions, so keep them concise and clear. 💡 Use Cases 🧮 Calculation and conversion functions as tools (pricing, unit conversion) 🤖 Reusable specialist agents via AgentTool 🎬 Async video encoding and image processing 📊 Non-blocking batch data processing ⚠️ Caveats - Function docstrings become tool descriptions. Write LLM-friendly descriptions — missing docstrings make tool purposes unclear. - Agents called via AgentTool run in a separate session from the parent. Be careful about state sharing. - Long Running Function Tools require a separate completion notification mechanism. Consider polling or webhook-based notifications. ✨ Function Tools let you integrate existing code assets directly into agents, and AgentTool enables seamless agent reuse. A massive boost to development productivity! #ADK# #AIAgent#

Rebuttal to Misconceptions About China’s Economy: Superficial Analysis Easily Leads to Misjudgments of Facts and Future Trends Recent commentary draws forced parallels between China and Japan prior to its economic stagnation, advances the one-sided claim that “China invests in the state while the United States and Japan invest in its people”, denies China’s livelihood safeguards, distorts debt logic, smears its development model, and even misrepresents the underlying rationale behind real estate, urbanization and people-centered policies. Such arguments ignore objective facts of China’s development, confuse disparities in national development stages and institutional systems, and misjudge the trajectory of China’s economy and society. This article systematically refutes these fallacies from five core dimensions — debt logic, livelihood security, the essence of development, real estate and urbanization trends, and policy orientation — to restore the fundamental logic of China’s development and its primary future pathways. I. Rebuttal on Debt Structure: The Fallacy That “China Shifts Debt Burdens Downward to the Public, While the U.S. and Japan Provide State Backstops Upward” — A Conceptual Sleight of Hand Ignoring Institutional Differences Core flawed claim: Individuals in the United States and Japan can file for bankruptcy with state-backed debt relief, while China lacks personal bankruptcy mechanisms and imposes lifelong debt obligations. This purportedly leaves China’s central government balance sheet robust while local governments and households bear heavy burdens, amounting to “downward debt transfer”. 1. Personal bankruptcy and debt restructuring are not entirely absent in China; pilots are underway with nationwide rollout accelerating The assertion that “China offers almost no access to debt restructuring or personal bankruptcy” directly contradicts reality. Pioneering local pilots: Shenzhen launched China’s first personal bankruptcy ordinance in 2021. In March 2026, the first personal bankruptcy liquidation case completed its four-year observation period, granting the debtor legal discharge of remaining liabilities and enabling a fresh start for “honest yet unfortunate debtors”, as confirmed by the Supreme People’s Court of China. Xiamen introduced personal bankruptcy protection regulations in November 2025 and has accepted 11 related cases. Jiangsu and Zhejiang have carried out pilot schemes for centralized personal debt resolution, with authorities in Nanjing, Wujiang and other regions helping hundreds of debtors resolve liabilities and repair credit records, per the Supreme People’s Court. Clear top-level design: The Chinese government has explicitly stated its intent to “explore the establishment of a personal bankruptcy system”. The Supreme People’s Court is summarizing pilot experience, expanding trial scope and advancing nationwide institutional implementation. Mortgage debt is not a lifelong obligation: To address unfinished housing projects and mortgage defaults, multiple regions have introduced policies supporting mortgage payment extensions and negotiated repayment arrangements. Judicial practice offers debt restructuring and interest relief for creditworthy debtors facing insolvency, rejecting the absolutist narrative that debtors remain liable for loans even after abandoning properties. 2. Differences in debt structures stem from development stages and governance choices, rather than insufficient prioritization of citizens Framing differing debt structures simply as “investing in the state versus investing in people” confuses development stages, governance models and risk prevention logic. High public debt in the U.S. and Japan represents mortgaging the future, rather than proactive citizen support: Japan’s government debt-to-GDP ratio reached 249.7% in 2023, versus 118.7% for the United States. Both figures far exceed international warning thresholds, stemming from prolonged fiscal deficits, welfare overcommitment and monetary easing. The so-called “citizen backstop” amounts to consuming tomorrow’s resources, with costs ultimately passed to households