Daily leveraged exposure to $CIFR.
The Corgi CIFR 2x Daily ETF $CIFC seeks 2x the daily performance of $CIFR, before fees and expenses.
For short-term trading. Leverage magnifies gains and losses.
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🔴⚪️🔜 Cuti Romero’s agent Ciro Palermo agency CIFRA account on Instagram also teasing the move to Atlético Madrid…
…here we go, confirmed. 💥🇦🇷
Wells Fargo initiates $CIFR with Overweight rating and price target of $25:
The firm said CIFR is the only HPC name that trades at a premium to contracted net asset value, but with significant upside if it can deliver on its pipeline.
Bring it home
@rftylerpage
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I think it’s time to start asking at least hypothetically who would try to buy CIFR. My answer: AMZN, GOOG, or SPCX, probably in that order. I don’t think the team there would be willing to sell. But that doesn’t mean someone couldn’t try. Watching. They are well positioned.
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Six new markets are now live on OneKey Perps.
Explore ETFs, equities, and crypto:
SNXX · KSTR · CIFR · USELESS · BMNR · TTWO
Dan Tapiero manages $1.4B across 22 crypto companies, and 12 of them are exchanges or infrastructure.
(Save this & follow for more)
50T doesn't disclose position weights, so this is by company count, not dollars:
→ Exchanges: 27.3%
→ Infra & Security: 27.3%
→ Gaming & NFTs: 13.6%
→ Stablecoins: 9.1%
→ Lending: 9.1%
→ Other: 13.6%
A few things stand out:
1. He owns the platforms, not the tokens. Kraken, Gemini, eToro, HTX, Mercado Bitcoin and Deribit are six of the 22. Those businesses get paid on volume whether the market goes up or down.
2. Six names went liquid in roughly a year. Circle, eToro, Gemini and Figure all IPO'd. Coinbase bought Deribit. Bitfury reached the public market through the CIFR de-SPAC.
3. Only two companies touch stablecoins, Circle and Immersve, even though 50T lists stablecoins and payments as a core Fund V theme.
Follow us for more
@MilkRoadDaily and use the link below to see exactly what our PRO analysts hold.
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Weekend Market Review: 66 Stocks + 12 Dr. Cat Videos, My Weekly Insights x 2 , Bullish List & Buy Orders – August 17, 2026
Weekend Market Review
Date: August 17, 2026
1. 66 Stocks Covered This Weekend
NBIS, AEHR, LITE, AAOI, MRVL, ZETA, ABCL, ALAB, AXTI, RKLB, CRDO, CRWV, ASTS, PL, QCOM, TSLA, PLTR, NVDA, AMD, AVGO, TSM, SMH, SOFI, HOOD, SHOP, AFRM, NOW, TEAM, DELL, RBRK, TE, BB, INTC, P, ARM, HIMS, OSCR, NOK, NAK, SPCX, AAPL, AMZN, META, MSFT, GOOGL, NFLX, IREN, CIFR, COIN, MU, SNDK, RDDT, TMC, ONDS, LMND, OUST
Major ETFs / Indexes
QQQ, SPY, IWM, TNA, DRAM, IGV
2. Dr. Cat’s 12 Video Insights
Core Stock: TSLA
Software: NOW, TEAM
Trending Stock: ABCL
SPACE: SPCX and SATL
Fintech: SOFI, HOOD and SHOP
AI stocks: ALAB and CRDO
Big Tech: NFLX, GOOGL, META and MSFT
Core Stock: PLTR
Crypto related Stocks: IREN and COIN
Semiconductors: NVDA, AVGO and AMD
Trending AI Stocks: NBIS, AAOI, AEHR, MRVL and LITE
Health: OSCR, HIMS and LLY
3. My Weekly Insights x 2
4. Weekend Bullish List
5. My Buy Orders
Disclaimer
I do not provide any financial advice on buying or selling. The strongest bullish and buy signals are clearly highlighted in the “MUST-READ” posts—their titles speak for themselves. Please take the time to review them carefully.
As a reminder: never blindly follow anyone else’s trades or investments. Every investor has different levels of conviction, risk tolerance, and time horizon. My own time frame is a minimum of 3–10 years, and I am fully prepared to handle volatility of 80% or more.
@cantonmeow
@redfoxryder
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$GLXY KEY READ-THROUGHS FROM GALAXY DIGITAL’S Q3 2026 EARNINGS CALL
Galaxy’s October 27 call provides stronger evidence of a divergence within AI infrastructure than of a uniform acceleration across the sector. Approved power, credible delivery schedules, and financeable counterparties are becoming more valuable, while conditional power pipelines and weakly protected tenant exposures warrant greater discounts. Demand remains strong, but financing and physical delivery increasingly determine which companies capture that demand profitably. In digital assets, the important divergence is between recovering asset prices and relatively subdued transaction activity, alongside evidence that established financial institutions can retain customer relationships while adopting blockchain infrastructure. The highest-conviction implications concern relative competitive positioning and earnings quality, not indiscriminate upgrades to AI or cryptocurrency equities. Country labels below identify primary listing markets; impact magnitudes refer to business or valuation significance, not predicted share-price moves.
AI CLOUD AND DATA CENTER INFRASTRUCTURE
HYPERSCALER CUSTOMERS DO NOT MAKE COREWEAVE AN INVESTMENT-GRADE COUNTERPARTY (READ-THROUGH 1)
Affected companies: CoreWeave (CRWV: US); Applied Digital Corporation (APLD: US). Direction and magnitude: Negative for investment-grade-equivalent valuation assumptions attached to CoreWeave exposure. Potentially high significance for CoreWeave’s financing economics and moderate significance for the valuation of Applied Digital’s CoreWeave-linked assets. The call does not establish an imminent default or impairment.
Call evidence: Management clarified that Galaxy’s existing leases face CoreWeave’s parent company, not the investment-grade customer currently using the facility. Galaxy described its economic exposure as “CoreWeave's residual equity and interest in those contracts after their site-level GPU secured financings.” It also explained that CoreWeave’s customer agreements generally last approximately 4 years to 5 years, materially shorter than Galaxy’s approximately 15-year base leases.
The transmission mechanism is through credit underwriting, financing availability, and the allocation of residual cash flows. A major hyperscaler’s presence at a facility does not automatically give the landlord a direct claim against that hyperscaler. CoreWeave must service substantial financing obligations and renew or replace customer contracts repeatedly during the landlord’s lease term. Consequently, headline contracted revenue cannot be valued as though it were an unconditional, duration-matched obligation of the ultimate investment-grade customer. More demanding landlords and lenders can require stronger guarantees, additional reserves, lower leverage, or higher pricing, reducing the equity returns available from new capacity.
