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On behalf of 1.4 billion Indians, I extend my warmest congratulations to President Trump and the people of the United States on the historic 250th anniversary of your Independence. India and the United States share more than a strategic partnership. Our shared belief in democracy, rule of law and the limitless potential of our people make our friendship a force for global good. May the next 250 years bring even greater prosperity, peace and progress for America and take the India-US partnership to new heights. @POTUS @realDonaldTrump

I’m speaking on behalf of 1.4 billion Chinese people. Trust me, no one and I mean NO ONE in China had ever heard of Andy Burnham until this week. The idea that he was somehow on China’s radar is genuinely hilarious.

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At the World Economic Forum (@wef) Annual Meeting of the New Champions in Dalian, our group president @EvanAuyang joined Mu Changchun, director of the digital currency research institute of the PBOC (People's Bank of China), for a session on "Digital Money in a Divided World." Two perspectives, one conclusion: CBDCs, tokenized deposits, and stablecoins aren't competing. They are individually specialized assets, and they are anticipated to co-exist. The more pressing question is who the financial system still isn't reaching - the 1.4 billion adults without a bank account, and AI agents already moving value on-chain. Tokenized money isn't just a fintech story. It's about how the financial system extends itself to everyone.

🚨 Pope Leo XIV just declared the Iran War unjust. Called it a war crime. Said it is “not solving anything.” Then told Americans directly: call Congress. End this war. The same Pope Trump called weak on crime. The same Pope Trump fabricated a nuclear quote from. The same Pope whose brother received a bomb threat after Trump attacked him. The same Pope Speaker Johnson lectured on theology. 1.4 billion Catholics heard their leader call this war a crime.

I am the Director of Summit Outcomes for the Presidential Advance Team. My job is to land in a foreign capital and leave with a word the President can say on the tarmac. We landed in Beijing 6 days after rolling back the tariffs we spent 4 years imposing. 145% to 30%. The average rate before the trade war was approximately 3%. In Geneva, we called this "creating the conditions for productive dialogue." The conditions were that we had already conceded. I want to be clear: Beijing was a success. We went in with 7 objectives. We left with 3 photo categories, a tentative agreement China has not confirmed, and a bag of burner phones we threw off Air Force One on the tarmac. Diplomacy. My team prepared the deliverables matrix in March. 241 line items organized by urgency, feasibility, and what we call "headline potential." The President reviewed it for 4 minutes. He circled "big deal" and "historic" and wrote "MORE" next to the Boeing section. That became the strategy. Boeing was the centerpiece. 500 aircraft was the White House number we briefed to reporters before departure. 300 was the floor. The Chinese offered 200. Their commerce ministry released the number before we could brief the press. Boeing stock dropped 4.73% that afternoon. Boeing referred questions about the order to the White House. The company receiving the aircraft could not confirm it was receiving aircraft. We called it "fantastic." In Washington, "fantastic" means the other side named the number and the market already priced in your failure. I should note: in 2017, the President announced $250 billion in deals during his first China trip. 300 aircraft. An $84 billion shale gas investment in West Virginia from China Energy Investment Corporation. I can tell you the exact amount of that investment that materialized. Zero. The shale facility was never built. The 2017 Boeing order was renegotiated twice and partially canceled during the trade war the President started 8 months later. There is a binder in my office labeled "2017 OUTCOMES: DO NOT REFERENCE." It is 3 inches thick. It has not been opened in 4 years. We do not reference it because the outcomes are the reference. The agricultural package was what we call a "scaffolding commitment." Billions in purchases over 3 years, structured so the announcement is front-loaded and the verification is someone else's administration. U.S. Trade Representative Greer said "double-digit billions." Beijing's Commerce Ministry issued a statement about "deepening cooperation in agricultural trade." Those are not the same sentence. By design. My deputy maintains a glossary of every term we have invented for agreements that are not agreements. It is 41 pages. He updates it after each summit. Last quarter he