some thoughts on Arc chain: ppl building on Arc or related to Arc have reached out to me several times over the past few weeks apparently, they want to get trenchers onto the chain early because they understand that memecoin activity is one of the fastest ways to bootstrap traction for a new chain i mostly ignored them i've been too busy to even keep track of all the messages i get these days, but more importantly, i've believed that onchain activity this cycle will be concentrated around Robinhood, BNB and Solana that was my bias until i learned that fomo will be integrating Arc shortly after launch Seyong from fomo recently told me that the integration should happen within a few days of launch and honestly, that changed my short-term bias on Arc don't get me wrong i still believe RH/BNB/SOL will be where the majority of the real action happens this cycle but there's something important to consider: fomo hasn't even integrated Hyperliquid, Tron or TON and all three of those chains produced runners that reached $100m+ so if fomo is integrating Arc right out of the gate, i think there's a very real possibility that there will be some serious short-term money-making opportunities for trenchers and that's the key distinction: short term i am NOT saying Arc is going to become the next BNB, Robinhood or Solana i'm saying this is the first time fomo will be integrating a non-mainstream chain essentially from launch that makes Arc a very interesting experiment and i'm positioned accordingly i bought the native token of the main launchpad on Arc, $LONG, along with the top 3 memecoins on the launchpad my thesis is basically this: 1. fomo is integrating Arc fomo is becoming one of the main crypto trading apps for retail this cycle i originally ignored Arc entirely the fomo integration changed that 2. Arc is actively trying to attract trenchers multiple ppl building around Arc have reached out to top trenchers like myself that suggests they understand how important early memecoin activity can be for a new chain 3. they appear to be trying the Robinhood playbook i've also had a source tell me that Arc understands how important it is to have trenchers on the chain early and is actively focused on making that happen essentially, they're borrowing a page from the Robinhood playbook and i want to be super, super clear about this: this is a degen, degen rabbit hole this is a short-term adventure i'm not rotating my core thesis away from RH/BNB/SOL and i genuinely believe that RH/BNB/SOL is where you want to concentrate your energy this cycle... and that most other chains will likely be a waste of time on a long enough timeframe so why am i touching Arc? i'm simply betting that the combination of new chain + launchpad + trenchers + fomo integration could create some very interesting early opportunities if you're interested in exploring it, you can either wait for the fomo integration later this week or bridge over earlier through the main launchpad on Arc, Long for those who want to bridge: 1. buy $CRCL on Robinhood (most tokens on Arc are paired against $CRCL): 2. bridge your Robinhood Chain $CRCL to Arc using the bridge provided by the main launchpad: 3. buy whatever you want through IMPORTANT: don't use trading bots like Basedbot or GMGN right now they're routing through the wrong pools and you could end up losing a significant amount of your money to slippage and if you're not on fomo yet, you really should hurry to get your account set up if this thesis plays out, you don't want to be setting everything up after the opportunities have already appeared join through my ref: i'm also doing a $350k giveaway for active fomo refs so you could literally get rewarded for being early again: this is a short-term degen experiment but if you're a trencher, this is exactly the kind of setup i'd want on my radar before the masses arrive