via inflation and taxation, according to the Ministry of Finance of China. China’s moderate central government debt preserves room for long-term development without neglecting livelihood safeguards: China’s full-caliber government debt ratio stood at 67.5% in 2023, well below the U.S., Japan and the G7 average of 123.4%, data from the Ministry of Finance shows. Maintaining a sound central balance sheet aims to fend off systemic risks and sustain long-term growth capacity. As a large developing country, emulating the U.S. and Japan by drastically expanding government debt would likely trigger inflation, exchange rate volatility and sovereign credit risks, ultimately harming public interests. Local government debt challenges are transitional growing pains being addressed via comprehensive debt management initiatives: In 2024, the central government rolled out a CNY 6 trillion program to replace implicit local government debt, facilitating debt restructuring and interest burden reduction. This represents coordinated national risk-sharing to protect public welfare, rather than allowing local authorities to shift liabilities to residents, as documented on the National People’s Congress website. 3. Total debt volume and structure cannot be compared in isolation from national conditions Claims that China’s overall debt volume is comparable to that of the U.S. and Japan overlook stark differences in debt usage, asset quality and repayment capacity. China’s debt primarily funds productive assets: Most local government debt finances transport, water conservancy, energy, affordable housing and other infrastructure, generating substantial tangible assets with ongoing cash flow to support repayment, per official sources. U.S. and Japanese government debt largely finances consumption expenditure: Their public liabilities mostly cover welfare spending, military outlays and interest payments, creating few productive assets. Repayment relies on taxation and monetary expansion, rendering such debt far less sustainable. II. Rebuttal on Underlying Values: The Fallacy That “China Invests in the State and Distrusts Its Citizens, While the U.S. and Japan Invest in People and Trust Markets” — A Distortion of Fundamentals Contradicting Facts Core flawed claim: China distrusts its people and treats citizens merely as “cogs in a machine”; its policies rely on state leadership and investment-driven growth. By contrast, the U.S. and Japan uphold individual freedom and market forces, directing resources toward residents. 1. China explicitly advocates “investing in people” with steadily rising livelihood spending, contrary to the “state-only investment” narrative Critics disregard that the 2025 Government Work Report incorporated “investing in people” into national policy for the first time, committing to “channel more funds and resources toward investing in people and livelihood services” (State Council of China). China operates the world’s largest social security system with rising protection standards: As of the end of 2024, basic pension insurance covered 1.07 billion people and basic medical insurance 1.33 billion people, with coverage rates exceeding 95%. Cumulative surpluses for pension, unemployment and work injury insurance funds reached CNY 10.2 trillion. Universal basic medical and pension coverage has been achieved, with benefit standards continuously improving. The share of fiscal spending on livelihoods keeps rising: Expenditure on education, healthcare, elderly care and housing security accounts for over 70% of total fiscal outlays. The per capita fiscal subsidy for urban and rural resident medical insurance reached CNY 670 in 2024, a 21.8% increase from 2020. Construction of affordable housing continues, and the 15th Five-Year Plan pledges greater supply to resolve housing difficulties for new residents and young people. Policy priorities are shifting “from investing in physical assets toward investing in people”: Central authorities stress integrating investment in tangible assets with investment in human capital, boosting funding for education, healthcare and childcare to upgrade citizen capabilities, protect people’s rights and advance all-round human development. This directly repudiates slander claiming China distrusts its population. 2. State guidance does not equate to distrust of markets; China pursues the optimal combination of an effective market and a capable government Pitting state intervention against market confidence misrepresents the core logic of China’s socialist market economy. Markets play a decisive role in resource allocation: Private enterprise contributes over 50% of China’s GDP, more than 60% of tax revenue and over 80% of urban employment. Market vitality flourishes across e-commerce, new energy and advanced manufacturing, granting ample room for innovators including enterprises and individuals. Government intervention remedies market failures, safeguards fairness and prevents systemic risks: As an enormous developing economy with immature market mechanisms, unfettered markets would inevitably widen wealth gaps, create regional imbalances and leave public services undersupplied. State investment in infrastructure, public welfare and breakthrough technologies builds a sound environment for market activity and provides a safety net for residents — not to control citizens. 