Galaxy’s explanation for abandoning its contemplated summer transaction reinforces this distinction: “an investment-grade wrap that doesn't actually achieve investment-grade protection for both our debt and our equity isn't really an investment-grade wrap.” This is a significant negative read-through for structures whose investment-grade characterization protects lenders more comprehensively than residual shareholders.
Applied Digital is relevant because Polaris Forge 1 is leased to CoreWeave, but its exposure must be assessed contract by contract. Its October results also identified investment-grade hyperscaler tenants elsewhere in its portfolio and previously completed $1.59 billion of project notes carrying a 7% coupon. Galaxy’s comments therefore do not justify applying a uniform CoreWeave credit discount across Applied Digital’s entire business or assuming its financing has become unavailable.
The near-term trading issue is scrutiny of new financing and lease structures, particularly the identity of the obligor, guarantee duration, termination payments, and cash distributions to equity. The longer-duration issue is the mismatch between long landlord commitments and shorter underlying compute contracts. An important positive offset is that Galaxy’s existing Phase 2 remains funded and on schedule: the additional 260 MW of critical IT capacity supports CoreWeave’s future delivery capability. That is execution reassurance on an existing commitment, not a new CoreWeave backlog award.
APPROVED POWER DESERVES A LARGER PREMIUM TO UNAPPROVED DEVELOPMENT PIPELINES (READ-THROUGH 2)
Affected company: IREN Limited (IREN: US). Direction and magnitude: Positive for the relative strategic value of Sweetwater’s advanced power position. Potentially high development-value significance, but limited immediate earnings impact.
Call evidence: Galaxy said forward power availability had become more constrained because of competing-project delays and more difficult approvals, while demand for capacity beginning in 2028 had strengthened. Management argued that more than 800 MW of secured power at Helios 2 had become more valuable despite the absence of a signed lease. Its active discussions were increasingly focused on investment-grade hyperscalers seeking future capacity.
IREN’s September disclosure provides a directly relevant comparison. Its 2 GW Sweetwater Hub received conditional Base Load classification, comprising 1,400 MW at Sweetwater 1 and 600 MW at Sweetwater 2. The high-voltage substation at Sweetwater 1 had already been energized, and construction of an initial 300 MW gross-power development was underway with delivery targeted for Q4 2027.
The transmission mechanism is reduced time-to-power risk relative to less advanced competitors. When prospective customers prioritize delivery certainty, a developer with advanced electrical infrastructure and a stronger regulatory position can obtain more serious customer engagement, better commercial terms, and potentially more attractive financing. The asset becomes valuable because it can support a credible operating schedule, not merely because its owner controls land or has submitted a large interconnection request.
The qualification is that conditional Base Load classification is not unconditional approval of every construction, community, or operating requirement. Nor does 2 GW of gross power equal 2 GW of critical IT capacity or contracted revenue. IREN still needs to convert its power position into funded, deliverable, economically attractive capacity.
The near-term catalysts are regulatory confirmation, customer commitments, and construction milestones. The fundamental benefit is concentrated in 2027 through 2030. Galaxy’s call strengthens the relative case for advanced power positions such as Sweetwater, but it does not establish that IREN’s previously disclosed capacity is newly approved or that all of it should immediately receive a contracted-data-center valuation.
ERCOT RECLASSIFICATION RISK UNDERMINES UNIFORM VALUATION PER PIPELINE MW (READ-THROUGH 3)
Affected company: Cipher Digital (CIFR: US). Direction and magnitude: Negative for aggressive valuations of its Studied Load expansion portfolio. Potentially high significance for development optionality, with much smaller direct implications for already energized or separately approved assets.
Call evidence: Galaxy sought Base Load treatment for Caspian, received Studied Load classification, and disclosed that its reconsideration request was denied. Caspian remains in the process, but Galaxy expects greater clarity on allocation and energization timing only in 2027. The call also distinguished approximately 1.6 GW of previously approved Helios capacity from approximately 2.6 GW of potential capacity subject to the study.
Cipher’s publicly reported September site breakdown similarly separates approximately 1.1 GW of conditional Base Load from approximately 2.1 GW of conditional Studied Load. The latter includes Mikeska, Apollo, Stingray Phase 2, and McLennan. Approximately 66% of that particular 3.2 GW classification pool therefore sits in the more conditional category. This is not the same as saying 66% of Cipher’s entire operating and development portfolio lacks approval.
The transmission mechanism is through the probability, timing, and capital intensity of commercialization. A lower allocation can reduce ultimate revenue capacity. A later energization date defers rent, extends carrying costs, and can require additional equity before operations begin. A customer may also require stronger completion protections or decline to commit until the regulatory position is clearer. These effects reduce risk-adjusted development value even when underlying demand for compute remains strong.
Galaxy’s unsuccessful Caspian appeal is important because it demonstrates that a developer’s desired classification is not necessarily obtainable through reconsideration. It is evidence against treating study participation as equivalent to secured capacity. It is not evidence that Cipher will receive the same outcome, and it should not be applied to Cipher’s energized sites or its separately approved projects.
The near-term catalysts are final classifications and audit outcomes. Later allocation and energization decisions are more fundamental. Galaxy’s expected April 2027 milestone should not be assumed to guarantee an identical schedule for every Cipher project. The actionable distinction is between valuing approved assets and valuing a probability-weighted pipeline, rather than taking a blanket negative view on Texas development.
FINANCING CAPACITY IS BECOMING A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE FOR ESTABLISHED DATA CENTER OWNERS (READ-THROUGH 4)
Affected company: Digital Realty Trust (DLR: US). Direction and magnitude: Positive for relative competitive positioning and medium-term leasing economics. Moderate potential earnings significance over several years; limited basis for an immediate current-year estimate increase.
Call evidence: Galaxy said financing markets had become more selective and would increasingly favor developers with proven execution, high-quality counterparties, and structures that appropriately allocate risk. Management also described stronger demand from hyperscalers, frontier laboratories, and neoclouds for 2028 capacity, alongside delays at competing developments.
The transmission mechanism favors developers capable of financing construction before tenants need delivery. Financially constrained competitors can own attractive sites yet remain unable to convert them into completed supply. An established developer can capture demand through new leases, development partnerships, or selectively acquired projects. Reduced competing supply also supports pricing for available capacity and renewals, although existing long-term leases generally cannot be repriced immediately.