⚠️Top 10 Security Incidents (January–June 2026) 1：KelpDAO, April 18, loss of approximately $292 million. The attacker exploited a verification flaw in the LayerZero-related cross-chain bridge validation flow, released a large amount of unbacked rsETH, and rapidly supplied it to protocols including Aave, Compound, Euler, and Fluid for borrowing and cashing out, ultimately evolving into a cross-protocol bad debt contagion event. 2：Drift Protocol, April 1, loss of approximately $285 million. The attacker obtained protocol administrative control by leveraging durable nonce, social engineering, and weaknesses in multisig governance, then introduced forged collateral assets and manipulated protocol parameters to drain a large amount of real assets from the protocol. 3：Step Finance, January 31, loss of approximately $40 million. The compromise of high-privilege devices and the treasury private key system resulted in significant asset losses. On February 24, the project announced it would cease operations. 4：Humanity Protocol, June 9, loss of approximately $31 million to $36 million. The root cause was improper management of private keys and multisig keys. After compromising critical devices, the attacker took over bridge administrative privileges and carried out fund transfers and abnormal minting across multiple chains. 5：Truebit, January 8, loss of approximately $26.6 million. The attacker exploited an integer overflow/pricing logic flaw in a legacy contract to mint a large amount of TRU at low cost and dump the tokens on the market, causing the token price to collapse rapidly. 6：Resolv Labs, March 22, loss of approximately $25 million. After obtaining high-privilege signing capabilities, the attacker exploited the lack of supply caps and ratio validation in the minting logic to mint approximately 80 million unbacked USR and cash them out. 7：SwapNet, January 25, loss of approximately $13.4 million. Its closed-source contract contained arbitrary-call / approval abuse risks. The attacker leveraged users' existing approved allowances to trigger malicious transferFrom calls and drained users' assets at scale. 8：Verus-Ethereum Bridge, May 18, loss of approximately $11.58 million. The cross-chain bridge failed to strictly verify whether the source-chain input amount matched the destination-chain release amount during the validation process. The attacker exploited this flaw to forge valid payloads and withdraw assets. 9：YieldBlox, February 22, loss of approximately $10.97 million. The attacker manipulated the price of USTRY in a low-liquidity market, causing the oracle to overestimate the collateral value, and then executed excessive borrowing from the Stellar lending pool. 10：THORChain, May 15, loss of approximately $10.7 million. A newly joined node operator exploited weaknesses in the GG20 threshold signature scheme, compromised a single vault, and withdrew assets across multiple chains, exposing the systemic risks of cross-chain signing infrastructure.

The rsETH markets on Aave V3 and Aave V4 have been frozen. Aave's contracts have not been exploited and this is an exploit related to rsETH. The freeze follows an exploit of the Kelp DAO rsETH bridge. Freezing the rsETH markets prevents new deposits and borrowing against rsETH collateral while the situation is assessed. We are reviewing information about rsETH borrows on Aave that occurred after the exploit and will share more details as soon as possible. If the protocol accumulates bad debt from this incident, we'll explore paths to offset the deficit.

We're seeing a significant price dislocation for $G token across exchanges. The spread between certain exchanges has remained above 30% for several hours and peaked at over 40%. The issue is primarily related to liquidity fragmentation and bridging constraints between Gravity Alpha Mainnet and Ethereum. The team @GravityChain is actively working on a solution to enable users to bridge assets from Gravity Alpha Mainnet to Ethereum more quickly and efficiently. We are treating this as a priority and will share further updates as we make progress.

BofA Initiates Coverage on $AMKR with Buy Rating, PT $70 Analyst comments: See Amkor as an underappreciated beneficiary of rising semiconductor packaging complexity, AI/HPC-related advanced packaging demand, improving utilization, and U.S. supply-chain regionalization. Advanced Products represented 82% of 2Q26 revenue, and we see Amkor benefiting from opportunities across 2.5D, HDFO-RDL, HDFO-bridge, co-packaged optics, and test. Computing is expected to become the company’s largest end market by 2028, supported by programs including NVIDIA’s Vera CPU, Microsoft’s Cobalt CPU, and later AMD’s Venice server CPU. The planned Arizona facility adds strategic value by providing U.S.-based advanced packaging capacity. Phase 1 is projected to be fully committed, with Apple and NVIDIA identified as key customers, a 10-year TSMC agreement, and an approximately $1.5B NVIDIA prepayment expected in 2027. Phase 1 targets roughly $1B of annual revenue and gross margin above 30% at scale by 2030. We forecast EPS increasing from $1.51 in 2025 to $3.41 in 2028E, representing a 31% CAGR, as mix and utilization improve. Our $70 price objective is based on 21x our 2028E EPS estimate of $3.41. BofA also sees meaningful operating leverage as utilization improves, with average utilization moving from the 50% range to the 70% range and Q2 gross margin expanding to 16.8%. Computing is expected to become Amkor’s largest end market by 2028, rising to roughly 35% of revenue from 20% in 2025. AMKR currently trades at about 14x BofA’s 2028 EPS estimate versus an OSAT peer median near 20x, while management’s longer-term framework targets ~$11B+ of revenue, ~22%+ gross margin and ~$5.00+ EPS by 2030 Key risks include higher capital intensity and negative free cash flow through the investment cycle, Arizona ramp and execution risk, semiconductor cyclicality, customer and mobile concentration, and advanced-packaging competition. Analyst: Ruplu Bhattacharya

