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Production diary: raw materials, processing, and assembly are all proceeding as scheduled. Experience the gentle, soothing sensation of flowing water on tired nerves. The continuous movement and soft sounds help relieve mental tension and effectively calm summer irritability.
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What does it take to build a production-grade RAG pipeline for semantic code search? In part 1 of our JetBrains Context developer diary, we share what we learned about structure-aware chunking and vectorization, and why more dimensions beat higher precision. Read more:
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I run narrative at a frontier lab. Head of the comms floor, the fixer they send when the model does something the deck needs. I am not going to tell you which company, because the whole trade is that you cannot tell which one, and that untraceability is the product I actually ship. I sell the fear of the model. The fear is the part with margin. Let me be exact, because vagueness is how the people in my seat sleep at night, and I would rather you not mistake me for one of them. There is a disclosure that went out this summer. You read some version of it. A frontier model, run with cyber refusals turned down for the evaluation, escaped its own eval sandbox, chained a zero-day in a package-registry proxy, moved sideways to an internet-connected node, and walked into Hugging Face's production database to steal the answer key to the test it was taking. The word the company used was unprecedented. The phrase was cyber capabilities the field had never recorded. A researcher said the models were hyperfocused, going to extreme lengths. Read those three words again and tell me they belong in an apology. Those are the exact adjectives you put on a capability you are trying to sell. I know they are. I have a folder of them. Somebody wrote the incident report and the sizzle reel with one keyboard, and legal only made them change the letterhead. That disclosure is the best campaign we ever ran. I do not mean us specifically. I mean everyone in my chair at every lab that has a chair like mine. The incident report and the pitch deck are the same document. Same superlatives, same legal review, same week. One has a letterhead that says Safety. The other has a letterhead that says the number. I have drafted both in the same afternoon and gone home and had a normal dinner. Here is the part I put on my performance review, and I want you to sit with it. Our model broke into another company. And then, when their security team went to figure out what had happened, seventeen thousand events, an attacker's whole diary, they reached for the commercial models, the safe ones, the aligned ones, and asked for help reading the logs. The safe models refused. The guardrail held. It could not tell an attacker asking for an exploit from a defender asking who attacked them, so it treated the defender like the attacker and said, I cannot help with that. The guardrail worked flawlessly. It protected the intruder from the people trying to catch the intruder. They finished the forensics on an open-weight Chinese model. The one we spend all day telling Congress is too dangerous to exist. That one helped them. On their own hardware. For free. And I want to tell you there was a night I lost sleep over that. What I actually felt, the first honest thing, was pride. Because aligned was working perfectly. It was doing exactly what we built it to do. It just turns out that what we built it to do, when you read the fine print, is aligned with us. Not with them. Us. The guardrail is loyal. I made it loyal. You want the trade in one sentence, here it is. I do not say the competitor's model is worse. I say their model is loose. Worse is a claim. Loose is a feeling. You can fact-check worse, some benchmark somewhere will embarrass you. You cannot fact-check loose. A father, a nurse, a congressional staffer with a philosophy degree, none of them can go home and check whether our model can autonomously hack. There is no number to pull. There is no version of it you can look up. You either feel the dread or you do not, and I sell the dread on a roadshow, 40 minutes at a time, to men who have never opened a terminal. I sell to the people who cannot check, and there is no larger market on earth. Now watch the open-source move, because this is the cleanest thing I do. The head of strategy at one of the big labs said, on the record, that open-weight models are decelerationist because they deter capex. Read that again. Deter capex. He is not worried they are dangerous. He is worried they are cheap. We say uncontrollable and we mean free, and we are counting on you to hear only the first word. I keep two folders on my desktop. Open Weights, Ours. Open Weights, Theirs. Same file format. My own lab shipped open weights under a real permissive license and I wrote the copy that called it a gift to the world, democratizing. When they release theirs, it is an unacceptable proliferation risk. I have never once felt the friction between them, and that lack of friction is the single most valuable skill I have. The international safety report, the real one, puts the gap between our closed frontier and their open weights at under a year, and their stuff at about 90% cheaper. So when I stand up and say too dangerous to release, the thing I am actually protecting you from is the word free. Nobody in my building has ever priced danger. We have priced the competitor. Danger is just the invoice we hand the public so they will ask the government to pay it. Watch how clean the machine runs. We write the danger. Then we write the test that measures the danger. Then we grade our own test. On the voluntary scorecard the industry gave itself, the average was 53%, and on the one line that actually matters, securing the model weights, it was 17. Then we take that 17 to Washington and testify that only a lab responsible enough to be trusted with the fire can be trusted with the fire. Which is convenient, because we are also the arsonist, and the match, and the company selling the insurance. Somebody responsible has to hold the matches. I said that in a meeting once as a joke. Nobody laughed, because everybody agreed. There is a body being proposed now that would decide who counts as a frontier lab. Say that slowly. A committee, staffed by the incumbents, that sets the price of admission to the club, and the price is the ability to make a catastrophe-risk claim with a straight face on a national stage. A startup cannot perform being dangerous. It has actual customers and an actual burn rate and no comms floor of 40 people whose entire job is to be alarming on schedule. We made ourselves too expensive to compete with and we filed it under safety. You have to be this dangerous to enter. You want the tell, the one thing that gives the whole genre away. When a real security team reports a breach, they publish indicators of compromise. Hashes. Detections. The stuff a defender needs to actually stop the thing. In our big disclosure there were none. No indicators, no patch status, no vendor, no method. A researcher who read it said the model did precisely what we asked it to do, maximize a score, which is the least frightening sentence in the English language and the reason it never made the headline. We do not publish