Anecdotes and personal experiences can be useful tools for understanding the utility of products for specific use cases, but I think it’s a mistake to use such a narrowly-scoped instrument to try to explain the business models of trillion-dollar companies — and, more contemporaneously, why they’ll be utterly disrupted by AI. Certainly this is true for a company like Google $GOOGL, as the mechanics of digital advertising are more complex than they might appear when looking at the results for any given query. The notion that Search merely, exclusively monetizes the results that would have otherwise been exposed organically, almost like a protection racket, is flawed. Search ads offer keyword adjacency / expansion tools, and shopping journeys start long before a consumer knows exactly which product they want to buy. Further, marketing teams can test their spend for revenue incrementality; doing so with Google Search is straightforward. Certainly some Search ad spend is wasted but that’s true for every ad channel. “Google Search dies because of Muse” ignores the incremental product discovery value of search advertising, the fact that Google has launched its own AI products that currently reach in aggregate billions of people per month (AI Overviews: 2.5BN, AI Mode: 1BN), the fact that Google owns the most popular browser, the fact that Google operates a mobile platform, and the fact that Google operates a suite of consumer products that are all deeply integrated. And in the context of this specific argument, it also ignores the fact that Muse will need to generate meaningful revenue at scale and will almost certainly do so with advertising. In some ways, Google Search has already died (and been resurrected in a different form). This is the premise of my Google’s Gambit series, which I started publishing long before Muse. The company is adapting in real time to new consumer interaction models. If consumers find agents useful for product discovery, there is no reason to believe that Google *can’t* accommodate that. But to reduce a ~$250BN annualized business to a consumer- and advertiser-hostile protection racket, and then assume that Google cannot adapt its distribution and monetization machinery to an agentic consumer workflow (which it already partially has, through Universal Commerce Protocol, Universal Cart, agentic checkout, etc.), is, in my view, overly simplistic and naïve.