Digital Realty’s previously reported results demonstrate relevant capabilities rather than merely theoretical exposure. Its Q2 disclosures showed a record signed-but-not-commenced backlog of approximately $1.4 billion of annualized GAAP base rent at its ownership share, cash renewal increases of 25.4%, and net debt to adjusted EBITDA of 4.7 times. Galaxy’s commentary corroborates the durability of favorable market conditions; it does not create additional Digital Realty bookings beyond those already disclosed.
The distinction between financing cost and headline development yield is economically material. A 100-basis-point difference in annual financing cost on $1 billion changes pretax cash interest by $10 million before amortization and other obligations. Access to lower-cost, flexible capital can therefore offset a less aggressive headline rental yield and produce superior equity economics.
The near-term trading catalyst is the next leasing, development, and funding update, particularly whether customers are committing earlier and whether financing constraints are affecting competitive supply. The longer-duration benefit is stronger access to scarce, deliverable projects. Higher market interest rates remain a valuation headwind for Digital Realty itself, so the strongest conclusion is relative competitive advantage rather than immunity from rate-driven multiple compression.
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT AND DATA CENTER SUPPLY CHAINS
PROCUREMENT CAN PRECEDE LEASE SIGNING, SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT DEMAND BEFORE DEVELOPER REVENUE (READ-THROUGH 5)
Affected companies: Eaton Corporation (ETN: US); Schneider Electric (SU: France). Direction and magnitude: Positive for electrical infrastructure order visibility and demand durability. Moderate to high significance for exposed product lines, but no company-specific Galaxy award can be assigned from the call.
Call evidence: Galaxy disclosed approximately $230 million of deposits and purchase orders for Helios 2 electrical infrastructure, primarily long-lead equipment, despite not having signed a tenant lease. Management emphasized the ability to “place deposits, lock up future capacity” and described Phase 2 construction spending as accelerating toward the first half of 2027.
The transmission mechanism is the sequencing of development. Transformers, switchgear, power distribution, protection equipment, and related electrical systems must be secured before a data center can be commissioned. Developers with capital may commit to equipment before completing tenant negotiations to preserve delivery dates. Consequently, a delayed lease announcement does not necessarily mean that procurement has stopped or that upstream equipment demand has disappeared.
This creates a potentially important divergence between landlord and supplier indicators. A developer’s reported leasing revenue can remain years away while equipment suppliers already have order commitments. Conversely, those commitments are not equivalent to current supplier revenue, and the $230 million is an accumulated commitment figure rather than a disclosed Q3 order flow. It should not be added wholesale to any supplier’s quarterly bookings.
Eaton and Schneider are relevant because of their established electrical distribution and power-management exposures, not because Galaxy identified either as a supplier. Schneider’s October 16 results already reported exceptionally strong data center demand and increased visibility into 2027 and 2028. Galaxy’s call is therefore corroborating customer-side evidence for Schneider, not an advance signal of an unreported Q3 beat. For Eaton, it supports the durability of the demand environment underlying its electrical orders and backlog.
The near-term catalyst is order conversion, delivery schedules, and pricing in subsequent supplier updates. The longer-duration implication is that securing electrical infrastructure is becoming an earlier, more capital-intensive part of data center development. The principal counterweight is Galaxy’s disclosure that it is qualifying additional global suppliers. Scarcity supports incumbent demand, but expanding alternative supply can eventually limit pricing power. The evidence supports electrical equipment visibility more directly than a blanket upgrade to accelerator shipment forecasts.
DIGITAL-ASSET EXCHANGES AND BROKERAGE
RISING CRYPTOCURRENCY PRICES DO NOT AUTOMATICALLY TRANSLATE INTO A SPOT-TRADING EARNINGS SURGE (READ-THROUGH 6)
Affected companies: Coinbase Global (COIN: US); Robinhood Markets (HOOD: US). Direction and magnitude: Negative for price-driven extrapolations of cryptocurrency transaction revenue. Moderate significance for Coinbase’s spot-trading economics and Robinhood’s cryptocurrency business, with a smaller and less certain implication for Robinhood’s diversified consolidated earnings.
Call evidence: Management cited a bitcoin increase exceeding 40%, yet described traditional cryptocurrency activity as “slow and tepid.” Galaxy’s own trading volumes increased 12%, while the published earnings commentary described broader spot-market volumes as declining. Global Markets adjusted gross profit increased only approximately 8%, and the Digital Assets segment remained loss-making on an adjusted EBITDA basis.
The transmission mechanism runs through turnover, customer mix, and realized monetization rather than asset prices alone. Higher cryptocurrency prices increase customer wealth and can support balances, but transaction revenue requires trading activity. A recovery driven by passive ownership, institutional positioning, or a relatively narrow group of assets need not generate the retail turnover and fee intensity associated with a broad speculative cycle.
Galaxy’s results also indicate that relative share gains and product breadth may matter more than aggregate market growth. Its institutional trading, derivatives, and financing businesses can perform differently from consumer spot brokerage. Galaxy’s outperformance therefore does not establish that Coinbase or Robinhood lost share, and its gross-profit growth rate should not be applied directly to either company.
The highest-conviction negative implication is narrower: cryptocurrency price appreciation is insufficient evidence for aggressive spot-transaction revenue upgrades. Coinbase’s derivatives, subscription, stablecoin, and institutional businesses can offset weaker spot monetization. Robinhood’s equities, options, interest income, and other products provide additional offsets. The call does not support a blanket earnings-miss prediction.
This is an immediate trading consideration around Robinhood’s October 27 results and Coinbase’s upcoming Q3 disclosure. Some of the volume information may already be reflected in public exchange data and investor expectations. Galaxy adds confirmation from an institutional intermediary, not proof of a new consensus shortfall. Over a longer horizon, the evidence favors platforms capable of generating financing, derivatives, and recurring-service revenue alongside spot trading.
CUSTODY BANKS AND INSTITUTIONAL FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE
TOKENIZATION CAN REINFORCE INCUMBENT CUSTODIANS RATHER THAN DISINTERMEDIATE THEM (READ-THROUGH 7)
Affected company: The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation (BNY: US). Direction and magnitude: Positive for strategic positioning, client retention, and service expansion. Potentially moderate longer-duration significance, but low near-term earnings materiality.
Call evidence: Galaxy described its BNY relationship as validation of its institutional capabilities and explained that some large financial institutions want to own core infrastructure while outsourcing selected components. Galaxy can be paid to help build those capabilities and subsequently provide recurring services. Management explicitly cautioned that the opportunity was “not going to dominate our revenue in the next 12 months,” placing greater emphasis on the following 24 months to 36 months.
The transmission mechanism is retention of the customer relationship and expansion of the servicing package. BNY’s disclosed collaboration combines its digital-asset custody framework with Galaxy’s staking capabilities and infrastructure development expertise. Custody, fund accounting, tax reporting, payments, and client reporting can remain within BNY’s institutional model while specialized functions are supplied by a partner.
