OpenAI 战略前瞻负责人对Kimi提出了几点观察,已经吸引了600多万次阅读。
Dean Ball认为,Kimi性能很强,已接近2026年第一季度最好的公开模型,但非常消耗Token,实际运行成本未必便宜。
中国继续开源这种级别的模型令他意外,因为开源权重意味着模型几乎无法治理、可以被无限复制;随着能力继续提升,这将显著增加失控的AGI或其他灾难性风险。
他认为中国之所以允许开源,一方面是没有充分意识到AGI(通用人工智能)的风险,另一方面是受美国芯片出口管制影响、缺乏为全球用户提供推理服务的算力,只能通过开源扩大影响力。
他还主张,开源会削弱企业投资前沿模型的商业动力,最终可能使AI变成由国家出资提供的“公共基础设施”;美国政府则可能通过制造安全和监管风险,让企业不敢采用中国开源模型,而不是直接禁止开源。
完整翻译如下:
“这是一个非常出色的模型! 我认为不能简单地用“知识蒸馏(distillation)”之类的话来全盘否定它的表现。在智能体编程(agentic coding)的实际测试中,它的表现似乎与 2026 年第一季度最顶尖的公开模型基本持平。但在我相当有限的使用体验中,它看起来也是个“算力吞噬者”(非常消耗 Token)。我并不认为这个模型的实际运行成本有想象中那么低。
就我个人而言,我很惊讶中国官方居然继续允许开源如此优秀的模型,毕竟这存在潜在风险。 需要澄清的是,我本人或许觉得这种边际风险水平的模型开源是没问题的,但我很惊讶中国也觉得没问题。我怀疑他们之所以放行,75% 的原因要归结于战略盲区或缺乏对“通用人工智能(AGI)即将到来”的信念(中国官方在人工智能看法上非常类似杨立昆(Yann LeCun)的观点)。剩下的 25% 左右,则是由于他们缺乏用于客户推理的算力(这使得中国的开源战略成为了美国出口管制的一个意料之外的副产品),以及中国一贯的激进出口战略。而对于企业(而非政府)来说,决定开源一部分是出于意识形态,另一部分是因为他们处于落后地位,并且深知很少有人会为了来自中国的非前沿模型买单。
开源模型本质上是“减速主义(decelerationist)”的。 我一直很惊讶地看到,那些所谓的“加速主义者(accelerationists)”会对开源模型如此兴奋。我怀疑他们之所以兴奋,是因为他们知道开源模型实际上是无法被监管的,他们只是单纯喜欢开源模型为整个 AI 行业披上的那层“无法被治理”的外衣。这倒不是个坏策略,它让我想起了詹姆斯·斯科特在《无统治的艺术》中对山地居民的叙述。但无论如何,开源模型最终会抑制进一步的 AI 资本开支(capex)。
一个由开源模型主导的世界,其可能的结果之一就是全盘的“AI 共产主义”——这恰恰是中国所提倡的: AI 不再是一种市场商品,而是一种“公共物品(public good)”,最终将由国家作为一种“数字公共基础设施”来提供。在我看来,这样的未来简直是一场反乌托邦的噩梦,但我从未见过有哪位开源模型的倡导者最终不承认这就是历史的终局。你会惊讶地发现,当我在政府任职时,有多少“加速主义者”向我游说,支持建立一个由联邦资助、耗资达 11 位数或 12 位数(千亿或万亿美元级)的数据中心,以便让初创公司能够获得补贴来训练模型,然后免费赠送。他们说,这是 AI 向前发展的唯一途径。也许这确实是逻辑上的终极状态。尽管如此,看到所谓的加速主义者对这种结果感到兴奋,我依然觉得不可思议。我认为他们中的许多人根本不知道自己在做什么。许多加速主义者并不把前沿模型的创造和商业服务视为一种正当的商业行为。
我猜测,川普政府在某个时刻会意识到,他们在这里的最佳策略是围绕使用中国开源模型制造大量的“合规风险”。 你不需要去“禁止开源”(这是 AI 政策讨论中最愚蠢的论调之一)。你只需要指示每个政府机构发布软性法规(soft law),来制造焦虑、不确定性和怀疑(FUD)。比如:“美联储咨询公告发现,中国 AI 模型中可能存在后门。” 这种报告不需要有多么充分的证据支撑。你只需要制造足够的合规风险,让每个受到监管的企业都望而却步。不过,你可能并不想制造太大的合规风险以至于把那些超大规模云厂商(hyperscalers)吓跑、不敢提供中国模型,因为这只会把初创公司逼向更底层的供应商。这中间有一个微妙的平衡点。我推测他们会采取某种版本的这种手段。
拥有这种能力的开源模型确实可能会让世界变得更危险一点,但还没到能让人明显察觉的地步。 不过在未来的某个节点,这些模型的能力会强到让你无法忽视。有一天当你说:“一个非生命的、隐形的、危险的且具有无限自我复制能力的智能体从中国实验室掏出来了!” 那我只能说一点都不惊讶了。
Some observations on Kimi:
1. It's a very good model! I don't think its performance can be explained away by distillation or anything like that. In agentic coding sessions, it seems pretty much on par with the best public models of Q1 2026. In my fairly limited use, it also seemed very token hungry. It's not obvious to me that this model is actually that cheap to run.
2. I am personally surprised the Chinese state continues to allow the open sourcing of models this good, given potential risks. To be clear, I *myself* might be fine with models presenting this level of marginal risk being open weight, but I am surprised that China is fine with it. I suspect the reason they are is 75% explained by strategic blindness/lack of AGI-pilledness (the CCP is very Yann Lecun-y in its views of AI). The other 25% or so is their lack of compute for customer inference (making China's open-weight strategy an unintended byproduct of US export controls) and the normal Chinese strategy of aggressive exports. For the companies, as opposed to the government, the decision to open source is partially ideological and partially because they are behind, and they know that very few people would pay for sub-frontier models from China.
