MEV may be a more useful framework for understanding agentic commerce than traditional platform economics or antitrust.
MEV research has already spent years on a problem that agentic commerce is about to encounter: what happens when economically valuable intentions become visible to intermediaries before execution, and those intermediaries can decide how the intentions are routed, disclosed, priced, or fulfilled?
Permissionless execution does not imply permissionless access to order flow. The builders with the best private flow win more blocks, and winning more blocks helps them attract more private flow.
Agentic commerce is about to reproduce the same problem one layer earlier, where the economically valuable object is not yet a "signed transaction" but an intent. Whoever sees that intent first can decide who gets to compete for it, what they are allowed to know, and how much of the resulting surplus returns to the principal.
The most important lesson from MEV is that a market’s architecture includes its settlement mechanism, but also its information-disclosure rules, its allocation of execution rights, and its distribution of the surplus created by privileged access.
For agentic commerce, those choices are far more consequential than which model the agents run.