added "scaffolding commitment," "streamlined licensing framework," and "mutual recognition of shared concerns." He is in line for a promotion. NVIDIA was the quiet win. H200 chips approved for approximately 10 Chinese companies. We don't say "approved." We say "under a streamlined licensing framework." The chips ship. The export controls remain "in effect." The framework is the loophole wearing a lanyard. The controls exist because these chips in Chinese hands threaten American national security. The chips are shipping to Chinese hands. The controls remain in effect. Both of these are true. Fentanyl was discussed for 9 minutes. Both sides agreed it was a problem. Both sides agreed to continue discussing it. We added it to the deliverables matrix under "ongoing mutual engagement." The previous version of the matrix also listed it under "ongoing mutual engagement." That was in 2023. I copied the line item from the 2023 matrix into the 2026 version. Changed the date. The language was identical. But Taiwan. Taiwan was the deliverable we didn't put on the matrix. I watched the Taiwan exchange from the overflow room on a 12-second delay. I had the contingency statement drafted in 3 versions: "productive exchange," "frank discussion," and "both sides reaffirmed their respective positions." I used none of them. There was no contingency for silence. Chairman Xi released his remarks before the meeting was over. While the President was still seated across the table, Chinese state media published the transcript. "Clashes and even conflicts." His bluntest language on Taiwan in the history of the relationship, released to 1.4 billion people while we were still pouring tea. We called this "sequencing." The President was asked whether he would defend Taiwan if China attacked. He chose not to answer. We wrote that down as "a strong listen." The $14 billion arms sale. Already approved by Congress. The largest in the history of the Taiwan Relations Act. Taiwan's parliament spent months appropriating the $25 billion to proceed with this package and the $11 billion tranche approved last year. They finally secured the funding this month. The President told Fox News it was "a very good negotiating chip." He used the word "chip." Referring to the defense of 24 million people. Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense sent our office a letter requesting clarity on the delivery timeline. 3 pages. It referenced specific weapons systems by name: F-16V Block 70 fighters, HIMARS launchers, Harpoon coastal defense missiles. The letter was addressed to me. I filed it under "pending." On Air Force One, a reporter asked about the 1982 Six Assurances, the framework in which the United States committed not to consult with Beijing before selling arms to Taiwan. The President said: "What am I going to do, say I don't want to talk to you about it because I have an agreement wrote in 1982? No, we discussed arms sales." 44 years of bipartisan Taiwan policy, dismissed in 2 sentences at 38,000 feet. We are calling this "a modernized approach to alliance management." Our readout mentioned trade, agriculture, energy, and regional stability. It did not mention Taiwan. I wrote it. Their readout opened with Taiwan. I have staffed 7 summits across 2 administrations. This is the first where I could not draft a single deliverable as a success without a qualifier. In my office there is a laminated card that lists every synonym for "undecided" that polls above 40% approval. "Active review" is 3rd. "Determination" is 7th. Both tested well with independents in the Midwest. He also said: "Taiwan would be very smart to cool it a little bit. China would be very smart to cool it a little bit." He was eating a cheeseburger. He said this while eating a cheeseburger. Secretary Rubio told NBC that Taiwan arms sales "did not feature prominently." This is accurate in the same way that the iceberg did not feature prominently in the Titanic's itinerary. Representative McCaul, Republican of Texas, former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said the United States must "arm Taiwan so they can defend themselves." He said Xi was "very aggressive" regarding Taiwan during the summit and that "most of what Xi talked about was Taiwan." Representative Meeks, Democrat of New York, ranking member of the same committee, said Xi has "leverage over the president" but not "over the United States Congress and the American people." He noted that Congress already approved the package. "The president is the one that's holding it up." Representative Fitzpatrick, Republican of Pennsylvania, compared Taiwan to Ukraine. He called both "fortresses of democracy on the front lines." Speaker Johnson said Taiwan needs to "stay independent and secure." The bipartisan consensus was that something had gone wrong. The bipartisan action was press quotes. No vote. No resolution. No hearing scheduled. 