Over 2,748 wBTC supplied as collateral on SparkLend since its March launch. What stands out is the pace. That supply moved in within three days, as borrowers refinanced existing BTC backed positions into SparkLend. The number reflects what the market was already signalling. BTC backed borrowing demand was never the constraint. It was the absence of venues built to handle it, and when Spark built one, capital followed. Borrow & Lend here -

SparkLend’s wBTC deposit cap is increasing from 3,000 to 30,000 wBTC. Since launch, the initial cap has been nearly fully utilized. Demand for BTC-backed borrowing on a second on-chain venue was real, and it came fast! This increase is managed through the cap automator mechanism. In practice, new capacity will open at up to 500 WBTC every 12 hours, scaling exposure gradually rather than all at once. Put your wBTC to work on SparkLend. 👇

USDC borrow rates against cbBTC/WBTC, fixed: • May 31: ~2.30% • Jun 30: ~2.50% • Jul 31: 🔜 Cheaper than other major platforms on Ethereum. And the rate doesn't move. Known rate, known term, known risk.

BTC is moving, and your liquidity should be moving with it WBTC/USDC on Hyperion is currently earning up to 62.48% APR. Three layers of yield on your BTC: • Fee APR: 50.76% — real swap volume • Farm APR: 5.96% — active LPs only • Campaign APR: 5.76% — in-range positions only • DRIPs: 1 DRIP per $100/day on top Built with @WrappedBTC on Hyperion. Deploy→

This Monday's best BTC loan rates 👇 Aave · BNB - 3.3% APR Aave · Arbitrum - 3.87% APR Aave · Ethereum (wBTC) - 4.04% APR Aave · Ethereum (cbBTC) - 4.06% APR Deposit BTC. Borrow USDC. We find the best rate automatically⚡

🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 💸 Loss: ~1,291.16 ETH + ~1,268,771 USDC + ~206,282 USDT + ~16.94 WBTC @trustedvolumes 🔍 Root Cause: In fillOrder function (selector 0x4112e1c2) of RFQ Implementation, signature validation checks _allowedSigners[msg.sender][signer] using caller (taker) instead of order's maker as key, allowing registration via registerAllowedOrderSigner for attack contract and execution of forged orders for any maker. 📌 Attacker EOA: 0xc3ebddea4f69df717a8f5c89e7cf20c1c0389100 📌 Victim Contract: 0x9ba0cf1588e1dfa905ec948f7fe5104dd40eda31 📌 Vulnerable Contract: 0x88eb28009351fb414a5746f5d8ca91cdc02760d8 Attacker drained assets from custodial contract with unlimited approvals via 4 forged RFQ orders.