Interesting how legitimate this looks from the UI, and good to explain what depositors can check before their USDC gets routed into something like this. At the block I checked, the market had about 7.734m USDC supplied and 7.734m USDC borrowed - One account, `0xe38a...Dc4C`, has effectively all of the borrow against 9.6517m AZND collateral. On the surface, this looks like a stablecoin lending market: - USDC loan asset - AZND collateral - 86% LLTV - current LTV around 80% catch is the oracle: `0x270B...5588b`. showing: BASE_FEED_1 = 0x0 BASE_FEED_2 = 0x0 QUOTE_FEED_1 = 0x0 QUOTE_FEED_2 = 0x0 BASE_VAULT = 0x0 QUOTE_VAULT = 0x0 SCALE_FACTOR = 1e24 price() = 1e24 For 18-decimal AZND against 6-decimal USDC, `1e24` is the Morpho-scaled version of "1 AZND = 1 USDC". So the oracle path has no external price input: no base feed, no quote feed, no vault conversion route. `price()` just returns the scale factor, and the market treats AZND as $1. If AZND is not actually redeemable at par, the borrower does not need a price manipulation attack. They can default and leave lenders with AZND collateral. Alpha USDC Asia V2 vault is more or less exclusive supplier to this market through a Morpho adapter. That adapter's supply shares convert to about 7.713m USDC, or roughly 99.72% of the market supply. Depositors here look legit, so the vault is acting as an abstraction to trap unsuspecting depositors... Vault control is concentrated too: owner = 0xEB4A...4645 curator = 0x6788...9Da5 (Both are allocators - yay) If AZND fails to hold par, the market is left short USDC relative to lender claims, with AZND as the recovery asset.