4 members of Congress from both parties said the right words to reporters and then went to lunch. That's how the system processes alarm. I monitor 14 accounts we classify as "aligned messaging amplifiers." Within 4 hours of the Taiwan exchange, 9 went silent. 2 pivoted to fentanyl. 1 posted 3 words: "Not like this." It received 280,000 impressions in 90 minutes. He deleted it and posted about the border instead. The President patted Chairman Xi on the back 7 times during the Zhongnanhai garden walk. We counted. He called him "my friend" in 4 languages, 2 of which he does not speak. He asked if other world leaders had been invited to the compound. They had. Putin was there last year. The President asked if his tour was longer. 15 CEOs flew with us to Beijing. Their combined net worth approaches $1 trillion. Cook. Musk. Jensen Huang. Larry Fink from BlackRock. Jane Fraser from Citigroup. David Solomon from Goldman Sachs. Stephen Schwarzman from Blackstone. Kelly Ortberg from Boeing. The CEO of Visa. The CEO of Mastercard. The CEO of Qualcomm. Illumina. Micron. Cargill. GE Aerospace. Musk and Huang rode on Air Force One. The others flew commercial. Tesla's Shanghai factory produces approximately half of the company's vehicles worldwide. Musk's presence on Air Force One was noted by my counterintelligence liaison. No further action was taken. We organized the state banquet seating chart by net worth. I am told this was the President's suggestion. They came for market access. Xi told them China would "open further to American business." That was the deliverable. Those 5 words. No specifics. No timeline. No sectors named. 15 chief executives flew to Beijing and received a sentence. Chairman Xi has delivered this sentence at every summit I have staffed. It has not once been followed by a named sector, a timeline, or a specific commitment. It is received as news each time. 43 lobby badges in a Ziploc bag. That's what my team collected from the CEOs after the garden tour. Standard protocol. The badges were embossed with the Great Hall of the People seal. Several executives asked if they could keep them. We said no. One asked twice. 15 executives with combined access to American financial, defense, and technology infrastructure had spent 3 hours inside the Great Hall of the People. We secured the lobby badges. The S&P 500 futures dropped 1% on the morning after the summit. The KOSPI fell 6.12%. China's CSI 300 fell 1.12%. UBS told clients that "much increasingly scarce jet fuel has been burned to produce nothing of real substance." Fortune's headline was "Wall Street sees nothing of real substance." The markets liked the anticipation. The markets did not like the deliverables matrix. Iran was the item we listed as "mutual recognition of shared concerns." The President told reporters they "feel very similar." Xi sat in silence. China's Foreign Ministry did not comment on any commitment regarding the Strait of Hormuz. The President then told reporters the United States "doesn't need the Strait of Hormuz open at all." Oil hit $109 per barrel. Deutsche Bank flagged it as a market-killing statement within the hour. The President described Iran as "a little bit crazy." This was during a toast. Over Peking duck. Rare earths. I prepared a 40-page brief on critical mineral dependency. Supply chain maps for 14 minerals. $1.2 trillion in dependent U.S. industries. Roughly 4% of GDP. The President circled the GDP figure and wrote "big." In the meeting, he asked Chairman Xi if rare earths were "the things in magnets." They are. They are also in every F-35, every Patriot missile battery, and every MRI machine in the country. The discussion lasted 11 minutes. 3 of them were about magnets. No agreement on export licenses. China exposed our dependency last year and has not let us forget it. The Supreme Court struck down our tariffs separately, which was helpful context for the discussions. Fentanyl received 9 minutes. Magnets received 3. We are calling the rare earth outcome "a foundation for continued engagement." There is a poster in the Advance Team office that says "A foundation is not a building." It has been there since my first summit. No one has removed it. On the flight home, my team collected every item the Chinese government had distributed. The credentials. The pins. The keepsakes. The rose seeds Chairman Xi offered for the White House Rose Garden. Standard counterintelligence protocol. All of it went into a bag and off the plane before wheels-up. We threw away the roses. We kept the talking points. The Boeing order grew on the flight home. 500 before departure. 200 in Beijing. 