Coldcard: “The bug lived in public for 5yrs, even third party researchers didn't find it. We believe if took the lastest LLM models to find it.” Public record: “The flaw was pointed at, in May of 2025, by a person, with no frontier model, who traced it to the library by name and was told the company would already know if something were wrong. It was found again after disclosure by people pointing ordinary code-analysis tools at a public repository. What took five years was not the finding. It was the looking.”

Coldcard turned bitcoin:native's strongest promise into its biggest risk. @Legendaryy on self custody: “And no matter how much of a believer you are, with all of that happening, I think the best way to store your Bitcoin, unfortunately, is to go out there and buy a BlackRock ETF. Because if BlackRock is messing up their storage, then they are physically replicating the Bitcoin. They owe you the Bitcoin, simply put.”

The COLDCARD hacker stole 1,500 BTC, but what was the point? They will never be able to spend it. Now they have a lifetime of fear. They should just return the funds and negotiate a white-hat bounty.

Another weird narrative post-ColdCard is that if we'd just had covenants (CTV, I guess?) it wouldn't have happened. This is nonsense. The many people who wanted the simplicity of generating one set of keys on one device couldn't use vaults - vaults require generating multiple sets of keys in different ways in order to get security from these kinds of attacks. The people who were willing to do that already did - they used multisig across different wallet vendors and ended up safe. Vaults are cool and may be used by some, but the kinds of folks who used ColdCard were definitely not going to use them, sorry. I, too, wish there were something simple we could "just do" to prevent this kind of thing.

🚨WATCH HOW QUICKLY COMPROMISED COLDCARD FUNDS GET WIPED! @ColeTU funded five wallets from a Coldcard Mk3 using the known insecure RNG seed: one plain seed, three with 1-, 2-, and 3-word BIP39 passphrases, plus one with a random account number. The plain seed $BTC was drained almost immediately. The passphrase and account variants remained untouched hours later.