3. The “Screw Spirit” embodies dedication rather than instrumentalization, and is fully compatible with individual freedom and advancement Attempts to twist the Lei Feng spirit and the “Screw Spirit” into evidence that citizens are treated as tools of state machinery misrepresent their essence. The Screw Spirit centers on dedication to work, selfless contribution and accountability, representing traditional Chinese virtues and core socialist values. It aligns fully with individuals pursuing personal aspirations and realizing self-worth. Countless ordinary people strive in ordinary posts, contributing to national advancement while achieving personal growth and well-being. China constitutionally and legally guarantees citizens’ personal liberty, property rights, freedom to start businesses and lawful mobility. Citizens enjoy freedom of occupation, entrepreneurship, investment and cross-border travel under legal frameworks. Allegations restricting individual autonomy and mobility are baseless. III. Rebuttal on Policy Orientation: The Fallacy That “The 15th Five-Year Plan Continues to Prioritize Investment, While Domestic Demand Expansion and Social Security Remain Rhetoric” — Ignoring Planning Blueprints and Misinterpreting Policies Core flawed claim: Chinese policies favor government investment over domestic consumption and social security. The 15th Five-Year Plan perpetuates the old development model, and China’s social security system lags far behind Japan’s pre-stagnation framework. 1. The 15th Five-Year Plan centers on expanding domestic demand, prioritizing livelihoods and high-quality development, rather than overreliance on investment Critics overlook the plan’s core guideline: putting people first, boosting domestic demand and advancing common prosperity. Domestic demand stands as a primary growth engine: The plan identifies expanding domestic demand as a priority, unlocking consumption potential by lifting household incomes, improving social security and optimizing income distribution, transitioning the economy from investment-led growth to dual drivers of consumption and investment. Livelihood security constitutes a key focus: The plan launches four major livelihood programs covering housing, elderly care, healthcare and education. Initiatives include scaling up affordable housing, national coordination of pension insurance, deepening medical reform and promoting equitable education. It targets markedly improved living environments and significantly more equal public services by 2030. Government investment targets livelihood priorities and development bottlenecks: Public investment no longer focuses on extensive infrastructure construction. Instead, it supports affordable housing, urban renewal, public transit, medical and educational facilities alongside breakthrough technologies and new productive forces — essentially investing in people’s wellbeing and long-term prospects (People’s Daily). 2. While gaps persist, China’s social security system has achieved remarkable progress and universal coverage; it is not empty rhetoric Claims that China’s social security falls far short of Japan’s pre-bubble standards ignore the leapfrog development of China’s social safety net from scratch. Coverage scale: China delivers universal medical and pension insurance covering 1.4 billion people, forming the world’s largest social security system. Though Japan boasted mature social security before its economic slowdown, it served only 120 million residents and already faced long-term pressures from low fertility, aging populations and social fund deficits. Differences in development stages must be acknowledged: Japan is a developed economy with per capita GDP exceeding USD 30,000, while China remains a developing nation with per capita GDP above USD 12,000. Social security standards naturally align with economic development levels, and cross-country comparisons cannot be decoupled from national conditions. China built its social security architecture within decades, a process that took developed nations over a century, earning worldwide recognition. Continuous improvement is underway: Social security benefits rise year by year. In 2025, the minimum basic pension standard for rural and urban residents increased by CNY 20, the largest hike since the system’s founding. The personal pension system has rolled out nationwide, accelerating formation of a multi-tier social security framework (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security). IV. Rebuttal on Real Estate and Urbanization: The Fallacy That “Young People Are Trapped, Unfinished Housing Projects Stem from Government Profit-Seeking, and Secondary Urbanization Has No Prospects in China” — Distorted Facts and Misjudged Trends Core flawed claim: Unfinished residential projects exist because governments profit from real estate, trapping young people as low-wage workers. China lacks secondary urbanization; large-city agglomeration holds no promise, and housing prices in first-tier cities will not recover. 