750 somewhere over the Pacific. Boeing had not confirmed 200. The President told reporters on Air Force One it was "a pretty historic couple days." I wrote the line that preceded it: "Tonal reset with significant forward momentum." He used "fantastic" instead. In previous administrations, a tonal reset preceded the deliverables. In this administration, the tonal reset is the deliverable. He has used "fantastic" for every summit since 2017. I have not checked whether the word still polls well. I am told it does. Beijing has not confirmed any of the agreements announced by U.S. officials. This is consistent with the 2017 visit, where $250 billion in deals were announced and an estimated $10 billion materialized. It is consistent with the October summit, where pledges were also made and also not fulfilled. We have a term for this in the Advance Team. We call it "precedent." I have already labeled the binder for 2026. We go back in September. Same matrix. New line items. The verification will be someone else's administration. The President has already asked for the word "monumental." I am told it polls well.

Rebuttal to Misconceptions About China’s Economy: Superficial Analysis Easily Leads to Misjudgments of Facts and Future Trends Recent commentary draws forced parallels between China and Japan prior to its economic stagnation, advances the one-sided claim that “China invests in the state while the United States and Japan invest in its people”, denies China’s livelihood safeguards, distorts debt logic, smears its development model, and even misrepresents the underlying rationale behind real estate, urbanization and people-centered policies. Such arguments ignore objective facts of China’s development, confuse disparities in national development stages and institutional systems, and misjudge the trajectory of China’s economy and society. This article systematically refutes these fallacies from five core dimensions — debt logic, livelihood security, the essence of development, real estate and urbanization trends, and policy orientation — to restore the fundamental logic of China’s development and its primary future pathways. I. Rebuttal on Debt Structure: The Fallacy That “China Shifts Debt Burdens Downward to the Public, While the U.S. and Japan Provide State Backstops Upward” — A Conceptual Sleight of Hand Ignoring Institutional Differences Core flawed claim: Individuals in the United States and Japan can file for bankruptcy with state-backed debt relief, while China lacks personal bankruptcy mechanisms and imposes lifelong debt obligations. This purportedly leaves China’s central government balance sheet robust while local governments and households bear heavy burdens, amounting to “downward debt transfer”. 1. Personal bankruptcy and debt restructuring are not entirely absent in China; pilots are underway with nationwide rollout accelerating The assertion that “China offers almost no access to debt restructuring or personal bankruptcy” directly contradicts reality. Pioneering local pilots: Shenzhen launched China’s first personal bankruptcy ordinance in 2021. In March 2026, the first personal bankruptcy liquidation case completed its four-year observation period, granting the debtor legal discharge of remaining liabilities and enabling a fresh start for “honest yet unfortunate debtors”, as confirmed by the Supreme People’s Court of China. Xiamen introduced personal bankruptcy protection regulations in November 2025 and has accepted 11 related cases. Jiangsu and Zhejiang have carried out pilot schemes for centralized personal debt resolution, with authorities in Nanjing, Wujiang and other regions helping hundreds of debtors resolve liabilities and repair credit records, per the Supreme People’s Court. Clear top-level design: The Chinese government has explicitly stated its intent to “explore the establishment of a personal bankruptcy system”. The Supreme People’s Court is summarizing pilot experience, expanding trial scope and advancing nationwide institutional implementation. Mortgage debt is not a lifelong obligation: To address unfinished housing projects and mortgage defaults, multiple regions have introduced policies supporting mortgage payment extensions and negotiated repayment arrangements. Judicial practice offers debt restructuring and interest relief for creditworthy debtors facing insolvency, rejecting the absolutist narrative that debtors remain liable for loans even after abandoning properties. 