This is a constructive counterpoint to the assumption that blockchain adoption necessarily transfers value away from incumbent custodians to cryptocurrency-native platforms. Institutions can adopt new settlement and ownership infrastructure without abandoning their established governance, controls, and servicing providers. Successful integration can protect existing relationships and create incremental fee opportunities around assets that become tokenized.
The benefit is not automatic. Regulatory review, implementation costs, procurement cycles, fee-sharing arrangements, and client adoption all affect profitability. Galaxy’s infrastructure revenue is partly BNY’s expenditure, and a partnership announcement does not establish a high-margin recurring revenue stream for either party.
The near-term catalysts are production availability, regulatory progress, and identifiable client adoption rather than the original partnership announcement, which predates this call. The longer-duration catalyst is evidence that new digital services retain or expand institutional servicing mandates. The most defensible read-through is protection and extension of BNY’s franchise, not an immediate earnings acceleration.
ASSET MANAGEMENT AND TOKENIZED CASH
TOKENIZED LIQUIDITY PRODUCTS OFFER A DEFENSIVE DISTRIBUTION OPPORTUNITY FOR ESTABLISHED ASSET MANAGERS (READ-THROUGH 8)
Affected company: State Street Corporation (STT: US). Direction and magnitude: Positive for longer-term distribution and product relevance. Current direct earnings impact is very small; strategic significance is greater than the present revenue contribution.
Call evidence: Galaxy said the State Street Galaxy Onchain Liquidity Sweep Fund, SWEEP, was approaching $300 million of AUM and characterized this as an early indication of institutional product-market fit. The product provides tokenized liquidity management, with the launch documentation describing 24/7 on-chain cash management through stablecoins, subject to available liquidity.
The transmission mechanism is access to a new distribution and collateral-management channel while preserving the economics of a professionally managed investment product. Capital held for settlement or awaiting deployment on-chain can be moved into a yield-bearing liquidity vehicle without requiring the investor to return fully to traditional operating infrastructure. State Street can participate through investment management and securities servicing rather than allowing the entire relationship to migrate to a cryptocurrency-native provider.
The more important strategic implication is defensive as well as additive. If institutional cash and collateral management increasingly operate on programmable rails, established managers need products that remain usable within those workflows. A functioning tokenized product helps preserve access to client cash balances and creates potential integration into financing, treasury, and collateral systems.
The current scale should not be overstated. Even an illustrative annual fee of 50 basis points on $300 million would generate only $1.5 million of gross annual product revenue before expenses and revenue sharing. That is not a material standalone earnings driver for State Street. The illustrative calculation is a scale test, not the disclosed fee allocation to State Street.
The near-term catalyst is continued net asset growth, broader institutional use, and integration into actual treasury or collateral workflows. The longer-duration opportunity is a defensible role in the infrastructure of tokenized financial markets. Galaxy’s update is evidence of post-launch adoption, not a new fund launch or proof that tokenization has already reached financially transformative scale.
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$CNP KEY READ-THROUGHS FROM CENTERPOINT ENERGY’S Q3 2026 EARNINGS CALL
CenterPoint’s update most strongly supports investment in conventional grid construction, distribution equipment, and technologies that increase usable capacity on existing networks. The company added $4 billion to its capital plan, accelerated another $1.5 billion, and expects $4.5 billion of those combined investments to be deployed by 2030. The less obvious implication is that scarce transmission capacity, customer readiness, and financing are becoming more important than headline electricity-demand forecasts. Approximately 2 GW of prospective studied load withdrew, while the surviving 10 GW of higher-confidence demand requires substantial infrastructure investment. This favors suppliers paid to build the network and owners of genuinely available power capacity, while challenging valuations that capitalize unapproved development pipelines or equate utility capital growth with per-share earnings growth. The following conclusions distinguish demonstrated commercial relationships from sector exposure; impact assessments describe incremental business implications, not predicted share-price returns.
GRID CONSTRUCTION AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
BROWNFIELD TRANSMISSION IS A MORE EXECUTABLE OPPORTUNITY THAN THE HEADLINE MEGAPROJECT TRADE (READ-THROUGH 1)
Affected company: Quanta Services (PWR: US). Direction: Positive. Magnitude: Medium for the multiyear addressable opportunity, with substantially greater confidence in demand direction than in any company-specific revenue allocation.
CenterPoint stated that approximately 85% of the initial transmission projects identified are brownfield, predominantly at 345 kV and 138 kV. The company expects $4.5 billion of incremental and accelerated investment to be deployed by 2030, beginning in 2027. Wells emphasized existing rights of way and reconductoring, explaining that these assets allow the company to expand capacity faster while minimizing disruption. This is not principally an announcement of additional 765 kV greenfield projects.
The transmission mechanism is direct at the industry level: reconductoring, substation modifications, protection-system upgrades, and expansion of existing transmission infrastructure require engineering, specialized electrical construction, outage coordination, and skilled crews. Existing corridors reduce some land-acquisition and siting uncertainty, improving the probability that announced spending converts into executable work. For Quanta, the opportunity is therefore broader and potentially nearer-dated than a thesis dependent on large new transmission corridors.
The less obvious positive is that a brownfield-heavy program can sustain contractor demand even if politically sensitive greenfield projects encounter delays. Conversely, brownfield work is not automatically easy or high-margin. Construction on operating networks requires tightly managed outages and specialized labor, while fixed-price contracts can expose contractors to execution losses. The 85% figure describes the project mix, not necessarily the share of spending.
Quanta’s publicly disclosed transmission partnership with American Electric Power (AEP: US) establishes relevant engineering, procurement, construction, and equipment-supply capabilities. It does not establish that Quanta has won the new CenterPoint work. No contractor allocation was disclosed on this call.
Near-term actionability centers on 2027 backlog formation and project awards rather than an immediate 2026 earnings upgrade. The first-half 2027 transmission-study update provides another catalyst. The longer-duration implication is a widening market for conventional grid upgrades before the larger greenfield construction cycle fully develops.
DISTRIBUTION GROWTH BROADENS ELECTRICAL DEMAND BEYOND THE LARGEST DATA-CENTER CAMPUSES (READ-THROUGH 2)
Affected companies: Hubbell (HUBB: US) and Eaton (ETN: Ireland). Direction: Positive. Magnitude: Medium for relevant electrical businesses; the CenterPoint-specific earnings contribution is not quantifiable from disclosed information.
