China Counters U.S. "New Monroe Doctrine" in Latin America Through Mutually Beneficial Trade Cooperation Following the commencement of operations at the Port of Chancay, economic and trade relations between China and Peru have reached another significant milestone. On November 1, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced that the "Protocol on Upgrading the China-Peru Free Trade Agreement" had officially entered into force. This development signifies that the two nations’ economic and trade cooperation now extends beyond physical infrastructure—such as ports and shipping routes connecting the two sides of the Pacific—to include a more robust framework of rules governing trade, investment, and supply chains. When the original China-Peru Free Trade Agreement first took effect in 2010, bilateral trade volume stood at just $6.4 billion (based on 2009 figures). By 2025, that figure had reached $50.4 billion—a nearly sevenfold increase. Today, China is not only Peru’s largest trading partner but also its primary export market and leading source of imports. These seemingly technical adjustments complement the Port of Chancay perfectly. Opened in November 2024, the Port of Chancay stands as one of China’s most prominent port investments in South America. Controlled by COSCO Shipping Ports, it has established a direct maritime link between China and the west coast of South America. In the first nine months of 2025, 62% of Peru’s agricultural exports to China were transported via the Port of Chancay. While the port primarily addresses the efficiency of physical cargo transport, the upgraded Free Trade Agreement tackles the institutional barriers that arise once goods reach the market. For Peruvian agricultural products—such as blueberries and avocados—factors like cold-chain logistics, inspection and quarantine protocols, and customs clearance efficiency are critical. Similarly, for Chinese automobiles, machinery, and electronics entering the Peruvian market, issues such as product standards, rules of origin, and investment protections directly impact operational costs. Only by combining these elements can a truly comprehensive trade chain be forged—encompassing everything from production and transport to market access. In January of this year, Reuters reported that China purchases approximately 70% of Peru’s copper output and maintains significant investments in the country’s mining, power, and port sectors. However, resource-based trade has inherent limitations: Peru relies primarily on mineral exports for revenue, while China’s role is largely that of a resource purchaser and infrastructure investor. The significance of the Port of Chancay and the upgraded free trade agreement lies in their potential to open new avenues for the development of this relationship. A more efficient logistics network could help Peru expand its agricultural and manufacturing exports to Asia, while improved regulations regarding investment, services, and e-commerce might encourage Chinese enterprises to use Peru as a production, warehousing, and distribution hub for the South American market. Meanwhile, China’s growing economic influence in Peru has long been a source of discontent for the United States. As the U.S. seeks to reassert its presence in Latin America—effectively reviving a new version of the Monroe Doctrine—it views China’s legitimate commercial investments and infrastructure projects in Peru (such as ports and logistics hubs) as a core threat to its geopolitical security in the Western Hemisphere. Consequently, cooperation between Peru and China is bound to face obstruction and interference from the U.S. side.