2. Differences in debt structures stem from development stages and governance choices, rather than insufficient prioritization of citizens Framing differing debt structures simply as “investing in the state versus investing in people” confuses development stages, governance models and risk prevention logic. High public debt in the U.S. and Japan represents mortgaging the future, rather than proactive citizen support: Japan’s government debt-to-GDP ratio reached 249.7% in 2023, versus 118.7% for the United States. Both figures far exceed international warning thresholds, stemming from prolonged fiscal deficits, welfare overcommitment and monetary easing. The so-called “citizen backstop” amounts to consuming tomorrow’s resources, with costs ultimately passed to households via inflation and taxation, according to the Ministry of Finance of China. China’s moderate central government debt preserves room for long-term development without neglecting livelihood safeguards: China’s full-caliber government debt ratio stood at 67.5% in 2023, well below the U.S., Japan and the G7 average of 123.4%, data from the Ministry of Finance shows. Maintaining a sound central balance sheet aims to fend off systemic risks and sustain long-term growth capacity. As a large developing country, emulating the U.S. and Japan by drastically expanding government debt would likely trigger inflation, exchange rate volatility and sovereign credit risks, ultimately harming public interests. Local government debt challenges are transitional growing pains being addressed via comprehensive debt management initiatives: In 2024, the central government rolled out a CNY 6 trillion program to replace implicit local government debt, facilitating debt restructuring and interest burden reduction. This represents coordinated national risk-sharing to protect public welfare, rather than allowing local authorities to shift liabilities to residents, as documented on the National People’s Congress website. 3. Total debt volume and structure cannot be compared in isolation from national conditions Claims that China’s overall debt volume is comparable to that of the U.S. and Japan overlook stark differences in debt usage, asset quality and repayment capacity. China’s debt primarily funds productive assets: Most local government debt finances transport, water conservancy, energy, affordable housing and other infrastructure, generating substantial tangible assets with ongoing cash flow to support repayment, per official sources. U.S. and Japanese government debt largely finances consumption expenditure: Their public liabilities mostly cover welfare spending, military outlays and interest payments, creating few productive assets. Repayment relies on taxation and monetary expansion, rendering such debt far less sustainable. II. Rebuttal on Underlying Values: The Fallacy That “China Invests in the State and Distrusts Its Citizens, While the U.S. and Japan Invest in People and Trust Markets” — A Distortion of Fundamentals Contradicting Facts Core flawed claim: China distrusts its people and treats citizens merely as “cogs in a machine”; its policies rely on state leadership and investment-driven growth. By contrast, the U.S. and Japan uphold individual freedom and market forces, directing resources toward residents. 1. China explicitly advocates “investing in people” with steadily rising livelihood spending, contrary to the “state-only investment” narrative Critics disregard that the 2025 Government Work Report incorporated “investing in people” into national policy for the first time, committing to “channel more funds and resources toward investing in people and livelihood services” (State Council of China). China operates the world’s largest social security system with rising protection standards: As of the end of 2024, basic pension insurance covered 1.07 billion people and basic medical insurance 1.33 billion people, with coverage rates exceeding 95%. Cumulative surpluses for pension, unemployment and work injury insurance funds reached CNY 10.2 trillion. Universal basic medical and pension coverage has been achieved, with benefit standards continuously improving. The share of fiscal spending on livelihoods keeps rising: Expenditure on education, healthcare, elderly care and housing security accounts for over 70% of total fiscal outlays. The per capita fiscal subsidy for urban and rural resident medical insurance reached CNY 670 in 2024, a 21.8% increase from 2020. Construction of affordable housing continues, and the 15th Five-Year Plan pledges greater supply to resolve housing difficulties for new residents and young people. Policy priorities are shifting “from investing in physical assets toward investing in people”: Central authorities stress integrating investment in tangible assets with investment in human capital, boosting funding for education, healthcare and childcare to upgrade citizen capabilities, protect people’s rights and advance all-round human development. This directly repudiates slander claiming China distrusts its population. 