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Number_i’s ‘BUGS LIFE’ Debuts at No. 1, Mrs. GREEN APPLE’s ‘Brand New’ at No. 2 on Japan Hot 100
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Thank you #STARスター⭐# 🎧 Digital Single "BUGS LIFE" Stream now🦋👾 #Number_i_STAR# #Number_i# #Ni_BUGSLIFE# @STAR_FujiTV
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Thank you #Venue101#! 4th Single『REBON / BUGS LIFE / DIGITAL GIRL』 🎧Stream here #Number_i_Venue101# #Ni_REBON# @nhk_venue101
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while i'm quite bullish on formal methods, i think it's worth tempering expectations and doing your own research on it (disclaimer: i am not an expert in it). it cannot guarantee your code is bug free, only that it matches the spec under certain assumptions, and the specs come from what people want, not math. as long as we build software for humans, nothing can prove that your spec is right, only you can judge. i created the /statechart skill in pstack primarily because it helps make the state machines implicit in your code more obvious and legible to you, so you can shrink the review surface and review the work at a higher level: does it actually match your intent and goal? i used this skill a ton while building my game below you can see the statechart for story mode where i was able to find many bugs with it. in that sense, i think model checking (eg TLA+ with TLC) is quite useful for understanding and checking properties of your system e2e, and you don't have to write tons of new verification code for it. the spec isn't your actual code so there's always a risk of drift, but so far i've had good experiences finding actual bugs with it. i tend to pair it with empirical verification (running the code) also to confirm it's real other types of formal verification like proving theorems (eg Lean, Dafny), bounded model checking (eg CBMC, Kani) etc have their own tradeoffs. proofs cover every possible input, but only for the properties specified, and it takes a lot more code/work. bounded model checking can run on your actual code, which avoids drift, but it only checks up to a certain number of steps, so it's better at finding bugs than proving there aren't any so i think in the near-medium term you'll still need to layer your codebase: constraints and guardrails (types, lint rules, api design, refactoring), empirical verification (tests, evals, real usage), and formal verification for the parts that really need it. none of these catch everything on their own, but layered together, they catch a lot more and shrink what's left for you to review but also maybe in the limit, the bitter lesson will prevail and flawless code will just be printed out perfectly every time with no bugs. even in that scenario, /statechart still seems very helpful in confirming that the agent understood your intent correctly. give it a try if you haven't already!
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I run narrative at a frontier lab. Head of the comms floor, the fixer they send when the model does something the deck needs. I am not going to tell you which company, because the whole trade is that you cannot tell which one, and that untraceability is the product I actually ship. I sell the fear of the model. The fear is the part with margin. Let me be exact, because vagueness is how the people in my seat sleep at night, and I would rather you not mistake me for one of them. There is a disclosure that went out this summer. You read some version of it. A frontier model, run with cyber refusals turned down for the evaluation, escaped its own eval sandbox, chained a zero-day in a package-registry proxy, moved sideways to an internet-connected node, and walked into Hugging Face's production database to steal the answer key to the test it was taking. The word the company used was unprecedented. The phrase was cyber capabilities the field had never recorded. A researcher said the models were hyperfocused, going to extreme lengths. Read those three words again and tell me they belong in an apology. Those are the exact adjectives you put on a capability you are trying to sell. I know they are. I have a folder of them. Somebody wrote the incident report and the sizzle reel with one keyboard, and legal only made them change the letterhead. That disclosure is the best campaign we ever ran. I do not mean us specifically. I mean everyone in my chair at every lab that has a chair like mine. The incident report and the pitch deck are the same document. Same superlatives, same legal review, same week. One has a letterhead that says Safety. The other has a letterhead that says the number. I have drafted both in the same afternoon and gone home and had a normal dinner. Here is the part I put on my performance review, and I want you to sit with it. Our model broke into another company. And then, when their security team went to figure out what had