Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev said Thursday that the Southern Kuril Islands, known as the Northern Territories in Japan, "have been, are and will remain Russian territory."

JAPAN'S PRIME MINISTER SANAE TAKAICHI HAS BLASTED RUSSIA OVER PUTIN'S VISIT TO ETOROFU, SAYING JAPAN STRONGLY PROTESTS THE ACTION AS THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES ARE INHERENTLY PART OF JAPAN'S TERRITORY BOTH HISTORICALLY AND UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THAT THE VISIT BY THE INCUMBENT RUSSIAN PRESIDENT IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH JAPAN'S CONSISTENT POSITION, HURTS THE FEELINGS OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE AND IS 'ABSOLUTELY UNACCEPTABLE'.

Tensions just sharpened in the North Pacific as Russia fires missiles near islands claimed by Japan. Days after Vladimir Putin’s first-ever visit to one of the disputed Kuril Islands, an island chain seized by the Soviet Union after World War II, Russia’s Pacific Fleet launched missiles from a nuclear submarine, a guided-missile cruiser, and coastal batteries near the islands Japan calls its Northern Territories. Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi did not hold back, stating that Tokyo “cannot tolerate” Russia’s moves to strengthen its military presence there. According to confirmed reports from Japan’s Foreign Ministry and detailed accounts from Kyodo News, the live-fire drills form part of a larger exercise already underway—a clear signal that the long-running territorial dispute has entered a more confrontational phase.

Across 26 years, Berkshire Hathaway has invested $11.3 billion of capital directly into Berkshire Hathaway Energy, by acquiring MidAmerican Energy, Northern Natural Gas, Kern River Gas Transmission, PacifiCorp, and NV Energy. It has also continued to re-invest all of BHE's earnings back into the business -- that's another $50+ billion. These investments have produced have produced zero cash dividends for Berkshire. Not a nickel. And, in 2024, the value of these assets were written down by more than $40 billion when the estate of Walter Scott sold its interests. Today the entire remaining carrying value of the subsidiary is gravely at risk from a potential $50 billion wildfire liability. But, that's not the biggest risk. The biggest risk is the company's enormous (~$40 billion) investment into wind generation. Buffett and Munger believed in Peak Oil. They committed a massive amount of Berkshire’s capital over the past quarter-century to a strategy that was rational only if Peak Oil was correct. The strategy emphasized wind and solar generation, transmission build-out across western timber and rangeland states, and the gradual replacement of hydrocarbon-fired generation in service territories where customers would, the thesis assumed, increasingly pay premium rates for non-hydrocarbon electricity in a world of structurally rising oil and gas prices. But the Peak Oil was bunk, as any rational economist could have predicted it would be. Since 2005, U.S. liquid hydrocarbon production has increased 4x. The structural oil and gas price level fell, on a real basis, by approximately 50% over the period of the strategy’s implementation. The customer base that was supposed to pay premium rates for renewable electricity in a hydrocarbon-scarce world is, instead, demanding lower rates in a hydrocarbon-abundant one, and the regulators who set those rates have responded. Munger died in November 2023 still on the record believing oil and gas was “absolutely certain to be incredibly short and very high priced.” His Peak Oil thesis had been falsified, by an order of magnitude, in real time, in his own country, for a decade. The financial press, which has spent fifteen years celebrating Buffett’s late-life evolution into a clean-energy visionary (cue the Kumbaya music), has not, to my knowledge, published a single feature article questioning why BHE's carrying value was marked down by $40+ billion -- the largest capital loss in Buffett's entire career. The story is sitting in the open. I do not know why nobody else is telling it.

Germany as a unified country is younger than many people think. The German Empire was proclaimed in 1871 after Prussia's victory in the Franco Prussian War. Its unification was engineered by Otto von Bismarck, the Minister President of Prussia, through a series of wars and diplomatic efforts that brought most of the German states under Prussian leadership. Before 1871, there was no single German nation state. For centuries, the German speaking lands were divided among hundreds of kingdoms, duchies, principalities, free imperial cities, and church territories. From 962 to 1806, most belonged to the Holy Roman Empire, a loose political union in which the emperor had limited authority and the individual states largely governed themselves. After the Holy Roman Empire was dissolved in 1806 during the Napoleonic Wars, the German Confederation was established in 1815 as a loose association of 39 independent states. In 1867, Prussia formed the North German Confederation, uniting most of the northern states. Following Prussia's victory over France in 1871, the southern German states joined, creating the German Empire and marking the first unified German nation state. #archaeohistories#