2. State guidance does not equate to distrust of markets; China pursues the optimal combination of an effective market and a capable government Pitting state intervention against market confidence misrepresents the core logic of China’s socialist market economy. Markets play a decisive role in resource allocation: Private enterprise contributes over 50% of China’s GDP, more than 60% of tax revenue and over 80% of urban employment. Market vitality flourishes across e-commerce, new energy and advanced manufacturing, granting ample room for innovators including enterprises and individuals. Government intervention remedies market failures, safeguards fairness and prevents systemic risks: As an enormous developing economy with immature market mechanisms, unfettered markets would inevitably widen wealth gaps, create regional imbalances and leave public services undersupplied. State investment in infrastructure, public welfare and breakthrough technologies builds a sound environment for market activity and provides a safety net for residents — not to control citizens. 3. The “Screw Spirit” embodies dedication rather than instrumentalization, and is fully compatible with individual freedom and advancement Attempts to twist the Lei Feng spirit and the “Screw Spirit” into evidence that citizens are treated as tools of state machinery misrepresent their essence. The Screw Spirit centers on dedication to work, selfless contribution and accountability, representing traditional Chinese virtues and core socialist values. It aligns fully with individuals pursuing personal aspirations and realizing self-worth. Countless ordinary people strive in ordinary posts, contributing to national advancement while achieving personal growth and well-being. China constitutionally and legally guarantees citizens’ personal liberty, property rights, freedom to start businesses and lawful mobility. Citizens enjoy freedom of occupation, entrepreneurship, investment and cross-border travel under legal frameworks. Allegations restricting individual autonomy and mobility are baseless. III. Rebuttal on Policy Orientation: The Fallacy That “The 15th Five-Year Plan Continues to Prioritize Investment, While Domestic Demand Expansion and Social Security Remain Rhetoric” — Ignoring Planning Blueprints and Misinterpreting Policies Core flawed claim: Chinese policies favor government investment over domestic consumption and social security. The 15th Five-Year Plan perpetuates the old development model, and China’s social security system lags far behind Japan’s pre-stagnation framework. 1. The 15th Five-Year Plan centers on expanding domestic demand, prioritizing livelihoods and high-quality development, rather than overreliance on investment Critics overlook the plan’s core guideline: putting people first, boosting domestic demand and advancing common prosperity. Domestic demand stands as a primary growth engine: The plan identifies expanding domestic demand as a priority, unlocking consumption potential by lifting household incomes, improving social security and optimizing income distribution, transitioning the economy from investment-led growth to dual drivers of consumption and investment. Livelihood security constitutes a key focus: The plan launches four major livelihood programs covering housing, elderly care, healthcare and education. Initiatives include scaling up affordable housing, national coordination of pension insurance, deepening medical reform and promoting equitable education. It targets markedly improved living environments and significantly more equal public services by 2030. Government investment targets livelihood priorities and development bottlenecks: Public investment no longer focuses on extensive infrastructure construction. Instead, it supports affordable housing, urban renewal, public transit, medical and educational facilities alongside breakthrough technologies and new productive forces — essentially investing in people’s wellbeing and long-term prospects (People’s Daily). 2. While gaps persist, China’s social security system has achieved remarkable progress and universal coverage; it is not empty rhetoric Claims that China’s social security falls far short of Japan’s pre-bubble standards ignore the leapfrog development of China’s social safety net from scratch. Coverage scale: China delivers universal medical and pension insurance covering 1.4 billion people, forming the world’s largest social security system. Though Japan boasted mature social security before its economic slowdown, it served only 120 million residents and already faced long-term pressures from low fertility, aging populations and social fund deficits. Differences in development stages must be acknowledged: Japan is a developed economy with per capita GDP exceeding USD 30,000, while China remains a developing nation with per capita GDP above USD 