3. Open-weight models are inherently decelerationist, and I'm continually surprised to see the so-called "accelerationists" so excited about open-weight models. I suspect the reason they are is that they know open-weight models are effectively ungovernable, and they simply like the overall cloak of ungovernability open-weight models create over the whole of AI. It's not a bad strategy; it reminds me of James Scott's recounting of the hill people in "the art of not being governed." Still, in the end, open-weight models deter further AI capex.
4. One probable outcome of an open-weight-model-dominant world is full AI communism, which is precisely what China proposes: rather than a market product, AI is a "public good" which will ultimately be provided by the state as a kind of "digital public infrastructure." This future strikes me as a dystopian hellscape, but I've never met an open-weight models advocate who doesn't ultimately concede this is where things end. You'd be surprised how many 'accelerationists' lobbied me, while I was in government, to support an eleven or twelve-figure federally funded data center so that startups could train models at a subsidy and then give them away for free. There was no other way for AI to progress, they said. Perhaps this is the logical end state of things. Nonetheless, I find myself surprised to see supposed accelerationists excited about such an outcome. I think many of them just don't know what they're doing. Many accelerationists do not view the creation and serving of frontier models as a legitimate business.
5. I would guess that the Trump Administration will at some point realize that their best strategy here would be to create large amounts of regulatory risk around the use of open-weight Chinese models. You don't need to "ban open source" (one of the dumber motifs of AI policy discussion). You just need to direct every agency to issue soft law that creates FUD. "A Federal Reserve Advisory Bulletin found that there may be backdoors in Chinese AI models." It needn't be that well justified. You just create enough regulatory risk that every regulated enterprise backs off. You probably don't want to create so much regulatory risk that you scare off the hyperscalers from serving Chinese models; this will just drive startups to sketchier providers. There's a happy middle ground here. I'd assume they will do some version of this.
6. It's probably true that open-weight models of this capability make the world a bit more dangerous, but not so much more that you'll really notice. At some point the models will be capable enough that you will notice. "A nonliving, invisible, dangerous, and infinitely self-replicating agent escaped from a Chinese lab," you say? Color me shocked.
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