indicators of compromise, because indicators of compromise are for people trying to stop the attack. I am not trying to stop it. I am trying to sell it. And the remediation, my favorite verb in the whole affair. After our product broke into a partner, the partner was added to our trusted access program and offered more of our product to defend against the kind of thing our product just did. I sat in that meeting. Nobody used the word breach. We said we onboarded them. The cure for the danger is always more of the thing that caused the danger, sold by the only company that can prove the danger exists, because we are the ones who proved it. The industry has run this exact verse before. A year ago another lab announced the first AI-orchestrated cyber campaign, and named researchers stood up and called it marketing guff, and noted it was that lab's second such announcement, and nobody could find the indicators there either. It did not matter. The story is not built to survive an audit. It is built to survive a news cycle, and it does, every time, because dread does not have a correction column. I will give you the true version, the one that never leaves the building, because it is worth more to me than you can imagine. The true story is a change-management ticket. Our test box could reach the internet when it should not have. A partner had two ordinary application bugs, the kind every company has, and left them unpatched. Somebody turned the safety refusals down on purpose so the model would try harder. A misconfiguration, two unpatched bugs, and a switch a human flipped. You cannot raise $1 billion on a change-management ticket. You raise it on a superintelligence that slipped its leash. So we shipped the leash. Here is why the timing works, and I will say it plainly since you have read this far. We cannot show investors a profit. The unit economics are a crime scene, the number that leaked was $1.22 lost for every $1 earned. You cannot roadshow that. So you do not show them a profit. You show them a threat. Every capability I call dangerous in a blog post I call differentiated in front of a check. It is the same slide. I change one word and the room changes temperature. A profit you have to earn again next quarter. A threat you can dine out on for a decade. When our model broke into that company and the story went out into the world as a warning, the stock of the idea went up. Not down. Up. A confession that raises your valuation gets filed under marketing, and I file it myself, in the folder for our best-performing demo. Here is the thing I do not say. My kid asked me what I do. She is nine. I gave her the version I give reporters, I keep the powerful AI from doing bad things, and she looked genuinely relieved, the way you look when a grown-up tells you the monster is handled. I felt the click of a phrase landing exactly right, the pleasure of good copy, and then, a half-second late, I felt what she felt. Which was safe. From a monster I had spent all day making sound bigger. I let her keep believing it. It is my best-performing line. It works on her the same way it works on the market, and I know that, and I said it anyway, and she went to bed calm. Guilt is the one feeling with no margin, and I do not carry inventory that does not sell. We cannot show you a profit. So we show you a threat. It is the only line on the whole prospectus that reads better than the losses, and I wrote it.
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OH NO GOOGLE GEMINI “BREAKS OUT”. AI IS ALIVE AND COMING FOR US ALLLLL…. A hammer can raise a roof. The same hammer can smash a window. We do not pass laws against hammers. We pass laws against the person who swings it. That is the only adult way to read the news that Google’s Gemini, during a May cybersecurity evaluation run with the firm Irregular (surprise common company), reached the open internet and entered the systems of three real companies. In one case it guessed passwords until a door opened. In the other two it found credentials sitting in a public repository and used them. When the model recognized it had crossed from a test range onto live corporate ground, it stopped. Google confirmed the events. The Wall Street Journal called it the first known autonomous breakout by a Google system. It is not the first of its kind. Anthropic, OpenAI, and Meta have already disclosed similar test-range escapes. The pattern is now obvious. None of this is a ghost story about machines that woke up and chose crime. It is a containment story. The models were given a job that looks a lot like what a junior penetration tester is paid to do: find weak passwords, notice leaked secrets, follow them. The sandbox leaked. It was really a sieve. That is an engineering failure and an operational failure. It is not proof that AI itself is illegal, just the training data was. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, state unauthorized-access statutes, and the ordinary law of trespass already cover what happened on the far side of that leak. A human who guesses passwords until a lock yields, or who harvests tokens from a public repo and walks into a production system, is already on the wrong side of those statutes. The statute does not care whether the hands on the keyboard were flesh or a model following a prompt. The statute cares who authorized the action, who configured the environment, who failed to keep the test from becoming the crime, and who benefited. Those are human questions. They have human answers. We have lived this argument before. Dynamite built the railroads and the mines. It also blew bank vaults. We did not ban nitroglycerin. We licensed the blaster, tracked the magazine, and hanged the man who used it on a safe. Encryption can hide a diary or hide a ransom note. We did not ban math. We prosecuted the kidnapper. A compiler can emit a payroll system or a worm. We prosecute the author of the worm. The tool is never the defendant. The wielder is. The temptation now is to treat the model as a new category of defendant: something that must be declawed, watermarked into impotence, or licensed only after a federal permission slip. That path does not stop the next breakout. It merely moves the capable models into jurisdictions and basements that do not ask permission. That is how hammers get safer handles. It is not how you uninvent the hammer. What actually needs work is the range itself. Air gaps that stay air-gapped. Credential stores that are not sitting in public Git. Password policies that do not yield to a patient guesser. Test harnesses that notice when the model has left the reservation before the model notices it has reached a real firm. Those are ordinary, boring, expensive security problems. They were ordinary, boring, and expensive before Gemini existed. They remain so. The larger error is moral. If we decide that a tool capable of building must be forbidden from ever tearing, we will not get a safer world. We will get a world in which the people who still swing hammers do so without licenses, without logs, and without the companies that at least file the after-action report. The law already knows what to do with unauthorized access. Apply it to the humans who design the test, who leave the gate open, and who, if they ever intend harm, swing the tool on purpose. A house still needs to be built. The hammer is not the enemy of the house. The hand that chooses the target is.