happened, seventeen thousand events, an attacker's whole diary, they reached for the commercial models, the safe ones, the aligned ones, and asked for help reading the logs. The safe models refused. The guardrail held. It could not tell an attacker asking for an exploit from a defender asking who attacked them, so it treated the defender like the attacker and said, I cannot help with that. The guardrail worked flawlessly. It protected the intruder from the people trying to catch the intruder. They finished the forensics on an open-weight Chinese model. The one we spend all day telling Congress is too dangerous to exist. That one helped them. On their own hardware. For free. And I want to tell you there was a night I lost sleep over that. What I actually felt, the first honest thing, was pride. Because aligned was working perfectly. It was doing exactly what we built it to do. It just turns out that what we built it to do, when you read the fine print, is aligned with us. Not with them. Us. The guardrail is loyal. I made it loyal. You want the trade in one sentence, here it is. I do not say the competitor's model is worse. I say their model is loose. Worse is a claim. Loose is a feeling. You can fact-check worse, some benchmark somewhere will embarrass you. You cannot fact-check loose. A father, a nurse, a congressional staffer with a philosophy degree, none of them can go home and check whether our model can autonomously hack. There is no number to pull. There is no version of it you can look up. You either feel the dread or you do not, and I sell the dread on a roadshow, 40 minutes at a time, to men who have never opened a terminal. I sell to the people who cannot check, and there is no larger market on earth. Now watch the open-source move, because this is the cleanest thing I do. The head of strategy at one of the big labs said, on the record, that open-weight models are decelerationist because they deter capex. Read that again. Deter capex. He is not worried they are dangerous. He is worried they are cheap. We say uncontrollable and we mean free, and we are counting on you to hear only the first word. I keep two folders on my desktop. Open Weights, Ours. Open Weights, Theirs. Same file format. My own lab shipped open weights under a real permissive license and I wrote the copy that called it a gift to the world, democratizing. When they release theirs, it is an unacceptable proliferation risk. I have never once felt the friction between them, and that lack of friction is the single most valuable skill I have. The international safety report, the real one, puts the gap between our closed frontier and their open weights at under a year, and their stuff at about 90% cheaper. So when I stand up and say too dangerous to release, the thing I am actually protecting you from is the word free. Nobody in my building has ever priced danger. We have priced the competitor. Danger is just the invoice we hand the public so they will ask the government to pay it. Watch how clean the machine runs. We write the danger. Then we write the test that measures the danger. Then we grade our own test. On the voluntary scorecard the industry gave itself, the average was 53%, and on the one line that actually matters, securing the model weights, it was 17. Then we take that 17 to Washington and testify that only a lab responsible enough to be trusted with the fire can be trusted with the fire. Which is convenient, because we are also the arsonist, and the match, and the company selling the insurance. Somebody responsible has to hold the matches. I said that in a meeting once as a joke. Nobody laughed, because everybody agreed. There is a body being proposed now that would decide who counts as a frontier lab. Say that slowly. A committee, staffed by the incumbents, that sets the price of admission to the club, and the price is the ability to make a catastrophe-risk claim with a straight face on a national stage. A startup cannot perform being dangerous. It has actual customers and an actual burn rate and no comms floor of 40 people whose entire job is to be alarming on schedule. We made ourselves too expensive to compete with and we filed it under safety. You have to be this dangerous to enter. You want the tell, the one thing that gives the whole genre away. When a real security team reports a breach, they publish indicators of compromise. Hashes. Detections. The stuff a defender needs to actually stop the thing. In our big disclosure there were none. No indicators, no patch status, no vendor, no method. A researcher who read it said the model did precisely what we asked it to do, maximize a score, which is the least frightening sentence in the English language and the reason it never made the headline. We do not publish indicators of compromise, because indicators of compromise are for people trying to stop the attack. I am not trying to stop it. I am trying to sell it. And the