On the economics/social science of religion Honored to have delivered the SCORE Strand 3 Keynote Lecture. The Social Consequences of Religions (SCORE) 3 Strand: Social Consequences of Religions initiative, directed by the extraordinary Sriya Iyer @SriyaIyer, is a broad integrative project and the occasion of the meeting with the release of Score 3 White Paper that will launch the next phase of the initiative. My talk "Intergenerational Persistence of Intergenerational Persistence in Religious Status: Some New Measures" had two distinct parts. First, I described work in progress with Kristina Butaeva @Butaeva_K, Renato De Angelis, and Weiqi Wang, which constructs measure of intergenerational persistence in religious status for the bulk of the post World War II period. We document changes in the dynamics of persistence using recently developed Markov Chain measures. These measures illustrate how the comparative persistence of evangelical Protestantism and no affiliation, compared to mainstream Protestantism and Catholicism, map to increasing cross sectional polarization. The methods we employ also allow us to dWe also find interesting gender differences. Second, I turn to the question of modelling the mechanisms underlying these mobility dynamics and make some general observations on the modelling of religious affiliation and religious belief using formal models. I do so from the vantage point of economic theory. I argue that it is essential to model religious affiliation and belief as the product of truth seeking. I contrast this with the focus on the role of identity and community public goods in religious affiliation that has been successfully modelled by economists. This leads me to argue that the modelling of belief has to avoid the fundamental (no pun intended) defect of the Strong Program in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: the requirement of symmetry, which David Bloor has described as "symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same types of cause would explain say, true and false beliefs." This position is, I claim, wrong to the extent it is nontrivial. My paper with William Brock, A Formal Model of Theory Choice in Science, 1999 is an example of how to integrate truth seeking with other determinants of belief in which asymmetries in explanation emerge as equilibrium properties of the belief distribution across scientists. I further argue that scientific, moral, and metaphysical truths need to be distinguished in the modelling process and further argue that, as a scientific and moral realist, were I to engage in the modelling, the truth or falsity of particular belief systems must be integral to the analysis. The recording of the lecture does not include the Q and A that followed my lecture. Here I raise the issue of viewpoint diversity. As someone who was raised with no religion and has no religion, I argued that my capacity to model religious belief is inevitably handicapped. I do not understand the qualia of religious belief and this matters.