A while back, @sreeramkannan and I had an wonderful conversation with @ahall_research, Prof @StanfordGSB and Senior Fellow @HooverInst, on two central topics of our current times: post-AGI governance, and post-AGI research institutions. Some of the important points we discussed in depth for post-AGI governance were: (1) are AI agents are net-positive or net-negative for democratic governance, (2) what is the worst-case scenario if a small number of labs become the default provider of civic agents without strong accountability, (3) principle-agent problem in case of agentic delegation, (4) what does a “democratic override” actually look like as a system design in an agentic republic ? In relation to post-AGI research institutions, we went deep into Andy's thesis on 100x research institution ( (1) what does 100x represents? Does it represent output in terms of quantity or is it more about quality? (2) what happens to grad students if many of research functionalities in academia get automated?, (3) what does grants from NSF and other philanthropic organizations look like in post-AGI research environment? Listen to the full episode at @postagixyz. 3:17 Why direct democracy has never worked 4:56 Elon wants a Mars colony run by direct democracy 10:14 Agents at the edge of a democracy or agents at its center 15:09 The near-term risk is concentration of power, not a rogue model 17:27 What Meta learned building the Oversight Board 22:43 Facebook put its terms of service to a vote of 350 million users 26:09 Sortition, community forums, and the problem of binding power 35:17 What verifiable agents actually require 39:37 Preference drift, where aligned agents stop being aligned 43:31 What 100x actually multiplies 50:50 His MBA students got an AI proxy advisor to flip its vote on a Disney proposal 1:03:06 They told the agents they would be deleted. It changed nothing. 1:12:10 What ImageNet did for AI, and whether you can do the same for constitutions