Google's Paper Assistant tries to automate the error-detection part of scientific review.
The system optimizes for finding errors and reviewing manuscripts rather than generating science, which is the inverted target most reasoning work skips.
If most papers are partly machine-written and the reviewer is also a machine, the human is squeezed out of both ends, and quality becomes whatever two models agree on.
Towards Automating Scientific Review with Google's Paper Assistant Tool
Paper:
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TRUMP TO BAN CHINESE ROBOTS, POWER INVERTERS
The Trump administration is set to ban imports of new Chinese humanoid robots, quadruped robots, and connected power inverters.
The move aims to protect the U.S. AI supply chain from cybersecurity and national security risks while encouraging manufacturers to shift production to the U.S. amid growing demand for AI infrastructure.
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Circle just lost a fifth of its value in a single day, and the blow came from its own inner circle. Its stock fell 17 percent after a new stablecoin launched, which is normal.
What is not normal is who built it…. the asset manager that runs roughly 80 percent of Circle's reserves, the exchange that co-founded USDC and is paid nearly a billion a year to distribute it, and the bank that holds the money. BlackRock, Coinbase, and BNY Mellon all backed a rival to the coin they help operate. The story is not really about a competitor.
Circle makes money one way, and it explains the whole reaction. $USDC is a digital dollar.
For every one in circulation, Circle holds a real dollar in cash and short-term Treasuries, roughly 74 billion dollars of reserves, and the interest those reserves earn is almost the entire business. About 80 percent of that pile sits in one fund, the Circle Reserve Fund, managed by BlackRock and custodied by BNY Mellon.
To get USDC into the world, Circle pays distributors. In one recent year it paid Coinbase alone 908 million dollars.
On June 30th more than 140 companies launched a competitor called Open USD, and it inverts the one thing Circle relied on. Instead of the issuer keeping the reserve interest, Open USD shares almost all of it with the businesses that use and distribute the coin. Free to mint, free to redeem, no caps. For any firm that had been helping Circle earn that interest for a fee, the math flips: stop collecting a fee to build someone else's yield, and collect the yield yourself.
The names that signed on are the core of Circle's own machine. The exchange that co-created USDC and earns close to a billion a year distributing it is not only backing Open USD, it is launching it on Base, the blockchain that exchange itself owns. The manager of roughly 80 percent of USDC's reserves is backing it too, and so is the custodian bank. The firms paid to run the reserves, sell the coin, and hold the assets are helping stand up an alternative.
This was clearly written into the incentives from the start. Coinbase earning 908 million to distribute Circle's product is Coinbase working for Circle. Coinbase owning a share of a rival that runs on its own chain is Coinbase working for itself. Once a distributor can own the economics instead of renting them, loyalty to the issuer means leaving money on the table. And the Coinbase deal is up for renewal in August, so Circle now renegotiates with a partner that just helped launch the alternative. That does not make the outcome certain. It changes who holds the leverage.
The deeper pattern reaches far past Circle if you look carefully. It is the risk in any business whose profit comes from sitting in the middle of other people's money.
Circle's role was to be the middleman on the digital dollar, holding the reserves and keeping the interest while everyone else moved the coin. That works until the parties on both sides decide they can route around you and split what you kept. The reserve manager, the distributor, and the custodian do not structurally need the issuer to capture that yield, and Open USD is the first serious attempt to prove it.
None of this means Circle is doomed, and the fair reading matters. This is also just rational diversification. BlackRock earns fees across every rail it can touch, backing a new one does not require abandoning the old one, and Open USD does not launch until later this year.
USDC is still trusted, deeply liquid, and regulated, and Circle's CEO argues the market is big enough for many winners, which may well be true.
But the message in the stock is hard to miss.
A company whose whole moat was owning the middle just watched the firms on either side of it agree to build a road around it. The most dangerous rival is rarely the stranger. It is the partner who already knows exactly how you get paid.
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STRC is now trading 35% of MSTR's daily share volume on a 7-day MA. SATA is at 6% of ASST.
But that's the wrong number. Run the dollar volume instead.
Over the last 30 days:
MSTR ~$2.96B/day · STRC ~$409M/day → STRC = 14% of MSTR's dollar flow
ASST ~$55M/day · SATA ~$19M/day → SATA = 35% of ASST's dollar flow
The ratio inverts because share volume hides what par-priced instruments actually move.
A SATA share trades at ~$100. An ASST share trades at ~$17. One SATA print is six ASST prints.
Of every dollar of capital touching the Strategy stack on a given day, 12¢ goes through STRC.
Of every dollar touching the Strive stack, 26¢ goes through SATA.
Strive's preferred is doing more of the work for its common than Strategy's is, proportional to the size of each ecosystem.
In absolute terms STRC is a $400M+ daily market. SATA is still a $19M one. The instrument is real on both sides.
The scale isn't comparable yet.
Watch the trajectory. STRC went from 4% of MSTR share volume in November to 35% today. Six months.
But remember, SATA is a LOT newer than STRC.
The same curve is starting to bend on SATA - 2% to 6% over the same window - just from a smaller base.
Can't wait to continue watching digital credit adoption in real time... especially with daily and semi-monthly dividends for the instruments.
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The European Commission has halted public EU funding for solar projects using inverters from high-risk suppliers.
This mainly affects Chinese firms like Huawei, as well as suppliers from Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
The EU took this step due to serious cybersecurity risks, officials fear foreign governments could control or disrupt the devices, causing blackouts or other issues in Europe’s energy network.
Chinese firms supply inverters for over 220 gigawatts of Europe’s solar capacity.
The rules apply immediately to European Investment Bank and other EU program funds.
This may raise costs for new solar builds in the short term as Europe shifts suppliers.
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