Key Takeaway: The US’ decision to allow Russia to supply diesel to the global markets, including to the United States, will support the Kremlin’s efforts to stonewall US efforts to end the war, as the profits from diesel exports will enable Russia to continue funding its war in Ukraine. The US decision to grant Russia a waiver to export diesel also represents a unilateral US concession in its negotiation posture with Russia, when Russia has offered the US no concessions in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.

NEW: People’s Republic of China (PRC) Vice President Han Zheng promoted Xi Jinping's Global Governance, Development, Civilization, and Security initiatives during the PRC's 81st UN General Assembly (UNGA) address on September 26. Han presented these initiatives as a way to support “Global South” countries through a non-Western-led international order. Han’s comments also indirectly criticized the United States, though not to the extent seen in the PRC's 2025 UNGA address, likely reflecting the PRC's desire for US concessions and cooperation following the Trump-Xi summit. (1/2) Other Key Takeaway: All of Taiwan's diplomatic allies, except for Haiti, Guatemala, and the Holy See, advocated for Taiwan during their 2026 UNGA speeches. The PRC continually works to exclude Taiwan from international organizations and forums and conducts coercion efforts to convince Taiwan's diplomatic allies to change their recognition from Taiwan to the PRC.

NEW: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to greatly exaggerate the extent of Russian advances across the frontline to construct a false narrative of Russian battlefield progress for domestic and international audiences. The unusual MoD statement comes in the midst of Russian State Duma elections and shortly before the convening of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Other Key Takeaways: The Russian MoD also tried to deny Ukrainian successes in the Lyman direction by presenting an inaccurate picture of the battlefield that denies the ample evidence provided by Russian milbloggers, Ukrainian sources, and geolocated footage. The Russian MoD’s claims likely aim to shape Russian voters' perceptions of the war during the ongoing State Duma elections as well as the perceptions of foreign governments that support Ukraine. Ukrainian forces extensively targeted Russian drone operators as part of their battlefield-shaping effort that enabled Ukrainian drone overmatch prior to Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction. The US Department of State approved on September 18 the sale of air defense equipment worth $2.68 billion to Ukraine. US President Donald Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act on September 18. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the eastern Fortress Belt and Oleksandrivka directions, while Russian forces recently advanced in the southern Fortress Belt direction. Russia launched two Zirkon anti-ship missiles and 174 drones and loitering munitions at Ukraine overnight.

ISW is seeking a full-time Russia Researcher to join the Russia Team, which produces daily open-source analysis of the war in Ukraine, the geostrategic dynamics of Russian domestic and foreign policy, and how those dynamics affect U.S. national security interests. The role requires flexible and, at times, unpredictable hours, including weekend and holiday coverage as needed. Qualifications include a bachelor's degree in a related field, with a master's degree preferred, as well as professional working proficiency in Russian. Ideal candidates will have strong open-source research, analytical, and writing skills, along with a solid understanding of Russian political dynamics and military operations. The role also involves collaborating across research teams, mentoring interns, and publishing findings through written, graphical, and oral briefings. (1/2)

NEW: Allowing the Houthis to consolidate control over the Red Sea coastal plain would enable the Houthis to assert illegal authority over international maritime traffic in the Bab al Mandeb Strait, which would be extremely detrimental to US interests. The Houthis' recent military activity in the Red Sea coastal plain indicates that the group is trying to reinforce its de facto control over the Red Sea coast in tandem with its efforts to assert illegal authority over maritime traffic. (1/2) Other Key Takeaways: The Houthis are using their ability to threaten international shipping to deter the United States from providing more significant support to Saudi Arabia against the Houthis. The Houthis have effectively told the United States that the group will not attack international, non-Saudi vessels if the United States refrains from supporting Saudi Arabia and confronting the Houthis. This diplomatic “understanding” is intended to deter the United States from becoming more involved in the conflict by warning that the Houthis could attack international vessels if the United States supports Saudi Arabia militarily. The current Houthi military campaign against Saudi Arabia is malignant and imposes economic costs on the entire international community, not solely Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s largest oil producers, and attacks on its major oil refineries and other facilities contribute to high oil prices worldwide. Saudi and international attempts to restrain the Houthis through mediation or contact with Iran are unlikely to succeed because the Houthis are an independent partner of Iran that pursues discrete objectives. The Houthis’ campaigns in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the Red Sea simultaneously advance both Houthi and Iranian objectives, which makes it further unlikely that Iran would try to “rein in” the Houthis.