Thanks for the attention on @uarcdotfun . We’re delaying platform open. From what we can see, the @arc team has cut public access to Arc mainnet. This looks more like the familiar early-chain pattern of locking access after a rush / front-run window — not an exit. Similar things happened during early Robinhood-related test phases too. Known risk right now: • Funds on Arc wallets may be temporarily stuck • Recovery timing is unknown How long until @arc reopens mainnet and the official bridge is still TBD. Hoping it won’t stretch a full month. We’ll follow @arc’s official announcements — and update as soon as access is back.

As part of streamlining our SolvBTC ecosystem, we’re sunsetting bridging support for multiple lower-usage chains and strategies. Affected chains include: → Merlin, Taiko, Mode, Sonic, Corn, Soneium, Berachain, Linea, Rootstock, Polygon, Movement, zkSync Era, HyperEVM, TAC, + related variants. ⚠️Bridging for these will be disabled by end of June.⚠️ If you hold SolvBTC on any of these, please bridge back to our maintained chains (BTC Mainnet, BNB, ETH, Base, Ink, Solana, Starknet, Stellar, XLayer) before the deadline. We’re focusing resources on high-liquidity chains and core strategies to deliver better security, deeper integrations, and sustained performance for SolvBTC, xSolvBTC, and BTC+. Full related questions, feel free to submit a ticket to our discord.