Houthi-Saudi Escalation, Current Situation, and Forecast (General Access) ICOD-0900, 09/08/2026 BLUF The years-long running conflict between Yemen's Houthi movement and Saudi Arabia has entered its most significant period of escalation since the 2022 ceasefire. The Houthis are increasingly targeting Saudi military, energy and maritime interests while Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces have engaged the Houthis in the most serious internal fighting seen since the ceasefire. The immediate escalation began in July after Saudi Arabia struck the runway at Sana'a International Airport as an Iranian aircraft carrying Houthi officials attempted to land. The Houthis subsequently launched missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia and announced a naval blockade against Saudi-linked shipping. The conflict has since developed along two interconnected fronts. The Houthis are attacking Saudi territory and Saudi linked shipping while also increasing attacks against Saudi backed forces inside Yemen. Saudi Arabia has conducted retaliatory strikes against Houthi military targets, while fighting inside Yemen has intensified around Marib, Taiz and Hodeidah. On September 8, the Houthis conducted their largest reported attack against Saudi Arabia during the current escalation, striking areas around Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran. Saudi authorities reported 73 people wounded and said several energy facilities temporarily suspended operations following fires and damage. Key Points • The Houthis are an Iran-aligned Yemeni movement that seized Sana'a in 2014 and established control over much of northern and western Yemen. Saudi Arabia intervened militarily in 2015 in support of Yemen's internationally recognized government. Major Saudi Houthi fighting declined substantially after the 2022 truce, although the underlying conflict was never resolved. • The immediate trigger for the current escalation was the July 13 Saudi strike on Sana'a International Airport. The strike disabled the runway and prevented an Iranian aircraft carrying a Houthi delegation from landing. The Houthis responded with missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia. • On July 20, the Houthis announced a naval blockade against Saudi linked shipping. On July 22, the Saudi flagged tanker *Encelia* was struck in the Red Sea. The incident was the first confirmed attack on a Saudi ship during the current escalation and marked a shift from threats against Saudi Arabia to sustained attacks on Saudi commercial interests. • Saudi energy infrastructure has become a major component of the Houthi campaign. ACLED recorded 16 Houthi attacks against Saudi assets between July 13 and August 14, including attacks involving seven oil facilities and six oil tankers. Some individual Houthi claims remain unconfirmed, but the broader pattern of attacks against Saudi energy and maritime infrastructure is established. • The Houthis have simultaneously increased attacks against Saudi backed Yemeni government forces. On August 6, Houthi attacks against government military camps in Hadramawt and Marib killed at least 30 soldiers, according to ACLED. On August 9, the Houthis launched a large combined drone, missile and unmanned explosive boat attack against the government held port of Mocha, killing seven people and damaging the port and other infrastructure. • Fighting inside Yemen has intensified further in September. Government forces have reported advances against the Houthis in parts of Hodeidah and Taiz, while fighting has also occurred in Marib and other areas. The available reporting indicates a significant increase in violence, but the conflict has not yet clearly returned to the large scale territorial warfare seen before the 2022 truce. • The September 8 attack represents the most significant Saudi homeland attack reported during the current escalation. Saudi authorities reported attacks affecting Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran, with 73 people wounded and fires at several energy facilities. The Houthis said they used ballistic missiles and drones against Aramco facilities and a Saudi air base. • The conflict therefore now involves three overlapping concerns: attacks against Saudi Arabia, fighting between the Houthis and Saudi backed forces inside Yemen, and threats to Red Sea shipping around Bab al Mandeb. The latter connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and is a major maritime route between the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal. Analyst Comment The current escalation should not yet be characterized as a return to the full scale Saudi Houthi war of 2015 through 2021. The more significant change is the combination of several pressure points that had largely remained dormant since the 2022 truce: attacks against Saudi territory, attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure, attacks against Saudi linked shipping and renewed heavy fighting inside Yemen. The Houthi campaign appears intended to impose costs on Saudi Arabia while constraining the ability of Saudi backed Yemeni forces to increase military pressure against Houthi held territory. The repeated targeting of energy infrastructure