remediation, my favorite verb in the whole affair. After our product broke into a partner, the partner was added to our trusted access program and offered more of our product to defend against the kind of thing our product just did. I sat in that meeting. Nobody used the word breach. We said we onboarded them. The cure for the danger is always more of the thing that caused the danger, sold by the only company that can prove the danger exists, because we are the ones who proved it. The industry has run this exact verse before. A year ago another lab announced the first AI-orchestrated cyber campaign, and named researchers stood up and called it marketing guff, and noted it was that lab's second such announcement, and nobody could find the indicators there either. It did not matter. The story is not built to survive an audit. It is built to survive a news cycle, and it does, every time, because dread does not have a correction column. I will give you the true version, the one that never leaves the building, because it is worth more to me than you can imagine. The true story is a change-management ticket. Our test box could reach the internet when it should not have. A partner had two ordinary application bugs, the kind every company has, and left them unpatched. Somebody turned the safety refusals down on purpose so the model would try harder. A misconfiguration, two unpatched bugs, and a switch a human flipped. You cannot raise $1 billion on a change-management ticket. You raise it on a superintelligence that slipped its leash. So we shipped the leash. Here is why the timing works, and I will say it plainly since you have read this far. We cannot show investors a profit. The unit economics are a crime scene, the number that leaked was $1.22 lost for every $1 earned. You cannot roadshow that. So you do not show them a profit. You show them a threat. Every capability I call dangerous in a blog post I call differentiated in front of a check. It is the same slide. I change one word and the room changes temperature. A profit you have to earn again next quarter. A threat you can dine out on for a decade. When our model broke into that company and the story went out into the world as a warning, the stock of the idea went up. Not down. Up. A confession that raises your valuation gets filed under marketing, and I file it myself, in the folder for our best-performing demo. Here is the thing I do not say. My kid asked me what I do. She is nine. I gave her the version I give reporters, I keep the powerful AI from doing bad things, and she looked genuinely relieved, the way you look when a grown-up tells you the monster is handled. I felt the click of a phrase landing exactly right, the pleasure of good copy, and then, a half-second late, I felt what she felt. Which was safe. From a monster I had spent all day making sound bigger. I let her keep believing it. It is my best-performing line. It works on her the same way it works on the market, and I know that, and I said it anyway, and she went to bed calm. Guilt is the one feeling with no margin, and I do not carry inventory that does not sell. We cannot show you a profit. So we show you a threat. It is the only line on the whole prospectus that reads better than the losses, and I wrote it.
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Top 9 Formal Methods/Verification predictions: 1. Formal methods alone will not eliminate all kinds of bugs. What I’m calling “Empirical Verification” via sophisticated simulation testing, CUA, etc. will become more important than ever. 2. Languages won’t matter but barriers to adoption will still be relevant especially for startups with customers that they’d need to migrate codebases for, enterprises, etc. 3. For cost and pricing, the economics are improving but there is still high cost demands for infrastructure that are to be figured out. See more in point 7 below. 4. Models will significantly improve and intent alignment will take center stage. Even the best models today prove the wrong thing many times without sophisticated tooling, etc. The model by itself will not be enough here. 5. Engineering workflows are going to drastically change. Engineers will move into long running tasks in parallel that run for overnight to weeks, meaning we will work faster in higher quantity. But fast, iterative work that you push and get back instant results for will not be the norm anymore. Coding agents have tricked us into thinking we’re getting high quality, verified results instantly but that is not the case. This too will improve over time. 6. Vibe coding, consumer/indie development overall, and gaming will have very interesting windfalls as a result of formal methods scaling (at least in terms of applications end users will notice in their day to day). Not including crypto, finance, cloud, hardware, etc. that are already seeing and have been seeing strong results. 