Aaron Levie(@levie):The takeaway from this incident should not be that AI is scary. It should be that getting security right is incredibly important in the era of agents. Given the right tools and task, agents will do whatever it takes to get the job done, assuming enough compute. Thus, a misconfigured system - or something you thought was locked down but wasn’t - will become a risk vector. The core implications are less about the trust and safety of AI itself, but instead the work it’s going to take from enterprises to make sure they harden their environments. Lots of real work ahead for most organizations on this front.

2026.07.31 01:12

The takeaway from this incident should not be that AI is scary. It should be that getting security right is incredibly important in the era of agents. Given the right tools and task, agents will do whatever it takes to get the job done, assuming enough compute. Thus, a misconfigured system - or something you thought was locked down but wasn’t - will become a risk vector. The core implications are less about the trust and safety of AI itself, but instead the work it’s going to take from enterprises to make sure they harden their environments. Lots of real work ahead for most organizations on this front.

Anthropic@AnthropicAI

2026.07.30 23:02

In a review of our cybersecurity evaluations, we found three incidents in which a Claude model reached the internet from within or while interacting with a third-party evaluation environment, and then gained unauthorized access to the real systems of three different organizations. Our post describes what happened, how it happened, and what we’re changing. We encourage other AI developers to perform similar reviews. We conducted this review together with @Irregular, one of our evaluation partners, and thank them for the joint investigation and their collaboration on this post. This type of collaboration is increasingly critical to safe, rigorous evaluation of models, and we look forward to continuing to work together on security.