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SlowMist
@SlowMist_Team
SlowMist is a Blockchain security firm established in 2018, providing services such as security audits, security consultants, red teaming, and more.
๊ฐ€์ž… April 2018
406 ํŒ”๋กœ์ž‰ ์ค‘    88.6K ํŒฌ
๐ŸšจSlowMist TI Alert๐Ÿšจ ๐Ÿ’ธ Loss: ~1,291.16 ETH + ~1,268,771 USDC + ~206,282 USDT + ~16.94 WBTC @trustedvolumes ๐Ÿ” Root Cause: In fillOrder function (selector 0x4112e1c2) of RFQ Implementation, signature validation checks _allowedSigners[msg.sender][signer] using caller (taker) instead of order's maker as key, allowing registration via registerAllowedOrderSigner for attack contract and execution of forged orders for any maker. ๐Ÿ“Œ Attacker EOA: 0xc3ebddea4f69df717a8f5c89e7cf20c1c0389100 ๐Ÿ“Œ Victim Contract: 0x9ba0cf1588e1dfa905ec948f7fe5104dd40eda31 ๐Ÿ“Œ Vulnerable Contract: 0x88eb28009351fb414a5746f5d8ca91cdc02760d8 Attacker drained assets from custodial contract with unlimited approvals via 4 forged RFQ orders.
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