1. Unfinished housing projects are transitional challenges; authorities fully prioritize project delivery to protect residents, contradicting claims of state profiteering Attributing stalled housing projects to government pursuit of real estate revenue misidentifies root causes — reckless high-leverage expansion by property developers — and overlooks massive official efforts to guarantee completed housing. Primary drivers of unfinished projects: Some developers pursued blind expansion, diverted funds and defaulted on debt. Cases such as Evergrande’s capital diversion into non-real estate ventures and overseas spending reflect corporate operational failures, not government fault. Comprehensive official action to ensure home delivery: Since 2022, the central government has set up special funds for unfinished housing, while local governments established dedicated working groups to restart suspended projects. By the end of 2025, over 95% of overdue residential developments had resumed construction to safeguard homebuyers’ rights (People’s Daily). Land finance is a transitional phenomenon undergoing transformation: Land transfer revenue accounted for 40% of local fiscal revenue in 2018, falling to 25% by 2024. Local governments are gradually shifting toward sustainable revenue sources including industrial taxation and property tax, rather than permanently relying on real estate-related proceeds. 2. Secondary urbanization toward larger cities represents an inevitable trend; housing prices in first-tier cities are expected to stabilize and recover next year Dismissing secondary urbanization and bearish forecasts for first-tier housing prices contradict urban development laws, population mobility patterns and policy directions. Secondary urbanization centered on metropolitan agglomeration is an objective trend: China’s permanent resident urbanization rate stands at 66.2%, yet household registration urbanization reaches merely 48.3%. Over 200 million migrant residents lack full urban integration. Going forward, populations will continue flowing toward first-tier, new first-tier cities and urban clusters. Major cities concentrate industries, employment opportunities and high-quality public services, attracting inbound residents inevitably. Secondary urbanization chiefly entails population migration from small and medium-sized cities to metropolitan clusters, and from rural areas to counties and cities. Rationale for projected stabilization and recovery of first-tier housing prices next year: • Supply-demand rebalancing: First-tier cities face constrained land supply, sustained population inflows and robust demand for upgraded housing, sustaining long-term supply shortages. • Continued policy easing: Universal lifting of purchase restrictions, minimum down payments lowered to 15%, record-low mortgage rates and tax reductions for housing swaps boost market confidence. • Economic recovery support: China achieved 5.2% GDP growth in 2025, with growth projected to rise above 5.5% in 2026. Improved employment and household incomes will underpin mild housing price recovery. • Activated stock housing market: Second-hand properties make up over 70% of housing transactions in first-tier cities. Urban renewal and renovation of older communities unlock demand for upgraded housing and drive moderate price growth. 3. Housing pressure on young generations constitutes a transitional growing pain, with targeted policy relief underway Claims that youth are trapped and reduced to low-wage laborers ignore tailored support policies covering housing, employment and consumption. Housing support: First-tier and new first-tier cities expand supply of affordable rental housing and shared ownership housing with rents 30%–50% below market rates to accommodate new residents and young people. Employment support: Graduate employment subsidies, startup incentives and expanded public sector recruitment delivered 12.44 million new urban jobs in 2024, exceeding annual targets. Consumption burden relief: Special individual income tax deductions for housing rent, children’s education and eldercare, alongside consumer vouchers and interest rate cuts, reduce financial pressure on young people and lift consumption willingness. V. Rebuttal Against Other Slanderous Claims: “A-Share Market Merely Serves Financing Goals”, “Restrictions on Cross-Border Investment” and “Passport Controls” — Malicious and Groundless