MORE: Arguments that NATO runs the risk of “war enthusiasm” and inducing a Russian attack by preparing for its own defense mistakenly accept the Kremlin’s framing that Russia was or will be provoked into illegally invading its neighbors. Pragmatic responses to Russian threats — such as shooting down Russian drones in NATO airspace, increasing NATO’s conventional presence in frontline states, or hardening critical infrastructure against the threat of Russian strikes or sabotage — are not escalatory actions by NATO, no matter how often the Kremlin frames them that way. They are necessary and justified responses to Russian threats and attacks. Preparing better defenses against and responding appropriately to escalating attacks is not escalation; it is prudence. Concerns expressed by some policymakers in frontline NATO states that they do not want to overly alarm their populations or drive away economic investment by moving to a war footing or publicly discussing Russian threats are understandable on the surface but impede necessary efforts. Europe may not need alarmed populations, but it needs informed populations and certainly does need alarmed governments.

ISW is seeking an Education Program Manager to advance ISW's mission of educating the next generation of national security leaders! The Education Program Manager will be responsible for the planning and execution of ISW's Internship Program, assisting the General H. David Petraeus Center for Emerging Leaders throughout the Hertog War Studies Program, and maintaining ISW's vast alumni network. An ideal candidate possesses 3-5 years of professional experience working in educational programming or in national security, demonstrated experience managing significant projects and programs, and a strong ability to coordinate with ISW's multimedia experts. Interested in working closely with ISW’s staff, students, interns, and alumni? Apply now:

PRC South China Sea Construction: The PRC will likely use environmental monitoring as a pretext to enhance and automate maritime domain awareness and enforcement of PRC territorial claims in the South China Sea. The South China Sea Institute of Oceanology (SCSIO), an institute of the PRC state-run Chinese Academy of Science (CAS), announced on August 18 that the PRC approved plans for a marine environmental observation station in the South China Sea that would monitor the “Zhongsha Islands.” The “Zhongsha Islands” is the PRC name for the grouping of the Scarborough Shoal, which the PRC seized from the Philippines in 2012, and the underwater Macclesfield Bank. The SCSIO said that the new station will establish a “three-dimensional marine observation network” covering the entirety of the “Zhongsha Islands” and collaborating with existing monitoring stations in the PRC-occupied Paracel and Spratly Islands. The SCSIO did not disclose the location of the new monitoring station but said it would include a “sea-based dual-core” and “land-based overall support.” The PRC may construct the land-based portion of the monitoring station on the nearby Paracel Islands because constructing directly on Scarborough Shoal — the only above-water feature in the “Zhongsha Islands” — would be unprecedented and potentially provoke a response from the Philippines. Read more in the full update ⬇️

NEW: Russian President Vladimir Putin used his August 22 speech at the United Russia Party Congress to further establish United Russia as the war party, thus setting conditions to use the party’s inevitable victory in the upcoming State Duma elections as evidence that the Russian people support a protracted war in Ukraine while further solidifying the party’s pro-war stance as a central part of Russia’s informal state ideology. Other Key Takeaways: Putin framed Russia’s ongoing combined strike campaign against Ukraine as a victory to the Russian public in order to offset Russia’s lack of tactical success on the battlefield and present Russia as having the capability to formulate kinetic responses to Ukrainian actions. Putin acknowledged the effects of Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russia’s fuel infrastructure and emphasized the need to improve Russia’s air defense systems. Putin reiterated his continued unwillingness to engage in any meaningful peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian port, oil, and dual-use logistics infrastructure. Russian forces launched an unspecified number of ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles, three cruise missiles, and 271 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Kostyantynivka, northeast of Oleksandrivka, and west of Orikhiv.

NEW: Russian President Vladimir Putin used his August 22 speech at the United Russia Party Congress to further establish United Russia as the war party, thus setting conditions to use the party’s inevitable victory in the upcoming State Duma elections as evidence that the Russian people support a protracted war in Ukraine while further solidifying the party’s pro-war stance as a central part of Russia’s informal state ideology. Other Key Takeaways: Putin framed Russia’s ongoing combined strike campaign against Ukraine as a victory to the Russian public in order to offset Russia’s lack of tactical success on the battlefield and present Russia as having the capability to formulate kinetic responses to Ukrainian actions. Putin acknowledged the effects of Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russia’s fuel infrastructure and emphasized the need to improve Russia’s air defense systems. Putin reiterated his continued unwillingness to engage in any meaningful peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian port, oil, and dual-use logistics infrastructure. Russian forces launched an unspecified number of ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles, three cruise missiles, and 271 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Kostyantynivka, northeast of Oleksandrivka, and west of Orikhiv.