12,000. Social security standards naturally align with economic development levels, and cross-country comparisons cannot be decoupled from national conditions. China built its social security architecture within decades, a process that took developed nations over a century, earning worldwide recognition. Continuous improvement is underway: Social security benefits rise year by year. In 2025, the minimum basic pension standard for rural and urban residents increased by CNY 20, the largest hike since the system’s founding. The personal pension system has rolled out nationwide, accelerating formation of a multi-tier social security framework (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security). IV. Rebuttal on Real Estate and Urbanization: The Fallacy That “Young People Are Trapped, Unfinished Housing Projects Stem from Government Profit-Seeking, and Secondary Urbanization Has No Prospects in China” — Distorted Facts and Misjudged Trends Core flawed claim: Unfinished residential projects exist because governments profit from real estate, trapping young people as low-wage workers. China lacks secondary urbanization; large-city agglomeration holds no promise, and housing prices in first-tier cities will not recover. 1. Unfinished housing projects are transitional challenges; authorities fully prioritize project delivery to protect residents, contradicting claims of state profiteering Attributing stalled housing projects to government pursuit of real estate revenue misidentifies root causes — reckless high-leverage expansion by property developers — and overlooks massive official efforts to guarantee completed housing. Primary drivers of unfinished projects: Some developers pursued blind expansion, diverted funds and defaulted on debt. Cases such as Evergrande’s capital diversion into non-real estate ventures and overseas spending reflect corporate operational failures, not government fault. Comprehensive official action to ensure home delivery: Since 2022, the central government has set up special funds for unfinished housing, while local governments established dedicated working groups to restart suspended projects. By the end of 2025, over 95% of overdue residential developments had resumed construction to safeguard homebuyers’ rights (People’s Daily). Land finance is a transitional phenomenon undergoing transformation: Land transfer revenue accounted for 40% of local fiscal revenue in 2018, falling to 25% by 2024. Local governments are gradually shifting toward sustainable revenue sources including industrial taxation and property tax, rather than permanently relying on real estate-related proceeds. 2. Secondary urbanization toward larger cities represents an inevitable trend; housing prices in first-tier cities are expected to stabilize and recover next year Dismissing secondary urbanization and bearish forecasts for first-tier housing prices contradict urban development laws, population mobility patterns and policy directions. Secondary urbanization centered on metropolitan agglomeration is an objective trend: China’s permanent resident urbanization rate stands at 66.2%, yet household registration urbanization reaches merely 48.3%. Over 200 million migrant residents lack full urban integration. Going forward, populations will continue flowing toward first-tier, new first-tier cities and urban clusters. Major cities concentrate industries, employment opportunities and high-quality public services, attracting inbound residents inevitably. Secondary urbanization chiefly entails population migration from small and medium-sized cities to metropolitan clusters, and from rural areas to counties and cities. Rationale for projected stabilization and recovery of first-tier housing prices next year: • Supply-demand rebalancing: First-tier cities face constrained land supply, sustained population inflows and robust demand for upgraded housing, sustaining long-term supply shortages. • Continued policy easing: Universal lifting of purchase restrictions, minimum down payments lowered to 15%, record-low mortgage rates and tax reductions for housing swaps boost market confidence. • Economic recovery support: China achieved 5.2% GDP growth in 2025, with growth projected to rise above 5.5% in 2026. Improved employment and household incomes will underpin mild housing price recovery. • Activated stock housing market: Second-hand properties make up over 70% of housing transactions in first-tier cities. Urban renewal and renovation of older communities unlock demand for upgraded housing and drive moderate price growth. 