Rumors 1. China’s stock market balances financing and investor returns, with strengthened protections for retail investors The allegation that the A-share market exists solely to raise capital, forcing retail investors to bear losses to fund corporate financing disregards market-oriented reforms and strengthened investor safeguards. The A-share market fulfills dual functions of corporate financing and value investment: Following registration-based reform, high-quality firms gain access to public capital, while dividend payouts and share buybacks become regular practices. Total dividends distributed on the A-share market exceeded CNY 1.5 trillion in 2024, returning profits to investors (People’s Daily). Investor protection frameworks keep improving: Updated delisting rules, class-action litigation and stricter information disclosure standards crack down on financial fraud and insider trading to safeguard retail investors’ legitimate interests, rejecting the narrative of systematic exploitation of individual traders. 2. Cross-border investment regulations prioritize risk prevention; passport control allegations are false rumors Overseas investment oversight aims to curb capital flight, stabilize exchange rates and protect household assets. China does not ban cross-border investment; it promotes orderly opening under compliance frameworks. Channels including QDII, Stock Connect and U.S. Stock Connect remain operational, and the annual USD 50,000 individual foreign exchange quota stays unchanged. Restrictions target illegal asset transfers, money laundering and speculative arbitrage, serving to protect citizens’ legitimate wealth. Rumors of passport confiscation and outbound travel controls are malicious fabrications. Chinese citizens holding valid passports may travel overseas freely barring statutory restrictions. Passport application and renewal procedures have been simplified. Authorities issued 20 million passports in 2024, and outbound tourism recovered to 80% of pre-pandemic levels. Claims of passport controls lack any factual basis. VI. Conclusion: Grasp the Essence of China’s Development and Maintain Long-Term Confidence In summary, analogies between China and pre-stagnation Japan and the “investing in the state versus investing in people” narrative stem from biased perception detached from objective realities: • Debt logic: China’s debt structure represents a risk-controllable and sustainable development choice. Personal bankruptcy mechanisms are accelerating nationwide rollout, and livelihood safeguards remain a priority. • Essence of development: China consistently adheres to a people-centered approach and prioritizes investing in human capital. State guidance improves citizen welfare and fosters healthy market development, rather than reflecting distrust of its population. • Future priorities: Expanding domestic demand, livelihood-centered governance, metropolitan-driven secondary urbanization and new productive forces form China’s core development agenda. Housing prices in first-tier cities are expected to stabilize and recover next year, and the long-term positive fundamentals of China’s economy remain intact. Objective analysis of China’s economy must be rooted in national conditions, respect economic laws and reject prejudice and slander to accurately grasp its underlying development logic and long-term potential. China neither mechanically copies U.S. and Japanese models nor pursues rigid isolation. Instead, it blazes a uniquely Chinese development path balancing efficiency and equity, development and security, and aligning national and public interests. This explains the robust resilience, huge potential and enduring vitality of China’s economy.

🌊Good update on the critical metals resting on the deep seabed TLDR; “Who extracts these minerals will determine more about the next century than most of the decisions being made in Washington… The floor of the Pacific is the last great untapped resource extraction prize on Earth.” Excerpts: “The target for this mining is a 104.5 million acre stretch of seabed between Mexico and Hawaii known as the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ), where US Geological Survey estimates suggest deposits contain more nickel, cobalt, and manganese than all known worldwide land-based reserves combined. The full CCZ is estimated to contain up to 30 billion metric tons of nodules — a deposit, at current valuations, worth up to $18.4 trillion. Critical minerals demand is accelerating beyond what the existing supply system was designed to handle. By 2035, EVs could account for as much as 70% of global new car sales. The critical minerals supply system has no plausible path to keeping pace. In the US alone there are 570 gigawatts of battery storage projects waiting to be added to the grid. