Bo Xilai and the Red Aristocracy’s Illusion of Power 薄熙来与红色贵族的权力幻觉 Recently, a post by Bo Guagua, son of the disgraced red aristocrat Bo Xilai, trying to resurrect his father’s reputation made waves on X. Here is my take on Bo Xilai, based on my own understanding and experience — and, by extension, on China’s red aristocracy. I wrote in Chinese in this piece. 薄瓜瓜最近重新开口，让我又想起了他的父亲薄熙来。 关于薄熙来的政治生涯，外界已经写得很多。但我对这个人的判断，并不是2012年倒台以后才形成的。从大连、辽宁、商务部到重庆，我自己看到的、朋友分享的几件事，串起来，反而很能说明薄熙来这个人，也很能说明中国一种特殊的政治阶层——红色贵族。

What Makes China’s Red Aristocracy Different I have written extensively about China’s “red aristocracy” in my book. But the term can be misleading to readers outside China. We probably need a better term for it. The recent passing of Zhu Rongji, premier in 1990s, revived the debate over whether he was genuinely the clean Party leader he insisted he was, or whether the careers of his family members made that claim hypocritical. His son became CEO of China’s largest state-owned investment bank while Zhu, as premier, was directing SOE reforms. His daughter worked for American investment banks serving Chinese SOEs in their financing. His son-in-law headed the overseas operations of China’s largest state-owned mining company. All three were already multimillionaires in USD decades ago, when most Chinese were earning only a few hundred yuan a month. This debate illustrates a broader problem in understanding China’s elite. The word aristocracy evokes a privileged class with inherited wealth, family names, estates, social prestige and elite networks. China’s Communist aristocracy may have all of those. But it is fundamentally different. Its defining privilege is not wealth or access to networks. It is proximity to political power—and the ability that comes with it to OPERATE ABOVE THE LAW, MARKET RULES AND SOCIAL NORMS. European aristocrats historically enjoyed immense legal privileges. But modern European aristocracy is largely the residue of that system. A British duke may inherit a fortune, a castle and powerful connections, but he still has to operate within a legal order. He cannot simply make a criminal case disappear, induce a regulator to punish a competitor, or decide that certain law does not apply to him. His privilege exists within the system. China’s red aristocracy emerged from a different structure. The descendants of Communist revolutionaries did not inherit formal titles. They inherited something more valuable in a Leninist state: access to the Party-state. Their family names open doors to senior officials, ministries, state-owned companies, banks and the enforcement apparatus. Connections can bring political sponsorship, regulatory approvals, financing, inside information and business opportunities unavailable to ordinary people. More importantly, political protection can determine not merely how much opportunity you have, but which rules apply to you at all. That is the distinction Western observers often miss. A Chinese princeling is not simply the equivalent of an American billionaire or a European aristocrat. The deeper privilege is arbitrariness in your favour. In a rule-based society, the wealthy have greater resources to operate within the rules. In China, political connections can influence how rules are written, interpreted and enforced—and sometimes whether they are enforced at all. That is not merely inequality of wealth. It is inequality before power. There is also a profound historical irony. The Communist revolution destroyed China’s old landed and commercial elites in the name of abolishing inherited privilege, only to create a new hereditary elite of its own—as socialist systems so often do. China’s red aristocracy is therefore not simply another privileged upper class. It is the product of a political system in which proximity to power can place a person above the rules governing everyone else. Western aristocracy today is largely inherited status operating within a legal system. China’s red aristocracy is inherited access to power operating above it.