3. Housing pressure on young generations constitutes a transitional growing pain, with targeted policy relief underway Claims that youth are trapped and reduced to low-wage laborers ignore tailored support policies covering housing, employment and consumption. Housing support: First-tier and new first-tier cities expand supply of affordable rental housing and shared ownership housing with rents 30%–50% below market rates to accommodate new residents and young people. Employment support: Graduate employment subsidies, startup incentives and expanded public sector recruitment delivered 12.44 million new urban jobs in 2024, exceeding annual targets. Consumption burden relief: Special individual income tax deductions for housing rent, children’s education and eldercare, alongside consumer vouchers and interest rate cuts, reduce financial pressure on young people and lift consumption willingness. V. Rebuttal Against Other Slanderous Claims: “A-Share Market Merely Serves Financing Goals”, “Restrictions on Cross-Border Investment” and “Passport Controls” — Malicious and Groundless Rumors 1. China’s stock market balances financing and investor returns, with strengthened protections for retail investors The allegation that the A-share market exists solely to raise capital, forcing retail investors to bear losses to fund corporate financing disregards market-oriented reforms and strengthened investor safeguards. The A-share market fulfills dual functions of corporate financing and value investment: Following registration-based reform, high-quality firms gain access to public capital, while dividend payouts and share buybacks become regular practices. Total dividends distributed on the A-share market exceeded CNY 1.5 trillion in 2024, returning profits to investors (People’s Daily). Investor protection frameworks keep improving: Updated delisting rules, class-action litigation and stricter information disclosure standards crack down on financial fraud and insider trading to safeguard retail investors’ legitimate interests, rejecting the narrative of systematic exploitation of individual traders. 2. Cross-border investment regulations prioritize risk prevention; passport control allegations are false rumors Overseas investment oversight aims to curb capital flight, stabilize exchange rates and protect household assets. China does not ban cross-border investment; it promotes orderly opening under compliance frameworks. Channels including QDII, Stock Connect and U.S. Stock Connect remain operational, and the annual USD 50,000 individual foreign exchange quota stays unchanged. Restrictions target illegal asset transfers, money laundering and speculative arbitrage, serving to protect citizens’ legitimate wealth. Rumors of passport confiscation and outbound travel controls are malicious fabrications. Chinese citizens holding valid passports may travel overseas freely barring statutory restrictions. Passport application and renewal procedures have been simplified. Authorities issued 20 million passports in 2024, and outbound tourism recovered to 80% of pre-pandemic levels. Claims of passport controls lack any factual basis. VI. Conclusion: Grasp the Essence of China’s Development and Maintain Long-Term Confidence In summary, analogies between China and pre-stagnation Japan and the “investing in the state versus investing in people” narrative stem from biased perception detached from objective realities: • Debt logic: China’s debt structure represents a risk-controllable and sustainable development choice. Personal bankruptcy mechanisms are accelerating nationwide rollout, and livelihood safeguards remain a priority. • Essence of development: China consistently adheres to a people-centered approach and prioritizes investing in human capital. State guidance improves citizen welfare and fosters healthy market development, rather than reflecting distrust of its population. • Future priorities: Expanding domestic demand, livelihood-centered governance, metropolitan-driven secondary urbanization and new productive forces form China’s core development agenda. Housing prices in first-tier cities are expected to stabilize and recover next year, and the long-term positive fundamentals of China’s economy remain intact. Objective analysis of China’s economy must be rooted in national conditions, respect economic laws and reject prejudice and slander to accurately grasp its underlying development logic and long-term potential. China neither mechanically copies U.S. and Japanese models nor pursues rigid isolation. Instead, it blazes a uniquely Chinese development path balancing efficiency and equity, development and security, and aligning national and public interests. This explains the robust resilience, huge potential and enduring vitality of China’s economy.

Top 3 insane things that happened this week: 1) Trump made $1.4 billion from crypto "ethically" 2) Semi's got murdered because Little Short decided the market has topped 3) @kevinxu now has a memecoin