🔶If China succeeds in using physical gold as global collateral (incl. REPO) tracked by tokenized blockchain for limited rehypothecation, the process has two phases, accelerated by China’s need to revalue its domestic debt against gold. ⭕️Revalue to equilibrium phase: Existing above-ground gold must first reprice higher so the stock provides enough collateral value relative to financing needs and to clear paper overhangs. China’s large yuan-denominated debt (local governments, SOEs, property) creates a direct incentive to let the yuan gold price rise. This devalues that debt in real terms while increasing the collateral value of the ounces it already holds (official + estimated non-reported). Michael Howell has linked Chinese demand to this internal devaluation dynamic. HK infrastructure (central clearing system, tokenized-deposit DvP targeting commercial 2027, interbank 400-oz bar tokens under Project Ensemble, SGE vault) gives Beijing the mechanism to support a higher equilibrium price without waiting for Western HQLA reclassification. ⭕️Pricing up via usage as collateral phase: Once gold is revalued and functions as verifiable, limited-rehypothecation collateral on a shared ledger, structural demand takes over. Banks, trade-finance desks and collateral managers hold more of it for REPO, margin and liquidity. This demand is additive to jewelry, investment and official buying. Mine supply is inelastic, so the result is a slower but persistent grind higher in USD terms after the initial reprice. 🎯China’s debt revaluation motive compresses the first phase. Ongoing collateral usage then sustains the second. Both phases are now supported by concrete HK moves rather than pure theory. #Gold# #Silver#

The drop is the NFP reaction, not some random dump. August U.S. nonfarm payrolls just printed +162,000 vs consensus around ~56,000. Unemployment stayed at 4.1%. That is a large beat after July’s weak/negative print. Why gold sold off ~$100: • Stronger labor market = higher odds the Fed hikes (or stays hawkish) at the Sep 15–16 meeting.

President Nixon’s administration did not wipe out (or even meaningfully reduce) the U.S. national debt using proceeds from the 1971–1973 U.S. Treasury Gold revaluations. The “Proceeds” and Impact on Debt ⭕️ The 1973 revaluation increased the book value of U.S. gold reserves (then around 260+ million ounces) by roughly $1.2 billion. This created a paper profit that was monetized via gold certificates issued to the Federal Reserve, slightly boosting Treasury cash holdings. ⭕️ Compare this to the national debt: • ~$398 billion in 1971. • ~$458 billion in 1973. ⭕️ The $1.2 billion gain was tiny—less than 0.3% of the debt—and the debt continued to rise in subsequent years due to ongoing deficits, not decline to zero or near-zero. 🎯The Nixon Gold revaluations were not a debt-erasing windfall.