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NewRulesGeopolitics
@NewRulesGeo
New Rules examines the geopolitical, economic, and ideological trends changing the world.
参加 November 2023
2 フォロー中    93.7K ファン
🚨🇷🇺🇰🇵 NATO IN PANIC: NORTH KOREAN LAUNCHERS COULD GIVE RUSSIA NEW BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCE Russia is reportedly set to receive additional North Korean launchers for KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles. And here's the important part: dedicated transporter-erector-launchers would allow Russian forces to field complete mobile units around them without increasing the burden on Russia’s Iskander brigades. 🔸 The main bottleneck has been the launcher fleet. Missiles can be stored and transported separately, but they cannot become a sustained battlefield force without heavy mobile platforms able to move, hide, erect and fire them. 🔸 Original North Korean launchers would allow KN-23 and KN-24 batteries to disperse across a wider area, relocate after firing and operate independently of fixed launch sites. 🔸 The solid-fuel KN-23 carries a roughly 500 kg warhead to around 450 km, with longer ranges possible using a lighter payload. Its low, manoeuvring trajectory is designed to make interception more difficult. 🔸 The KN-24 has a range of about 410 km and carries an estimated 400–500 kg payload. Together, the two systems can strike airfields, command posts, logistics hubs and air-defence sites far behind the front. 🔸 Separate Korean-made missile units would expand the number of ballistic strikes Russia can prepare at the same time while preserving Iskander launchers and Russian-made missiles for other missions. 🔸 Pyongyang would gain something equally valuable: real combat data. Every launch provides information on reliability, accuracy, enemy interception attempts and the demands of sustained wartime use — experience no peacetime test range can reproduce. The launchers are what turn imported missiles into a parallel mobile strike force. More firing units, more launch locations and more ballistic threats would make Ukraine’s air-defence planning significantly harder. Which targets are most at risk: airfields, logistics hubs or air-defense sites?
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