#PeckShieldAlert# @KyberNetwork Exploiter has laundered 2,900 $ETH ($6.8M) to #Tornadocash# KyberSwap fell victim to a reentrancy attack on November 23, 2023, which resulted in a loss of ~$47M.

The Drift Protocol exploiter who stole $285M has deposited 23,095 $ETH ($44.4M) into #TornadoCash# today. The exploiter still holds 107,165 $ETH ($201M).

#PeckShieldAlert# The @trustedvolumes exploiter has laundered $278K in stolen funds so far: they deposited 10.2 $ETH ($23.6K) to #TornadoCash# and laundered 110 $ETH ($250K) via #THORChain# to #BTC#; they also attempted to deposit 0.5 $ETH to #Railgun# but changed their mind and sent it back. TrustedVolumes was exploited for ~$6.7M on May 7th

It appears the @VerusCoin Ethereum bridge was exploited for $7.55M. The exploiter swapped all the stolen funds for 3,916 $ETH($7.52M) and deposited them into #TornadoCash# for laundering.

After 5 months of dormancy, the Step Finance exploiter sold all 261,933 $SOL($21.4M), bridged the funds to #Ethereum#, and bought 12,128 $ETH. The exploiter then deposited the $ETH into #TornadoCash# to launder the funds.

⚠️ According to ZachXBT, an early whale address associated with the #Solana# genesis block was reportedly compromised, resulting in an estimated loss of $14.2M (180.9K $SOL). Based on on-chain analysis, the funds first underwent abnormal unstaking, then flowed through newly created Solana wallets for consolidation and swaps, before being bridged to Ethereum for transfer. Victim Address: HwtbQBNnLERakdUDuCCLWmUs2oETLFQZeHUWeQdPads Attacker Addresses: Ffd1oB2aYM5UzMYUM7TmxULDRQb6KzgrBwmgj9U1C2bE (Solana) 653pnn5fzF51FfotBwxua55Es4QXxTdaXJLbPczVmswp (Solana) 0xaa5cfa4e96dda0f9aa30f4dc948b542a9b5817c6 (Ethereum) 0x536b4ee7507c41143e1b0bd1bf3f2b84be404836 (Ethereum) 0xbf11bdfbeb9ed137c352c81e45d191cacae6b0cf (Ethereum) The attacker has begun laundering the stolen funds through #TornadoCash#.

Mad about how Tornado Cash and crypto devs have been treated by prior administrations? The new CLARITY Act draft would prevent that from happening again with what’s called a “specific intent” standard. @kkirkbos, @TuongvyLe12, and @JoshR_GSR on why that matters — and where passage odds actually stand. @DEXintheCityPod Timestamps: ⚖️ 0:00 Intro — new CLARITY Act draft drops; why there’s still a lot of work to do 📜 5:27 Blockchain Regulatory Certainty Act developer protections and why the “specific intent” standard is so important 🏦 11:06 How TradFi actually feels about crypto market structure legislation 📊 14:45 What CLARITY must achieve: the US as the center for crypto innovation and the security/commodity line 🎰 18:11 Lightning round — passage odds: KK at 35%, Vy at 90%, Josh at 45% 🌸 21:32 Does the recent M&A wave, massive VC raises and Circle's Arc token presale mean it’s crypto spring? 💙 27:41 Coinbase: Get 20% off the first year of your Coinbase One annual plan at 📈 29:39 The least bearish bear market in history — RWA wave and institutional onchain demand ♀️ 33:41 The E11even controversy: ‘Maybe we should just not have strippers at official events.’ 🎤 34:56 SEC Chair Paul Atkins' speech recognizing that onchain infrastructure can achieve the same goals as TradFi rails 📚 43:00 The education gap: most legislators still at Bitcoin-level crypto knowledge 🤖 46:46 AI good news: Redmod AI system may detect pancreatic cancer early

i've been one of the very few people consistently reviewing tornado cash dao proposals (and man, this is fucking time-consuming), and i've come to the conclusion that the recent proposals are either malicious or just bullshit quality (and simply adds unnecessary noise). along the lines i tweeted recently of "no governance is best governance," i've been working on a _terminal_ tornado cash governance proposal that permanently _disables_ tornado cash governance so that no future proposal (malicious or otherwise) can ever be submitted, voted on, or executed again. at the same time, it adds `unlockAll()` so previously locked torn, including the torn locked specifically to pass this proposal, is never trapped. any torn held directly by the governance contract itself (i.e. dao treasury funds not accounted for in the vault) is intentionally left _inaccessible_ and will remain permanently trapped forever once the governance is sealed. my ask: please review the proposal and share your feedback (i haven't done any security reviews so far as well as i'm running on little sleep, so any security comments appreciated as well): the proposal is not live yet. i'll only deploy it if i can get sufficient commitments from torn token holders to support and pass it. if executed, torn effectively becomes a meme token. tornado cash governance must die. long live tornado cash.

An attacker has deposited an additional $3.2M into Tornado Cash after more than three years of inactivity. The hacker stole $4.4M from wallets linked to ChunHaoLee_ in December 2022 and swapped the stolen assets for ETH shortly after the theft. The attacker had previously deposited approximately $992K into Tornado Cash and has now deposited the remaining $3.2M theft address: 0xD8De42401A1E63E52b92523e222a15913aa05031 Stay smart.