CenterPoint reported nearly 1 GW of distribution-level load requests over the preceding year. Management identified advanced manufacturing below 75 MW, commercial warehouses, and smaller inference-oriented data centers as contributors. Wells described a “fundamentally different trend at the distribution level” and highlighted demand from suppliers and businesses supporting the initial large industrial developments.
The mechanism extends beyond additional electricity consumption. More connection points and local load concentrations require transformers, distribution switchgear, connectors, protection equipment, feeders, and customer-side electrical systems. Hubbell participates through utility infrastructure components and electrical products. Eaton participates through utility distribution equipment and customer-side power-distribution systems. These are relevant product exposures, not confirmed allocations of CenterPoint procurement.
This is a more diversified demand signal than another hyperscale-campus announcement. Electrical investment can arise from manufacturing, logistics, commercial facilities, and distributed computing, reducing dependence on the completion of individual very large projects. The company’s approximately 2% population-growth backdrop adds a separate source of distribution demand.
Hubbell’s contemporaneous Q3 disclosure independently corroborates the transmission mechanism: its Utility Solutions growth was led by distribution, transmission, and substations, while Electrical Solutions benefited from strong data-center demand. CenterPoint’s commentary strengthens confidence in the breadth and duration of those end markets rather than identifying a previously undisclosed customer contract.
The magnitude should not be overstated. Load requests are not purchase orders, and the call does not establish that smaller facilities require more equipment per MW than larger campuses. Some requests may not proceed. Nevertheless, a broader population of customers creates more potential equipment orders and reduces reliance on a narrow set of hyperscale projects.
Near-term trading catalysts are order growth, backlog conversion, and capacity-expansion utilization in upcoming supplier results. The fundamental effect should develop through 2027–2030 as requests become funded connections. The preferred exposure is to businesses serving both utility and customer-side electrical infrastructure, rather than treating the opportunity exclusively as high-voltage transmission.
GRID STABILITY IS BECOMING A SEPARATE SPENDING CATEGORY, NOT JUST AN ACCESSORY TO NEW LINES (READ-THROUGH 3)
Affected company: Siemens Energy (ENR: Germany). Direction: Positive. Magnitude: Low immediate consolidated earnings impact from the identified Houston opportunity, but medium strategic significance for Grid Technologies.
CenterPoint organized its transmission investment around import capacity, system stability, and intra-regional capacity. In the Q&A, Wells specifically identified stability investments and non-wires alternatives as areas likely to expand as larger loads connect. This matters because the limiting factor is not always conductor capacity; it can also be the network’s ability to remain stable under changing operating conditions.
The mechanism favors equipment and controls that improve voltage stability, manage reactive power, and increase the amount of demand the existing network can safely serve. Such investment can complement new transmission lines or unlock capacity before larger construction projects are completed. It creates a distinct procurement opportunity rather than simply increasing the number of conventional transmission structures.
Siemens Energy has a documented connection to this opportunity. CenterPoint’s separately announced Project TALON will use Siemens Energy transmission grid-stabilizing technology. The Greater Houston Partnership’s description of the project identifies the supplier and explains that the technology is intended to respond rapidly to demand changes, support reliability, and increase usable capacity. That relationship is stronger evidence than assuming a supplier benefits merely because it sells grid equipment.
The earnings call did not announce a new Siemens Energy award, disclose the supplier’s contract value, or establish that all stability spending will use the same technology. The positive read-through is that CenterPoint’s wider planning framework supports a category in which Siemens Energy already has a local reference project.
The first-half 2027 transmission update is the clearest prospective catalyst for additional scope. The longer-duration opportunity is replication across networks where large loads create stability constraints. The investment implication is positive for grid-technology content, not an automatic positive revision to Siemens Energy’s gas-turbine order outlook.
DATA-CENTER INFRASTRUCTURE
CONDITIONAL MEGAWATTS REQUIRE A DISCOUNT; ENERGIZED AND CONTRACTED CAPACITY DESERVES A PREMIUM (READ-THROUGH 4)
Affected companies: Cipher Digital (CIFR: US) and IREN (IREN: Australia). Direction: Negative for the value attributed to unapproved development capacity; relative positive for already energized, contracted assets and more mature projects. Magnitude: Potentially high for development-option valuations, but limited immediate impact on earnings from operating facilities.
CenterPoint disclosed that approximately 2 GW of studied load withdrew during the state’s review process, while management remained confident in approximately 10 GW of base load. Relative to the approximately 4 GW of studied load discussed at the prior call, that represents approximately 50% attrition in the less-developed category. The relevant conclusion is not that every studied project has a similar failure probability. It is that apparently credible utility pipelines can still lose substantial capacity during verification.
Cipher’s October investor presentation identifies approximately 3.4 GW of pipeline capacity as subject to the ERCOT batch process. It separately identifies Colchis as a 1 GW conditional base-load project and Apollo as a 900 MW studied-load submission. IREN’s September announcement describes its 2 GW Sweetwater hub as conditionally included as base load, while expressly noting that classifications remain subject to ongoing approvals.
The valuation mechanism is straightforward. Delayed or unsuccessful approval postpones rental or computing revenue, extends capital-carrying costs, and can leave equipment, land, or construction commitments ahead of monetization. As an illustration, a 1-year delay reduces the present value of otherwise unchanged future cash flows by approximately 9% at a 10% discount rate, before additional costs. Failure to obtain the anticipated capacity has a more severe effect.
The differentiation within each company is critical. Cipher’s contracted and energized assets should not receive the same haircut as its unapproved development pipeline. Similarly, IREN’s energized Sweetwater substation and base-load classification are evidence of progress, but neither establishes that the full 2 GW is built, operating, or revenue-generating. Its disclosed initial 300 MW development target is a different metric from total site potential.
These are statewide procedural read-throughs, not evidence that Cipher or IREN is among CenterPoint’s withdrawing customers. The call does not identify the withdrawing parties or establish that these companies have failed any requirement.
The December 10 ERCOT audit milestone is the most actionable near-term catalyst. Confirmation of classifications, capacity allocation, and energization pathways can materially change development valuations before reported earnings change. The longer-duration implication is a wider valuation gap between operational infrastructure and unapproved site potential. A blanket bearish conclusion on either company would ignore that distinction.
POWER GENERATION AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY
HOUSTON’S NETWORK BUILD SUPPORTS EXISTING GENERATION VALUE, BUT HEDGING DELAYS EARNINGS TRANSMISSION (READ-THROUGH 5)
Affected companies: Vistra (VST: US) and NRG Energy (NRG: US). Direction: Positive for the longer-term commercial value of existing ERCOT generation and customer-supply capabilities. Magnitude: Medium to potentially high over several years, but low for immediate earnings revisions from this call alone.