and shipping is consistent with an effort to increase the economic and political cost of Saudi involvement. ACLED assesses that the Houthis have calibrated attacks against oil infrastructure to inflict economic damage and pressure Riyadh for concessions. The geography is also becoming increasingly important. Fighting around Hodeidah, Taiz and the western coast places a significant portion of the renewed conflict near the Red Sea and approaches to Bab al Mandeb. At the same time, the Houthis are attacking Saudi infrastructure farther north, including Jazan, Najran and Yanbu. This creates a conflict that extends from the Yemeni battlefield into Saudi economic infrastructure and the maritime routes connecting the Red Sea to global markets. Saudi Arabia's dependence on its Red Sea infrastructure is particularly relevant while maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains disrupted. The Houthis therefore have an opportunity to impose additional costs on Saudi energy exports by threatening an alternative route that has become more important during the current regional crisis. For the United States, the immediate operational implication is likely to be increased demand for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and defensive air and missile defense support. The United States already maintains an integrated regional air defense architecture with Saudi Arabia and other partners, including shared warning mechanisms and U.S. personnel working alongside partner Patriot units. Continued Houthi missile and drone attacks therefore have the potential to increase U.S. requirements for warning, tracking and defensive support without necessarily requiring direct U.S. offensive operations against the Houthis. A significant expansion of direct U.S. strikes should be treated as a separate escalation indicator rather than assumed to be the natural next step. Assessment The current trajectory indicates that the Houthi-Saudi conflict is likely to remain elevated in the near term. Both sides have demonstrated an ability and willingness to continue military operations, while the conditions that supported the relative calm following the 2022 truce have deteriorated substantially. Key Judgements - A continued Houthi campaign against Saudi Arabia is likely in the near term. The group has established a recurring pattern of targeting Saudi military, energy and maritime interests. The September 8 attack demonstrates that the Houthis retain the capability and intent to conduct large missile and drone operations against Saudi territory. - Houthi attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure and shipping are likely to remain central to the campaign. These targets allow the Houthis to impose economic and political costs without having to seize additional territory. The repeated attacks against Saudi linked vessels and energy facilities indicate that maritime and economic pressure has become an established component of the current campaign. - Fighting inside Yemen is likely to remain a major driver of further escalation. Houthi attacks against Saudi backed government forces have increased substantially, while government forces have become more active against Houthi positions. Further increases in government military pressure would provide the Houthis with an additional justification for attacks against Saudi Arabia. - A sustained Houthi effort to disrupt Red Sea shipping is possible, but the current campaign remains narrower than the group's previous campaign against international commercial shipping. The current blockade is primarily directed at Saudi linked shipping, although attacks around Bab al Mandeb could have broader consequences if the campaign expands. - U.S. ISR and defensive air and missile defense requirements are likely to increase if the current tempo continues. The United States already has mechanisms for sharing threat information and supporting partner air defense forces. Continued Houthi attacks would increase the demand for warning, tracking and defensive support. Direct U.S. offensive action against the Houthis should be considered a separate escalation scenario. - The key indicator is whether the conflict remains contained or expands substantially around Bab al Mandeb. Continued attacks against shipping combined with sustained fighting around Hodeidah and the western coast would indicate that the conflict is increasingly becoming a struggle over Yemen's Red Sea coastline and the maritime corridor beyond the immediate Saudi Houthi confrontation. - A return to the relative calm that followed the 2022 truce is currently unlikely without a reduction in military pressure. Each additional Houthi attack creates pressure for a Saudi response, while additional Saudi or government military operations create incentives for further Houthi retaliation. Without a political mechanism capable of interrupting that cycle, the current elevated level of conflict is likely to persist. Sources:

NORTHERN OIL AND GAS REITERATES ITS 2026 CAPITAL EXPENDITURES GUIDANCE, ADDING THAT CAPEX IS EXPECTED TO TREND LOWER IN Q4 ABSENT SIGNIFICANT NON-BUDGETED ACTIVITY, THOUGH BASED ON THE CURRENT PACE IT EXPECTS 2026 CAPITAL SPENDING TO BE TOWARD THE HIGHER END OF THE RANGE.