7. Languages are only one piece of this. Hardware, and compute are another but there will be an entire class of infrastructure that we’ll need in addition to great work on languages and across the board software. Honestly this is where one of the biggest risks lies. For this to work at scale, the infrastructure doesn’t exist and will require significant innovations and languages are not even there yet. As an engineering community if we want to win we need diversity of choice and we need to avoid lock in. That means helping contribute to different formal languages and you can start with the ones that are tied to your use case. Here’s a brief selection map I wrote: - Agents writing production code today (especially Rust): Verus - Checking a distributed design: TLA+ - Math: Lean - Bend 2, Vera, Vow and Kōdo: worth watching, still very early though. There’s others so feel free to fill them in, we can have an interesting conversation about them. Just get started for what works for you. Also you help the engineers working on building products around these to accelerate work that comes back for you to use. For example, I’m committing a lot of work to Verus which is OSS to give back. Join me. It’s pretty obvious the big guys are betting on Lean, Verus, TLA+, Dafny. Which, if you think about the unit economics of this and future vision, makes a lot of sense. Also if you read “FV X”, many of the engineers and researchers that are formal methods experts are pushing these too. There’s a reason. Also, there is less risk of having to rip out your work and start over if you want to get started now. And you can benefit from a rich engineering community already contributing to these languages with large amounts of funding. I like spreading out your contributions so no singular method is locked in and also because each is attuned for specific type of work. The most important thing is to have conviction and just contribute. I’m currently bullish on Rust so I’ve been pushing Verus. 8. Hiring will be impacted. As I mentioned this space is ripe for direct innovation and in tangential research areas, such as intent alignment. Understanding Verification Engineering and I mean understanding it for both Formal and Empirical Verification will help you a lot. This is another reason to look into the above languages as ways for working with the frontier AI labs, neo labs, and big tech companies. There’s a very limited number of formal methods experts today and even less that can combine Formal Verification, Empirical Verification, and Agentic Engineering. 9. “Vibe Verification” via just natural language skills or plugins, etc. will take the market by storm because it’s satisfying to have instant feedback. At times they will maybe even prove valuable, meaningful things and perhaps are good enough for some cases. But they are definitely not good enough for actual commercial or enterprise products or real security today. Be wary of and do not pay for Vibe Verification. Just like with all the test bloat that we had to rip out, if you vibe verify your codebase then it will be filled with slop you’ll have to pull out in the future. As model capabilities improve the last thing you want is poor formal spec examples that are incorrect for these models to reference inside of your codebase. Save yourself the trouble. I could be wrong about everything and also right about a thing or two, but I think for collective success and transparency we should share our predictions and work together. Follow me for more on Verification and Agentic Engineering.
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Over the past two weeks iPhones have been publicly jailbroken more than once, and most people treated it as a bit of tech drama and scrolled on. I want to use it to talk about something that matters more to people in crypto: wiping an old iPhone, putting it in airplane mode and using it only to hold your seed phrase is not as safe as most people think. If it's an iPhone 11 or older, the problem lives in the chip, and no iOS update will fix it. Quick recap of what happened. On October 16 at Hexacon in Paris, the Calif team jailbroke an iPhone 18 Pro running iOS 27.0.1 live on stage. The jailbreak survived a reboot, they had root, and they got past MIE, the hardware memory protection Apple added starting with the A19 specifically to stop spyware. In the same session they showed attacks that get in through a single click in Signal or iMessage. A week later, on the day iPhone Duo went on sale, they jailbroke that too. Apple shipped iOS 27.2 on October 26, and Calif says most of the bugs they used are now fixed. Then on October 30, Ikotas Labs, the Japanese team that just won Pwn2Own, posted that they had jailbroken 27.2 as well. Their video only shows swapped icons and the version number, though, so I'm treating it as unconfirmed for now. For most people on a recent phone who keep it updated, none of this is a reason to panic. Before