CPI a comment. The Keynesian Inflation Delusion Today will likely bring another ritual display of the Keynesian catechism from Fed officials and their Wall Street echo chamber: every price increase becomes a demand problem, every disruption warrants monetary punishment, and every tariff is assumed to be an inflation accelerant. Watch especially for the warnings about “second- and third-order effects.” That is their preferred refuge, a theoretical construct invoked to defend a predetermined conclusion, even when the feared effects repeatedly fail to materialize in the real economy. This is the through-the-looking-glass quality of the current debate: Trump’s supply-side growth agenda, more energy production, investment, domestic capacity, deregulation, and productive output, will be recast as inflationary. In the Keynesian worldview, growth itself becomes suspect. More supply, more investment, and greater productive capacity are not treated as remedies for scarcity and rising prices, they are treated as new sources of inflationary pressure. Fed officials still cling to the absurd conceit that rate hikes can cure supply shocks, whether caused by energy shortages, broken supply chains, foreign conflict, or regulatory constraint. They cannot. Higher interest rates do not produce more oil, expand port capacity, rebuild factories, or reverse destructive policy. They raise the cost of capital, suppress investment, and punish households and productive businesses for failures that originated elsewhere. Furthermore, growth is reflexively identified as inflationary, a classic Keynesian error. Instead of distinguishing between monetary inflation and supply-driven price pressures, they collapse everything into a single demand-management framework. The result is a policy response that restrains the very investment and production needed to relieve genuine bottlenecks. Their Wall Street acolytes repeat the same stale script: tariffs are inflationary, tighter money is virtuous, and the Fed can fine-tune the price level with the blunt instrument of interest rates. It is a worldview built for spreadsheet models rather than the real economy. Tariffs may reallocate costs and redirect trade flows, but they are not remotely comparable to sustained monetary debasement, the actual source of generalized inflation. The deeper problem is intellectual laziness disguised as expertise. Keynesian Fed officials want every inflation episode to validate their own power: if prices rise, they demand more discretion, more intervention, and higher rates. But monetary policy cannot solve every economic problem. Pretending otherwise has produced weaker investment, distorted capital allocation, and a central bank that repeatedly mistakes symptoms for causes.