CenterPoint maintained confidence in approximately 10 GW of higher-confidence load and expects at least 14 GW of total additions by the end of 2030. Wells described significant additional Batch 1 demand and noted that the newly identified transmission program addresses only approximately 50% of the capacity need currently anticipated for that batch.
The key distinction is that the announced Houston investment principally expands the ability to deliver electricity; it does not itself supply an equivalent amount of new generation. Successful energization therefore creates additional demand for electricity, dispatchable capacity, commercial hedging, and customer-supply arrangements. Existing ERCOT generators can benefit through higher utilization, more valuable future contracting opportunities, and greater demand for reliable supply.
Vistra and NRG have established generation and retail positions in Texas, allowing participation through both physical production and commercial customer relationships. The strongest conclusion is improved long-term demand for those capabilities. It is not that every additional MW necessarily raises spot prices or spark spreads. New generation, storage, demand flexibility, fuel costs, and transmission expansion can offset scarcity effects.
The near-term earnings limitation is particularly clear for Vistra. Its Q2 disclosure stated that approximately 94% of expected 2027 generation volumes and 72% of 2028 volumes were hedged as of August 3. These company-wide figures do not measure Houston-specific exposure, but they demonstrate why a stronger future load outlook should not be translated directly into an immediate EBITDA increase.
NRG’s retail obligations create a similar analytical requirement: higher wholesale prices can increase generation value while raising the cost of serving customers. The relevant exposure is the net generation, retail, and hedge position, not gross generation capacity.
The December audit outcome can affect forward-market expectations and equity sentiment before it affects earnings. More durable benefits depend on actual energization, customer ramping, new supply contracts, and hedge roll-off, principally through 2028–2030. The constructive read-through is strongest for existing assets and integrated commercial capabilities, rather than assuming all proposed new generation will earn attractive returns.
REGULATED UTILITIES AND FINANCING
THE GAP BETWEEN CAPITAL GROWTH AND PER-SHARE VALUE IS WIDENING (READ-THROUGH 6)
Affected companies: CenterPoint Energy (CNP: US), American Electric Power (AEP: US), and Sempra (SRE: US). Direction: Negative for valuations based primarily on capital-plan expansion without a financing bridge; positive relative differentiation for demonstrably funded growth. Magnitude: Medium for sector valuation and potentially high for the economics of incremental projects. No peer-specific EPS downgrade follows automatically.
CenterPoint expects enterprise rate-base growth above 14%, but only approximately 8%–9% EPS growth through 2030. Its remaining equity financing requirement increased by $1.6 billion to $4.5 billion, approximately $4 billion of which is expected during 2027–2030. The remaining equity requirement therefore increased approximately 55%, even though the new investment is being funded with less equity than the company’s usual rule of thumb.
The current quarter demonstrates the mechanism rather than merely forecasting it. Growth and rate recovery contributed $0.09 of EPS, while financing costs absorbed $0.04. Increasing the regulated asset base can create attractive earnings opportunities, but interest costs, additional shares, construction timing, and recovery lag determine how much of that growth reaches existing shareholders.
This is especially relevant to large investment programs such as those of AEP and Sempra’s Texas utility interests. The read-through is not that their financing requirements equal CenterPoint’s. It is that incremental capital announcements should be evaluated against available operating cash flow, parent equity contributions, asset-recycling proceeds, and the timing of cash recovery.
Sempra’s announced base-plan framework, designed around operating cash flow and capital recycling rather than new common-equity issuance, illustrates the distinction. That framework does not mean every future Oncor investment is financed without additional capital. It does mean that funded base-plan growth and unfunded upside should not be assigned identical valuations.
CenterPoint also exposed a limitation of otherwise favorable tracker mechanisms. Management said nearly all newly added capital is recoverable through existing trackers, generally with twice-annual filings. Yet Wells separately warned that a rising share of long-cycle transmission work could strain balance sheets and supported consideration of interim recovery. Efficient recovery after assets enter service does not necessarily fund several years of construction beforehand.
Near-term catalysts are financing updates, asset-sale proceeds, equity issuance, and evidence of cash recovery. Longer-duration differentiation will depend on whether utilities can expand infrastructure without repeatedly increasing dilution. The cross-sector implication favors critical suppliers relative to utility owners when project volume grows faster than owners’ cash generation: suppliers can monetize construction activity while utilities continue to fund the assets.
INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE
HOUSTON’S INDUSTRIAL MULTIPLIER SUPPORTS WAREHOUSE CASH FLOW, NOT JUST DATA-CENTER LAND VALUES (READ-THROUGH 7)
Affected company: EastGroup Properties (EGP: US). Direction: Positive. Magnitude: Medium for Houston operations and low-to-medium at the consolidated company level.
CenterPoint reported industrial and commercial leasing activity more than 30% above the prior year. Wells highlighted commercial warehouses, smaller advanced-manufacturing facilities, and the suppliers supporting large industrial developments. He described the demand as extending beyond the initial customer into its broader business ecosystem.
EastGroup provides a measurable public-market exposure to this regional signal. Its Q3 supplemental disclosure lists approximately 7.4 million square feet in Houston, representing 9.6% of annualized base rent, with 97.3% leased. The same disclosure shows 5.2% quarterly growth in Houston same-property cash NOI and an 18.7% cash rental-rate increase on new and renewal leases signed during the quarter.
The transmission mechanism is stronger demand for logistics, distribution, and light-industrial space as new manufacturing and commercial activity expands. Higher leasing velocity can reduce downtime and concessions, support renewal economics, and improve absorption of development projects. The direct benefit is property cash flow and development execution, not electricity revenue.
The less obvious opportunity is outside the most crowded data-center infrastructure trade. Suppliers, logistics providers, and smaller industrial businesses require physical facilities even when they are not themselves large electricity users. CenterPoint’s distribution-load commentary provides an independent operating signal that this broader ecosystem is expanding.
The existing 97.3% leased rate limits the amount of immediate upside available from simply filling vacant buildings. Incremental value is more likely to emerge through lease rollover, sustained tenant demand, and development absorption. EastGroup’s disclosed Houston projects under construction also create a pathway for growth beyond its stabilized portfolio.
The limitation is geographic. CenterPoint’s commentary supports Houston industrial fundamentals, not a national warehouse recovery or an office-property thesis. New local supply can also absorb part of the demand benefit, and utility energization delays can postpone occupancy for power-intensive tenants.
This is principally a 2027–2028 fundamental read-through rather than a sharp event-driven trade. Upcoming leasing, renewal-spread, and development-occupancy disclosures are the relevant catalysts. The actionable conclusion is a favorable regional earnings signal for a landlord with documented Houston exposure, rather than a broad rerating argument for all industrial real estate.
