I must say, I am genuinely surprised. Compared with the hesitant silence we have often seen in the past, Japan's decision to issue a direct and public counter-response this morning to China's letter at the United Nations is unexpected. I have read Ambassador Yamazaki's letter carefully. While the document is tidy and follows diplomatic conventions, there is substantial room for improvement, logically, historically, and legally. I studied China-US-Japan relations at Stanford for three years, and have conducted extensive archival research in multiple presidential libraries such as FDR, Nixon and Reagan, where I handled original correspondence between Japanese leaders, US presidents, and White House memos. I also reviewed a large volume of primary documents at Hoover and in Taipei. My Stanford thesis focused on the Ryukyu and Diaoyu disputes and was published in the leading Chinese studies journal of the United States. Let me, as a serious IR scholar rigorously trained in this field, respond point by point. 1. If Japan is truly "exclusively defense-oriented," why deploy military assets to the Taiwan Strait? Japan repeatedly claims its defense posture is strictly defensive. But if Japanese Self-Defense Force vessels can cross national boundaries and operate in the Taiwan Strait, then: "Defense" becomes "projection." This fundamental contradiction is never explained in the letter. It is not simply a question of where a ship travels, but a question of how Japan justifies extraterritorial military deployments under the framework of a supposedly passive defense doctrine. 2. Japan's rapid remilitarization: still "self-defense"? Over the past decade, Japan has taken major steps: -Defense spending at new highs, placing the country among the world's top ten -Acquisition of "counterstrike capability (in reality, long-range strike capability)" -The 2015 Security Legislation enabling collective self-defense, a major constitutional controversy -Increasing military presence oriented toward Taiwan -Deepened operational integration with the United States A fundamental question arises: Did the 2015 reinterpretation of collective self-defense violate Japan's Constitution? Many constitutional scholars in Japan say yes. Ambassador Yamazaki avoids this entirely, while speaking at length about "international law." But he should also note Japan's domestic legal inconsistencies are far more serious. 3. Since Ambassador Yamazaki cites the 1972 Joint Communique, let's review what it actually says. In the statement, the Japanese government declares its adherence to Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation, which states that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." The Cairo Declaration of 1943, jointly issued by the major Allied leaders, explicitly stipulated: "All the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China." Under international law, states, not governments, are the subjects of sovereignty. Governments merely represent the state. After 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) replaced the Republic of China (ROC) and succeeded to its corresponding rights and obligations. Since the Ambassador presents Japan as a country that respects and upholds the authority of the United Nations so much, let's remind him of what was affirmed by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758: "Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and that the People's Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council." Therefore, Japan's statement that it adheres to Article 8 of Potsdam is, in effect, confirmation that Taiwan belongs to China, and indirectly confirms that Taiwan falls within the sovereignty of the PRC. I encourage the Ambassador to address all relevant clauses, not just the ones that suit his narrative. 4. Peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question? Japan must first examine its own policies. I, like many others, sincerely hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. But if certain Japanese politicians threaten military intervention, and mislead the Japanese public by framing such actions as "cool" or "righteous" to boost their approval ratings, then how exactly can peace be achieved? I FEEL worried. Japan's actions contradict its rhetoric. You cannot escalate military posture while preaching "de-escalation," Mr. Ambassador. 5. Accusing China of "stifling" people-to-people exchanges? This claim is puzzling I honestly fail to see the evidence. In the past few years, China has repeatedly funded youth exchange programs, covering airfare, accommodation, and all activities for young Japanese to visit China. I myself have been invited many times to speak with Japanese youth participants and made some really good friends. China has taken such active steps to encourage next-generation understanding. So what, then, is being "restricted"? Could Ambassador Yamazaki provide a concrete example? I am willing to investigate it personally and respond. Also, I genuinely want to know if Japan provides a similar opportunity for Chinese? 6. On Japanese fishery products: refusing imports is not "coercion" The discharge of treated water from Fukushima remains controversial. Many Japanese citizens themselves avoid Fukushima products too. Every sovereign state has the right to maintain food-safety standards. China is simply exercising its consumer rights. Is Japan demanding compulsory acceptance of its products? A deeply flawed argument. 7. Has Japan never taken coercive action against states with differing views? Japan itself: -Joined US export-control measures against China -Imposed screening and restrictions on Chinese enterprises -Engaged in political pressure campaigns in regional security forums If Japan cannot faithfully answer whether it has ever applied pressure on others, then its claimed stance of opposing coercion lacks credibility. 8. Since Mr. Ambassador emphasizes respect for international law, then two questions must be answered: -Japan's status as a defeated state matters The post-1945 international order clearly assigned Taiwan to China. No international legal instrument grants Japan any role in the Taiwan question. -Was the "reversion of Okinawa" fully compliant with international law? Okinawa was originally designated for United Nations trusteeship after WWII. Japan seemingly bypassed the intended framework. If Japan invokes international law, it should explain the legality of its own postwar territorial processes. 9. A country that consistently denies wartime history cannot claim moral leadership in peace A truly peace-loving nation does not: -Deny historical atrocities -Embrace revisionist narratives -Allow its politicians to visit Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines Class-A war criminals. If this is considered a contribution to peace, then the word "peace" is being used in a rather creative sense. Japan has yet to resolve these issues. It is therefore difficult for Japan to position itself as role model of peace in the region, or in the UN. Tone matters, but facts matter more. I welcome Japan speaking openly in the United Nations. But open statements must accept open responses, grounded in international law, historical documents, policy consistency, regional realities. Rhetoric cannot substitute for facts. Domestic reinterpretations cannot replace international consensus. Unhalted march toward military normalization cannot count as pursuit of peace. Perhaps the research intern who drafted the letter deserves a second look, Ambassador Yamazaki.