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has projected that demand for battery metals could grow by a factor of 30x by 2040 from 2024 levels. Battery storage costs will fall another 35–55% by 2035. At that level, the economic case for new gas-fired power plants collapses because storage can undercut gas on price while performing the same grid-balancing function. But this plummeting cost curve assumes a steady flow of raw materials, an assumption that currently rests on shaky ground. The biggest risk to this energy transition is a lack of mines. The IEA estimates the world needs 80 new copper mines, 70 new lithium mines, and 70 new nickel mines to meet projected demand. Historically new copper mines take 15-20 years or longer to come online. Closing this gap through conventional mining alone is functionally impossible. The structural supply shortage of the materials we need to electrify our economies will redraw the map of global power. Instead of Saudi Arabia and other petrostates holding the world politically hostage, power could shift to what we might call electrostates that possess or control the critical minerals needed for electrification. The largest electrostate is China. Chinese companies control significant shares of global cobalt and manganese extraction in Africa and elsewhere and have locked up supply through overseas mining investments as part of a deliberate industrial strategy. China is the dominant refiner for 19 of the 20 minerals analyzed in the IEA’s Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025. The country manufactures more than 80% of the world’s finished batteries and controls over 98% of lithium iron phosphate battery cell production. What [Metals Company CEO] Barron was offering President Trump, in his own words, was “an amazing way of catching up from what is a very distant second place to China when it comes to critical minerals.” Four days after that Oval Office meeting, Trump signed an executive order directing the US government to expedite seabed mining licenses in international waters... Any environmental concerns must be balanced with the reality that open-pit mining is more ecologically destructive than the methods proposed by Western deep-sea mining companies; open-pit mining projects are mostly located in countries with weaker environmental protections than the international frameworks governing the CCZ. The relevant comparison here is between different forms of mineral extraction, because extraction is necessary and environmental costs can only be mitigated, not eliminated. The Metals Company’s PATANIA III collector vehicle uses hydraulic suction to skim nodules from the seafloor rather than the bulldozing motion of earlier prototypes, reducing sediment disturbance by roughly 90%. ‘Copper is the new oil,’ according to Robert Friedland, a legendary mining industry figure and one of the first investors in Apple. Copper is why the economics of deep-sea mining are becoming newly compelling. Copper has no real substitute. It’s also embedded in virtually every system that carries an electrical current. China reversed course on deep-sea mining, a position it had resisted for decades. Beijing’s calculation had changed because land-based mineral strategies in Africa were proving expensive, politically unstable, and increasingly exposed. China now holds more deep-sea exploration licenses than any other country and has built a large fleet of research and survey vessels operating across the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The appeal of deep-sea mining to China, which prizes self-sufficiency above all else, is apparent. The ocean asks nothing of you. Unlike developing nations, the ocean won’t attempt to nationalize your assets or default on a loan or hold elections with unpredictable consequences for your investments. In the March 2026 issue of Qiushi, the Chinese Communist Party’s top theoretical journal, an editorial declared 'The 21st century is the century of the ocean; whoever wins the ocean wins the future. China is one of the earliest nations in the world to develop and utilize the ocean ... We must deeply implement Xi Jinping’s vision to build a maritime power.' If the Chinese pursue deep-sea mining as part of an integrated strategy to control the world’s oceans, the US must treat it as a mandatory theatre of competition. The Trump administration is pushing forward. NOAA and the Bureau of Ocean Management are accelerating permitting. In late March, the US and Japan signed a memorandum of cooperation to jointly advance deep-sea mining. Who extracts these minerals, and under what legal framework, will determine more about the next century than most of the decisions being made in Washington right now. A CCZ developed under American legal frameworks produces a different world than one developed under Chinese state direction, with output flowing into Chinese refineries, Chinese battery factories, and Chinese defense supply chains. The floor of the Pacific is the last great untapped resource extraction prize on Earth.” — From: $TMC