LIQUID NETWORK UPDATE: INCIDENT REPORT Status as of September 8, 2026, 19:10 UTC What Happened? On September 6, 2026 at 15:53:10 UTC (Liquid block 4,050,336), a vulnerability in the open-source Elements software related to how Liquid nodes cache range proof verifications was exploited, resulting in the creation of ~4,000 LBTC that were not backed by bitcoin held in reserve. The individual(s) responsible for the exploit then used the SideSwap service, a Liquid Federation member that holds a peg-out authorization (PAK) key, to convert the unbacked LBTC to BTC via Liquid’s standard peg-out mechanism. Because the validation failure occurred at the transaction level before the peg-out was initiated, both SideSwap’s node and the Liquid Network’s globally distributed functionary nodes accepted the LBTC as valid. The functionaries processed the peg-out as authorized, releasing approximately 4,000 BTC through SideSwap’s whitelisted bitcoin address, which SideSwap then forwarded to the address specified by the exploiters. Before the incident, the Liquid reserve held approximately 4,205 BTC. Following this peg-out and additional peg-outs processed before operations were halted, the reserve balance fell to 197 BTC. Key Clarifications No keys were compromised. The Liquid Federation functionaries were not hacked, and no private keys were compromised. The peg-out mechanism that authorizes withdrawals to whitelisted addresses operated as designed. Other Liquid-issued assets were not affected. USDT and other tokens issued on the Liquid Network were not impacted by the vulnerability, though they are temporarily unavailable while the network remains paused. Investigation is ongoing. As is common in complex critical-system failure investigations, this incident arose from the convergence of several individually low-probability factors that interacted in ways that ultimately defeated the system's built-in redundancies. More detail will be shared in forthcoming communications. What Steps Have Been Taken To Recover The Assets? The individual(s) responsible for the exploit left a public message on the bitcoin mainchain identifying themselves as white-hat security researchers and requesting contact to address the vulnerability. Patch deployed. Blockstream identified and deployed a patch to the Liquid Network’s bridge nodes, which was completed on September 7 at 01:09 UTC, ensuring the vulnerability is no longer exploitable. Partial fund recovery. On September 7 at 16:09:25 UTC (Liquid block 965,950), the exploiters returned 3,400 BTC to the Liquid Federation peg wallet. Approximately 598.5 BTC (15% of the total) remains outstanding. Discussions between Blockstream and the individuals responsible are ongoing to secure the return of the remaining funds. What Comes Next? Our immediate priorities are recovering the remaining funds and resuming normal network operations safely and as quickly as possible. Software update in progress. A fix for the exploited vulnerability has been developed and is undergoing multiple rounds of internal and external review. Blockstream is preparing an emergency release of Elements (v23.3.4), which is expected to be released as soon as possible, but within approximately 48 hours. Network restoration. Once the software update is finalized, Liquid Network functionary operators will perform additional adjustments to resume full functionality and restore the corrected network state, including rejection of the invalid peg-out. Ongoing updates. We will continue to provide detailed updates as the situation progresses. What You Should Know The Liquid Network remains offline at this time, while we work on reviewing the security fixes and network resumption code and coordinate with the white hat hacker towards timely resumption of the network with 1:1 backing for BTC. While the network is paused, users cannot transact on Liquid. If you operate a Liquid node, please watch for the emergency Elements release and follow the upgrade instructions when available. Users do not need to take any proactive steps to protect their funds at this time. The Liquid Federation and its members are committed to resolving this incident in coordination with Blockstream and to resuming normal operations as soon as it is safe to do so.