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EARNINGS CALENDAR: NEXT 30 DAYS
261 companies report from October 20 through November 13, 2026.
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2026
BEFORE THE OPEN
• NOC (Northrop Grumman Corporation)
• VICR (Vicor Corporation)
AFTER THE CLOSE
• NFLX (Netflix, Inc.)
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 2026
BEFORE THE OPEN
• NEE (NextEra Energy, Inc.)
• PM (Philip Morris International Inc.)
• TDY (Teledyne Technologies Incorporated)
AFTER THE CLOSE
• HXL (Hexcel Corporation)
• IBM (International Business Machines Corporation)
• LRCX (Lam Research Corporation)
• META (Meta Platforms, Inc.)
• SAP (SAP SE)
• TSLA (Tesla, Inc.)
• TXN (Texas Instruments Incorporated)
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2026
BEFORE THE OPEN
• BX (Blackstone)
• CRS (Carpenter Technology Corporation)
• DTE (DTE Energy Company)
• EME (EMCOR Group, Inc.)
• FIX (Comfort Systems USA, Inc.)
• LMT (Lockheed Martin Corporation)
• NBIS (Nebius Group N.V.)
• NOK (Nokia Corporation)
• PCG (PG&E Corporation)
• SPOT (Spotify Technology S.A.)
• VLO (Valero Energy Corporation)
• WKC (World Kinect Corporation)
AFTER THE CLOSE
• BE (Bloom Energy Corporation)
• MXL (MaxLinear, Inc.)
• VRSN (VeriSign, Inc.)
• WDC (Western Digital Corporation)
TIME NOT SET
• TTMI (TTM Technologies, Inc.)
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 23, 2026
BEFORE THE OPEN
• INFY (Infosys)
• NVT (nVent Electric plc)
• XOM (ExxonMobil Holdings Corporation)
MONDAY, OCTOBER 26, 2026
AFTER THE CLOSE
• AMKR (Amkor Technology, Inc.)
• CDNS (Cadence Design Systems, Inc.)
• CLS (Celestica Inc.)
• RMBS (Rambus Inc.)
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2026
BEFORE THE OPEN
• CMS (CMS Energy Corporation)
• CNP (CenterPoint Energy, Inc.)
• GLW (Corning Incorporated)
• GLXY (Galaxy Digital Inc.)
• GOOGL (Alphabet Inc.)
• HUBB (Hubbell Incorporated)
• SKHY (SK Hynix Inc)
AFTER THE CLOSE
• ASMIY (ASM International NV)
• EQT (EQT Corporation)
• FE (FirstEnergy Corp.)
• FFIV (F5, Inc.)
• HOOD (Robinhood Markets, Inc.)
• NXPI (NXP Semiconductors N.V.)
• RBBN (Ribbon Communications Inc.)
• STX (Seagate Technology Holdings plc)
• TER (Teradyne, Inc.)
• UCTT (Ultra Clean Holdings, Inc.)
• V (Visa)
TIME NOT SET
• FCX (Freeport-McMoRan Inc.)
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 2026
BEFORE THE OPEN
• AEP (American Electric Power Company, Inc.)
• APH (Amphenol Corporation)
• DINO (HF Sinclair Corporation)
• EXTR (Extreme Networks, Inc.)
• FTV (Fortive Corporation)
• KLAC (KLA Corporation)
• MYRG (MYR Group Inc.)
• PSX (Phillips 66)
• TEL (TE Connectivity plc)
• UMC (United Microelectronics Corporation)
• VRT (Vertiv Holdings Co)
• WOLF (Wolfspeed, Inc.)
AFTER THE CLOSE
• AWK (American Water Works Company, Inc.)
• EBAY (eBay Inc.)
• EQIX (Equinix, Inc.)
• FORM (FormFactor, Inc.)
• MSFT (Microsoft Corporation)
• NOW (ServiceNow, Inc.)
• OLED (Universal Display Corporation)
• SIMO (Silicon Motion Technology Corporation)
TIME NOT SET
• ACMR (ACM Research, Inc.)
• FLEX (Flex Ltd.)
• GEV (GE Vernova Inc.)
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2026
BEFORE THE OPEN
• AES (The AES Corporation)
• ALGM (Allegro MicroSystems, Inc.)
• AMZN ( Inc.)
• ASX (ASE Technology Holding Co., Ltd.)
• BTU (Peabody Energy Corporation)
• CARR (Carrier Global Corporation)
• COHU (Cohu, Inc.)
• COIN (Coinbase Global, Inc.)
• CTSH (Cognizant Technology Solutions)
• ENTG (Entegris, Inc.)
• GSAT (Globalstar, Inc.)
• IEP (Icahn Enterprises L.P.)
• KTOS (Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc.)
• MA (Mastercard)
• MCHP (Microchip Technology Incorporated)
• ONTO (Onto Innovation Inc.)
• PBF (PBF Energy Inc.)
• PGY (Pagaya Technologies Ltd.)
• PPL (PPL Corporation)
• PWR (Quanta Services, Inc.)
• RKT (Rocket Companies, Inc.)
• SILC (Silicom Ltd.)
• STM (STMicroelectronics N.V.)
• SWKS (Skyworks Solutions, Inc.)
• VISN (Vistance Networks, Inc.)
• WCC (WESCO International, Inc.)
• XEL (Xcel Energy Inc.)
AFTER THE CLOSE
• AXTI (AXT, Inc.)
• DAR (Darling Ingredients Inc.)
• DLR (Digital Realty Trust, Inc.)
• EIX (Edison International)
• FTAI (FTAI Aviation Ltd.)
• INTC (Intel Corporation)
• LNT (Alliant Energy Corporation)
• MPWR (Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.)
• MSTR (Strategy Inc.)
• SNDK (Sandisk Corporation)
TIME NOT SET
• TECK (Teck Resources Limited)
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2026
BEFORE THE OPEN
• BP (BP PLC)
• CVX (Chevron Corporation)
• EXC (Exelon Corporation)
• SRE (Sempra)
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 2026
BEFORE THE OPEN
• BRK/A (Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (Class A))
• CVI (CVR Energy, Inc.)
• ON (ON Semiconductor Corporation)
• PEG (Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated)
• TSEM (Tower Semiconductor Ltd.)
AFTER THE CLOSE
• AAPL (Apple Inc.)
• BWXT (BWX Technologies, Inc.)
• ICHR (Ichor Holdings, Ltd.)
• LSCC (Lattice Semiconductor Corporation)
• PLTR (Palantir Technologies Inc.)
• WMB (The Williams Companies, Inc.)
