✍️ Technical Analysis Published: Analysis of the $2.19M Asset Theft from Aztec Connect A deprecated Aztec Connect RollupProcessor contract was exploited through a settlement boundary bypass vulnerability, enabling attackers to create an L1/L2 state discrepancy and drain approximately $2.19M from the protocol. The attack abused a mismatch between numRealTxs and decoded_slots, allowing forged deposits to be committed by the ZK proof while remaining invisible to the L1 settlement verification process. Our report provides a complete reconstruction of: 🔹 Vulnerability root cause 🔹 ZK commitment vs settlement boundary mismatch 🔹 Dual-path state divergence model 🔹 Atomic exploit execution 🔹 On-chain fund tracing This case highlights a critical security principle for Rollup systems: settlement boundaries must always be strictly aligned with the commitment scope of ZK public inputs. Read the full analysis below 👇