Assumes three things:
(1) that the state of the art models are widely available/ open-source. That is contrary to what my expectations are w.r.t. incentives. OpenAI & Claude have every incentive to hold back the good cyber models and make you pay up for an AI-audit basically.
(2) that the security vulnerabilities themselves are "shallow" and easily detectable. Because defenders have to secure the whole surface area of their codebase against attack, dollar for dollar they will not be able to spend as much in tokens to *harden* every LOC as the attackers will be able to spend to *break* one specific point.
A few reasons do doubt (2) is
a. The PHP vulnerability we're all witnessing was actually discovered and disclosed years ago; was a very deep bug that many people overlooked.
b. it's been shown that just spending more tokens can get better results. (i.e. the Claude Riemann-Zeta result, where the engineer basically just kept prompting the model to "keep trying")
c. ecdsa dot fail, the more tokens get thrown at the problem, the more progress gets made. Implies that spending more on tokens surfaces more insights as you get deeper into the problem.
(3) that the pace of software development slows down to the pace of security engineering. If anything, AI is vastly *accelerating* the product/engineering cycles, and exponentially *more code* will be produced in the coming years. Hard to imagine that security tools will be able to keep pace (security is always ignored by everyone until it's impossible not to).
So it's not obvious to me that AI favors the defense. In fact, at the limit things will settle to roughly where they stand today: attacker has slight advantage based on the asymmetry of resources they can bring to bear against one, carefully selected target.
AI tools can certainly help improve security but not enough to overcome this fundamental asymmetry to flip the advantage to the side of the defender, imho.