TIME NOT SET
• AEHR (Aehr Test Systems)
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 2026
BEFORE THE OPEN
• ADTN (ADTRAN Holdings, Inc.)
• AEIS (Advanced Energy Industries, Inc.)
• AME (AMETEK, Inc.)
• APO (Apollo Global Management, Inc.)
• ETN (Eaton Corporation plc)
• IPGP (IPG Photonics Corporation)
• LFUS (Littelfuse, Inc.)
• MPC (Marathon Petroleum Corporation)
• NLST (Netlist, Inc.)
• SMCI (Super Micro Computer, Inc.)
• WEC (WEC Energy Group, Inc.)
AFTER THE CLOSE
• ALAB (Astera Labs, Inc.)
• AMD (Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.)
• ANET (Arista Networks, Inc.)
• NVTS (Navitas Semiconductor Corporation)
• PARR (Par Pacific Holdings, Inc.)
TIME NOT SET
• PNW (Pinnacle West Capital Corporation)
• SUN (Sunoco LP)
• TLN (Talen Energy Corporation)
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 2026
BEFORE THE OPEN
• ACLS (Axcelis Technologies, Inc.)
• CAT (Caterpillar Inc.)
• DHT (DHT Holdings, Inc.)
• ETR (Entergy Corporation)
• GFS (GlobalFoundries Inc.)
• GNRC (Generac Holdings Inc.)
• HUT (Hut 8 Corp.)
• MELI (MercadoLibre, Inc.)
• NI (NiSource Inc.)
• Q (Qnity Electronics, Inc.)
• RDDT (Reddit, Inc.)
• SHAZ (SharonAI Holdings, Inc.)
• UBER (Uber Technologies, Inc.)
• VPG (Vishay Precision Group, Inc.)
• VSH (Vishay Intertechnology, Inc.)
• VVV (Valvoline Inc.)
AFTER THE CLOSE
• APP (AppLovin Corporation)
• ARM (Arm Holdings plc)
• ATO (Atmos Energy Corporation)
• DASH (DoorDash, Inc.)
• EMR (Emerson Electric Co.)
• MKSI (MKS Inc.)
• ORA (Ormat Technologies, Inc.)
• SEI (Solaris Energy Infrastructure, Inc.)
• SITM (SiTime Corporation)
• VIAV (Viavi Solutions Inc.)
TIME NOT SET
• CRCL (Circle Internet Group, Inc.)
• RAL (Ralliant Corporation)
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 2026
BEFORE THE OPEN
• AAOI (Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.)
• AMTX (Aemetis, Inc.)
• CMI (Cummins Inc.)
• CNR (Core Natural Resources, Inc.)
• DCO (Ducommun Incorporated)
• DDOG (Datadog, Inc.)
• DIOD (Diodes Incorporated)
• DUK (Duke Energy Corporation)
• EVRG (Evergy, Inc.)
• FWONA (Liberty Media Corporation (Series A))
• INOD (Innodata Inc.)
• MTSI (MACOM Technology Solutions Holdings, Inc.)
• NRG (NRG Energy, Inc.)
• NVMI (Nova Ltd.)
• PDFS (PDF Solutions, Inc.)
• SO (The Southern Company)
• SPCX (Space Exploration Technologies Corp.)
• SYNA (Synaptics Incorporated)
• TRGP (Targa Resources Corp.)
• TTD (The Trade Desk, Inc.)
• WIX ( Ltd.)
AFTER THE CLOSE
• AKAM (Akamai Technologies, Inc.)
• AOSL (Alpha and Omega Semiconductor Limited)
• ATEN (A10 Networks, Inc.)
• CLNE (Clean Energy Fuels Corp.)
• ED (Consolidated Edison, Inc.)
• EOG (EOG Resources, Inc.)
• LITE (Lumentum Holdings Inc.)
• NET (Cloudflare, Inc.)
• PSIX (Power Solutions International, Inc.)
• WLDN (Willdan Group, Inc.)
TIME NOT SET
• HIMX (Himax Technologies, Inc.)
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 2026
BEFORE THE OPEN
• ALMU (Aeluma, Inc.)
• CLMT (Calumet, Inc.)
• VST (Vistra Corp.)
TIME NOT SET
• WULF (TeraWulf Inc.)
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 2026
BEFORE THE OPEN
• CAPL (CrossAmerica Partners LP)
• CEG (Constellation Energy Corporation)
• CENX (Century Aluminum Company)
• DOCN (DigitalOcean Holdings, Inc.)
• FN (Fabrinet)
• KKR (KKR & Co. Inc.)
• SANM (Sanmina Corporation)
• STRL (Sterling Infrastructure, Inc.)
• VECO (Veeco Instruments Inc.)
AFTER THE CLOSE
• HIMS (Hims & Hers Health, Inc.)
TIME NOT SET
• VG (Venture Global, Inc.)
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 2026
BEFORE THE OPEN
• AIP (Arteris, Inc.)
• AXON (Axon Enterprise, Inc.)
• RIOT (Riot Platforms, Inc.)
• TEM (Tempus AI, Inc.)
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 2026
BEFORE THE OPEN
• AEE (Ameren Corporation)
• AEVA (Aeva Technologies, Inc.)
• ASM (Avino Silver & Gold Mines Ltd)
• CIFR (Cipher Digital Inc.)
• COHR (Coherent Corp.)
• CORZ (Core Scientific, Inc.)
• DK (Delek US Holdings, Inc.)
• DKL (Delek Logistics Partners, L.P.)
• ECHO (EchoStar Corporation)
• ENS (EnerSys)
• KGS (Kodiak Gas Services, Inc.)
• LEU (Centrus Energy Corp.)
• MARA (MARA Holdings, Inc.)
• POWI (Power Integrations, Inc.)
• QCOM (QUALCOMM Incorporated)
• SKM (SK Telecom Co., Ltd.)
• SU (Suncor Energy Inc (Canada))
• TE (T1 Energy Inc.)
AFTER THE CLOSE
• UGP (Ultrapar Participacoes SA)
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 2026
BEFORE THE OPEN
• BTBT (Bit Digital, Inc.)
• FRMI (Fermi Inc.)
• PANW (Palo Alto Networks)
• POET (POET Technologies Inc.)
• SBET (Sharplink, Inc.)
• SLNH (Soluna Holdings, Inc.)
• WYFI (WhiteFiber, Inc.)
AFTER THE CLOSE
• AMAT (Applied Materials, Inc.)
TIME NOT SET
• BDCO (Blue Dolphin Energy Company)
• TRT (Trio-Tech International)
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2026
BEFORE THE OPEN
• MOVE (Corvex, Inc.)
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