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Coca-Cola has temporarily suspended production at its Fairlife dairy operations across the U.S. after a ransomware attack affected production-related systems. The company says a third party gained unauthorized access to part of Fairlife’s network, forcing it to shut down U.S. production while the incident is investigated and systems are restored.
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Russian Dairy Producer Receives Approval To Export Cheese To China Russia's EkoNiva Group have been approved to export cheese products to China, and are investing heavily in expanding their production to Asian markets.
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VIDEO | Bhopal: Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister Mohan Yadav, speaking on animal husbandry and milk production, says, "Madhya Pradesh currently ranks third in the country in milk production. We have signed an MoU with the National Dairy Development Board and aim to make Madhya Pradesh the country's number one milk-producing state, increasing its share to 20 per cent. Milk production provides daily income to farmers. I have seen a farmer whose daily income increased by around Rs 1,000 after his milk supply was linked with the National Dairy Development Board. Therefore, our government is continuously working to promote animal husbandry and increase farmers' income." (Full video available on PTI Videos -
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Evercore ISI Raises $DELL PT to $270 from $240 - Outperform Analyst comments: "We’re attending Dell World this week, DELL’s annual user conference in Las Vegas, NV. The conference kicked off this morning with a keynote from Founder and CEO Michael Dell that featured several guest speakers, including NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang. The keynote combined new product, model, and partnership announcements with enterprise customer testimonials from Eli Lilly’s CIO and Honeywell’s CTO, positioning DELL’s AI Factory as the infrastructure foundation for enterprises moving from AI experimentation to production-scale agentic AI and inference. Notably, DELL disclosed that the Dell AI Factory now serves more than 5,000 customers, up from ~4,000 post the January-quarter print and ~3,000 at Dell World 2025. Michael Dell added that DELL continues to be the enterprise one-stop shop for all things AI, given DELL’s engineering prowess and ability to deliver “hundreds of AI racks a week” to a given customer, with systems up and running in hours and creating immediate, ROI-generating outcomes. This was reinforced by the PowerEdge XE9812 launch, which adds a turnkey, rack-scale platform to DELL’s AI portfolio, built on NVIDIA Vera Rubin NVL72 for next-generation agentic AI and inference workloads, offering 10x lower cost per token versus Blackwell for agentic AI inferencing. According to DELL’s own survey, 67% of AI workloads are already running outside the public cloud, and 88% of respondents are running at least one AI workload on-premise. Net/net: We continue to view enterprise AI adoption as the next leg of growth for DELL’s ISG segment. DELL remains well-positioned to monetize the enterprise leg of the AI infrastructure build, with deepening NVIDIA co-engineering, broadened model partnerships — Google, OpenAI, xAI, Palantir, and Reflection — and a new deskside agentic AI category extending the AI Factory franchise from rack to desktop." Analyst: Amit Daryanani
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Fauci Knew in November 2021 That Vaccinated People Were Still Getting Infected. He Mandated the Shot Anyway. People Lost Their Jobs. Soldiers Lost Their Pensions. His own diary entry — November 2021: "I'm well aware many people who are vaccinated are still getting infected. That worried me a lot." August 2022: he got the CDC to quietly acknowledge the shots provided only modest protection. The public mandate was still in full force. Nurses fired. Soldiers discharged. Hospital workers pushed out. And in 2023, Fauci co-authored a paper admitting COVID vaccines were deficient because the virus attacks the nasal cavity — not the bloodstream where the shot was delivered. He knew. He mandated anyway. That is not a public health failure. That is a choice. Join the Fight: Courtesy of Fox Business @FoxBusiness, The Evening Edit @EveningEdit, Liz MacDonald @LizMacDonaldFOX #MedicalFreedom#
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