Keynesian stimulus doesn't stimulate the economy uniformly: it picks winners and losers, and the winners are never you. When Washington authorizes a spending package, the money doesn't teleport equally into every American's pocket. It moves through specific channels: procurement contracts, bank bailouts, infrastructure projects managed by firms with lobbyists on retainer. The 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act sent $535 million to Solyndra, a solar company whose investors had donated heavily to the Obama campaign. Solyndra went bankrupt in 2011. You got the bill. The Federal Reserve's post-2008 quantitative easing made this spectacularly obvious. Asset prices surged while real wages stagnated. The S&P 500 tripled between 2009 and 2013. Working-class Americans, with minimal financial assets, watched from the outside. Keynesians frame all of this as "aggregate demand management," a phrase so abstract it becomes practically meaningless. Strip away the academic vocabulary and you find politicians directing money to allies, financed by debasing the currency everyone else holds. The redistribution isn't a side effect: it's the intended outcome.

Milton Keynes, a government-planned New Town once derided as bland, is getting recognition for its culture. But its economic success has long made it a humble model for city-building. Read more: 📷: Chunip Wong/iStockphoto

Soumaya Keynes and Claer Barrett discuss the results of a recent study on the impact of GLP-1 weight loss drugs on women — and whether it was weight loss or increased confidence that unemployed women to find jobs and single women to partner up.

A thoroughly enjoyable play exploring John Maynard Keynes, the man, his works, and his era.. The scenes depicting the battle of ideas between Keynes and Hayek are brilliantly executed. #economy# #economics# #keynes# @TRH_London

CPI a comment. The Keynesian Inflation Delusion Today will likely bring another ritual display of the Keynesian catechism from Fed officials and their Wall Street echo chamber: every price increase becomes a demand problem, every disruption warrants monetary punishment, and every tariff is assumed to be an inflation accelerant. Watch especially for the warnings about “second- and third-order effects.” That is their preferred refuge, a theoretical construct invoked to defend a predetermined conclusion, even when the feared effects repeatedly fail to materialize in the real economy. This is the through-the-looking-glass quality of the current debate: Trump’s supply-side growth agenda, more energy production, investment, domestic capacity, deregulation, and productive output, will be recast as inflationary. In the Keynesian worldview, growth itself becomes suspect. More supply, more investment, and greater productive capacity are not treated as remedies for scarcity and rising prices, they are treated as new sources of inflationary pressure. Fed officials still cling to the absurd conceit that rate hikes can cure supply shocks, whether caused by energy shortages, broken supply chains, foreign conflict, or regulatory constraint. They cannot. Higher interest rates do not produce more oil, expand port capacity, rebuild factories, or reverse destructive policy. They raise the cost of capital, suppress investment, and punish households and productive businesses for failures that originated elsewhere. Furthermore, growth is reflexively identified as inflationary, a classic Keynesian error. Instead of distinguishing between monetary inflation and supply-driven price pressures, they collapse everything into a single demand-management framework. The result is a policy response that restrains the very investment and production needed to relieve genuine bottlenecks. Their Wall Street acolytes repeat the same stale script: tariffs are inflationary, tighter money is virtuous, and the Fed can fine-tune the price level with the blunt instrument of interest rates. It is a worldview built for spreadsheet models rather than the real economy. Tariffs may reallocate costs and redirect trade flows, but they are not remotely comparable to sustained monetary debasement, the actual source of generalized inflation. The deeper problem is intellectual laziness disguised as expertise. Keynesian Fed officials want every inflation episode to validate their own power: if prices rise, they demand more discretion, more intervention, and higher rates. But monetary policy cannot solve every economic problem. Pretending otherwise has produced weaker investment, distorted capital allocation, and a central bank that repeatedly mistakes symptoms for causes.

Warsh did a good job last night making clear he’s not a hardcore Keynesian. No pre-judging meetings, no heavy forward guidance, just letting the data do the talking. Expect market breadth to expand. Small Cap growth and S&P 500 Equal Weight.