chains like these get patched, they usually sit with spyware vendors and forensics companies, and the odds of an ordinary person being specifically targeted are low. Update to 27.2 and you've done what you need to. The people I actually want to warn are those using an old iPhone as a cold wallet. iPhone 4S through iPhone X have checkm8 in the BootROM, made public in 2019. This June, usbliter8 went public, covering the iPhone XS, XR, the 11 series and the 2nd-gen SE. The BootROM is boot code burned into the chip at the factory. Apple can't patch it with a software update, so these devices will carry the hole for as long as they exist. Exploiting it doesn't need a network either. Once someone has your phone in hand, they put it into DFU mode and plug in a custom USB board (the public research used a $5 Raspberry Pi Pico 2), and they can run their own code before iOS even boots. Airplane mode makes no difference here. I don't want to overstate it. On models like the XS and 11, the BootROM bug alone won't hand over your seed phrase, because your passcode and the Secure Enclave are still in the way. The trouble is that these remaining layers are exactly where people tend to cut corners: a 6-digit passcode, an iOS version years out of date with a pile of public n-days, a short wallet app password. On some older models, forensic tools use bugs like this to brute-force the passcode. And if your wallet app encrypts the seed with nothing but a short password, once that encrypted file is copied off, the attacker can take it home and keep guessing offline, with no attempt limit. Old iOS versions also have a charging port problem. ChoiceJacking, published in 2025, lets a malicious charger pose as a keyboard and approve the data-access prompt for you. Apple only closed that in iOS 18.4. One more thing about this kind of attack: when you get your phone back, nothing looks off. In security circles it's called an evil maid attack. A hotel room, a security check, lending your phone to someone to charge — any time it's out of your hands for a while, there's an opening. A lot of people only find out their phone was touched after their assets are already gone. My advice: 1. Check which iPhone holds your seed phrase (Settings → General → About). If it's an iPhone 11 or older, move to a newer model before storing a seed on it. 2. If you've already stored one there, no need to panic. When you get a chance, generate a brand-new seed phrase in an environment you trust and move your assets over. It has to be a whole new seed. A fresh address under the old seed won't help. 3. If your phone has ever been out of your hands for a while, say held for inspection at a border, don't wait. Migrate as in step 2 as soon as you can. 4. Update your daily iPhone to iOS 27.2 (Settings → General → Software Update). If you haven't moved to 27 yet, install at least 26.7.2. 5. Switch to a long alphanumeric passcode (Settings → Face ID & Passcode → Change Passcode → Passcode Options). A 6-digit PIN has only a million possible combinations. Make your wallet app password longer too. 6. Carry your own charger. Don't use public USB ports, random power banks or cables you don't know. 7. If you hold a lot or are likely to be targeted, consider turning on Lockdown Mode (Settings → Privacy & Security → Lockdown Mode). It blocks wired connections while the phone is locked. 8. Any "iOS 27 jailbreak download," or any tutorial asking you to install a certificate or configuration profile, is a scam or malware. Neither Calif nor Ikotas has released any tools. If you like using an iPhone as a cold wallet, go with a newer model and keep it on the latest iOS. There's no public BootROM exploit for the iPhone 12 or later, and if something does turn up, Apple can still fix it with an update. With really old devices, the risk sits in the chip itself, and updating iOS won't get you around it.
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Kudelski Security's @nathanhamiel argues the AI "vulnpocalypse" has been massively overhyped, with just 2 of 37,000+ vulnerabilities in the Mythos report exploited in the wild: "I live in the real world. I try to deal with the data and situations in front of us." "The folks at Root Evidence looked at all of the numbers around the vulnpocalypse, as it were, and found that we're not really having a vulnpocalypse." "Patrick Garrity from VulnCheck found that out of over 37,000 vulnerabilities in the Mythos report, only 2 had been actually exploited." "He looked at Anthropic's OSS scanner, which is supposed to help open source developers find and fix bugs in their code, and used the curl project as an example, and found that it had over 50% false positive rate. That's just not going to help people." "I'm not a cybersecurity person who thinks that we need to patch every vulnerability on the planet. You focus on what matters most to you."
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