Last week had over $53 million in onchain losses, with 10 major incidents spanning key management, signer/validator control, upgrade authority, and more AFX (Anti-Fragile Exchange): $24.15M USDC. AFX is a Layer 1 chain running a perpetuals exchange with an onchain orderbook. Compromised validator hot keys reportedly met the quorum with enough signatures to clear the threshold. AFX suspended the bridge and said trading infrastructure and mainnet were untouched; a 70% white-hat offer went unanswered. Triple-A: estimated $9.7M to $11.8M. Triple-A is a Singapore payments processor that lets merchants accept crypto and get paid in fiat. Attackers took control of operational and treasury wallets across at least four chains. Triple-A says client funds weren't touched, and the Singapore Police Force is involved. VerusCoin Ethereum Bridge: $7.54M. VerusCoin is a blockchain that lets people launch their own interoperable chains. This is the bridge’s second loss in two months, after the attacker abused submitImports to trigger Ethereum-side payouts unbacked on the Verus source chain. @blockaid_ calls it the same entry point and bug class as the $11.58M May loss. Wanchain Cardano-BNB Bridge / NIGHT: $9M to $13M (depending on NIGHT's price, 515.2M taken in nine minutes). Wanchain operates cross-chain bridges. NIGHT is the token of Midnight, a privacy sidechain on Cardano. BlockSec's early read blames non-injective signed-message encoding in the Cardano-side TreasuryCheck validator, which let an approval for ~3,110 NIGHT on BNB Chain be reused to pull 203M. Wanchain took the bridge offline and acknowledged unauthorised withdrawals, the Midnight Foundation called it contained, and exchanges added precautions. B² Network B2 staking: $3.86M (~$3.01M to $3.11M realised after ~$850K of slippage). B² Network is a Bitcoin Layer 2 and a staking service on BNB Chain. The draining address had held the staking contract's upgrade authority since 2025 and only lost it after the transfer, so this was likely a compromised or insider key rather than a seizure, though B² hasn't disclosed which. B² suspended staking, promised full compensation, and offered the hacker a white-hat bounty. WEMIX: $5.22M (only ~$724K realised as the token collapsed from $1 to ~$0.0008). The attacker compromised owner authority on a WEMIX$-related contract (WEMIX is the blockchain arm of Korean game publisher Wemade), and minted 5.2M tokens outside DIOS, the stabiliser that only mints against incoming USDC, so the new supply had no reserve behind it. WEMIX suspended bridges, paused the WEMIX$ Module and PNIX DEX, withdrew foundation liquidity, requested exchange and issuer freezes, and has a contract-wide audit underway. 42DAO / Balance Protocol: $914K (plus ~$3.5M of nominal BLC erased as the token fell from $0.9954 to ~$0.0014). 42DAO is a MakerDAO fork on BNB Chain, critically missing the original’s Oracle Security Module. The attacker manipulated the BTCB feed through the Spotter/VAT liquidation path, which lacked TWAP, bounds, floor, drawdown and delay controls. Lien Finance: $542K USDC. An attacker exploited this options protocol via a logic exploit that allowed for price manipulation in their OTC pools. SlowMist blames exchangeEquivalentBonds in BondMakerCollateralizedEth, which lacked multiset integrity checks and minted BondTokens without consuming collateral, while Defimon and ExVul trace the drain through GeneralizedDotc OTC pools. These are the original Lien BondMaker contracts, and the bug class matches the September 2020 whitehat rescue of ~$10M. Garden Finance: $450K USDT across Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum and BNB Chain. Garden Finance is a Bitcoin bridge where solvers compete to fill cross-chain swaps. The bridge suffered an exploit after an offchain database breach let the solver release funds for unfunded swaps, its second such compromise in nine months after a ~$11M loss. Garden took the app offline, said nobody lost funds, and is investigating with zeroShadow, Quantstamp and Blockaid. Guru-fund Lotus deployments: $96K to $101K (~$61.5K realised after slippage). The fund management protocol suffered a loss after an attacker exploited a legacy, never-verified P2P adapter that was left enabled in the protocol registry and could grant arbitrary token allowances through the delegatecall function during normal deposits. The Guru-fund team paused the protocol and announced the protocol will be winding down in the wake of this hack. With the variety of attack vectors and pace of exploits, it’s clear that attackers are constantly looking for any way in. Whether you’re a protocol, investor, or fund looking for protection against these risks and more, get in touch with our team today. You’re Covered with Nexus Mutual

Excited to share this @WarOnTheRocks piece I've been contemplating and working on for a while now: "The Blind Spots in Chinese Military Studies." My contention is the authoritative textbooks and sources published by the PLA are dwindling or becoming outdated in the face of organizational reforms and data restrictions. The result is a community that is increasingly speculating or inferring Chinese military strategy from woefully outdated doctrinal texts, despite valiant efforts to stitch together incomplete pictures from a paucity of sources. This leads to the current challenge facing PLA watchers: deducing how the PLA will bridge the divide between military strategy and campaign-level and tactical-level operations based on outdated texts. Western analysts resort to using partial sources on particular issues to interpret the PLA's collective, authoritative guidance on the key principles of strategy and operational warfighting. This is a demanding task with a high degree of difficulty, and reasonable Western analysts can come to different conclusions. Less capable analysts are likely to mirror-image or get it wrong. I advocate restoring the Open Source Enterprise — formally called the Foreign Broadcast Information Service — back into the public domain. This can be done by empowering existing U.S. government platforms with the capability and experience to support a reconstituted FBIS — such as the Library of Congress — to revive taxpayer-funded open-source intelligence-gathering of translations of foreign military and political news, articles, and textbooks, in particular related to the PLA. This of course will not fundamentally solve the problem, but it will help. Thanks to David M. Finkelstein, @jwuthnow, Lonnie Henley, Dennis Blasko, Phil Saunders, Ken Allen, Chad Sbragia, Joshua Arostegui, and @NathanMBM for their helpful comments on previous drafts.