The Kremlin is expanding state-run international journalism training initiatives, building a global media recruitment pipeline, and expanding training that specifically targets young media professionals abroad. Kremlin-run media is increasingly incorporating AI media training curricula, likely to scale production of content that aligns with Kremlin narratives. The Kremlin seeks to expand the scale, reach, and longevity of Russia’s information influence through its growing journalism training initiatives abroad. Read more in ISW's special report ⬇️

MORE: A senior Russian official reiterated the Kremlin’s continued unwillingness to engage in any meaningful negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. ⬇️ Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on August 21 that Russia will only accept a peace proposal that aligns with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war aims and reflects the “ground realities.” Putin’s maximalist and often-repeated war aims include Ukraine’s complete capitulation, the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv, and severe limitations on the Ukrainian military and Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations. Russian officials’ continued invocation of “battlefield realities” fails to address Russia’s declining rate of advance and incremental and gradual tactical successes and instead requires that Ukraine concede to Russia’s unwavering demands. Ryabkov’s statement confirms Putin’s commitment to continue the war in Ukraine despite the growing economic and military strain. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly reiterated his commitment to peace negotiations and a willingness to make meaningful compromises to end the war, despite Russian efforts to falsely paint Ukraine as the intransigent party in peace efforts.

NEW: The Alabuga Special Economic Zone, a key drone production facility for the Russian military, has begun recruitment efforts aimed directly at teenagers from occupied Ukraine. Other Key Takeaways: Russian and occupation officials are highlighting Russian efforts to militarize schools in occupied areas in advance of the 2026-2027 school year. The Russian security apparatus is artificially manipulating border laws to create the impression that occupied Ukrainian territories have been fully integrated into Russia. The Luhansk Oblast occupation administration is reckoning with significant medical staffing shortages, including in part by relocating Russian doctors to work in occupied areas. Occupation administrations continue to profit from the seizure and sale of stolen Ukrainian assets.

ISW is hiring! We’re seeking a full-time Russia Researcher to join our premier analytical team studying Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This role will contribute to ISW’s work providing timely, open-source analysis of the war in Ukraine and Russia’s domestic and foreign policy, with a focus on understanding how Russia’s evolving political and geostrategic dynamics affect U.S. national security interests. The ideal candidate will bring strong analytical skills, professional working proficiency in Russian, and a demonstrated ability to produce exceptional, timely research in a fast-paced environment. Interested in joining ISW’s Russia & Ukraine team? Apply today:

MORE: The PRC began the island construction in late 2025. Satellite imagery from @planet also shows piers, a helipad, and various buildings on the reef as of August 2026. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (@CSIS) Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative reported on August 14 that the PRC may now be building a runway on the artificial island that could measure up to 9,000 feet long. PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times published an article on August 20 claiming that recent construction was carried out to improve the quality of life for residents and fishermen, citing a March statement by a PRC foreign ministry spokesperson. Antelope Reef is part of the Paracel Islands, which the PRC administers but Vietnam also claims. The PRC has used other Paracel Islands outposts as surveillance and administrative hubs. Antelope Reef’s large lagoon offers a protective harbor for PRC surface vessels and submarines, and its runway and future infrastructure, such as missile launchers and radar, may make it a useful base for the PRC to exert sea and air control over the South China Sea. PRC efforts to militarize the South China Sea may complicate US and coalition efforts to reinforce and defend Taiwan during a war.

MORE: Sources told The Financial Times on August 21 that Ukraine is seeking approval to use Starlink-equipped drones to strike Russian ballistic missile launchers up to 200 kilometers inside Russia. Authorization to access Starlink over geographically defined segments of Russia would allow Ukrainian forces to conduct more accurate strikes against Russian mobile ground-based ballistic missile launchers, given Ukraine’s integration of Starlink-equipped drones during the intermediate-strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Ukraine. Russian combined drone and missile strike packages have shifted in Summer 2026 to rely on ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles to exploit Ukraine’s Patriot and ballistic missile interceptor shortage. Ukraine’s request for restricted Starlink use demonstrates an alternative approach to countering Russian ground-based ballistic missiles that does not require the actual shipment of missile interceptors from the United States and other Ukrainian partners. Reliable low-latency satellite access over Russia could also allow Ukraine to effectively and accurately target mobile ground-based missile launchers in Russia and offset the wider surface-to-air missile shortage.

MORE: The failure of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) appears to have further weakened the pro-concession, “realist” camp relative to Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and other anti-concession officials. Vahidi’s faction therefore remains in a stronger position to argue that continued pressure on the United States, rather than Iranian concessions, can secure the regime’s objectives.

NEW: North Korea reportedly deployed drone operators to Kursk Oblast to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, which will allow North Korean forces to gain valuable tactical and technological skills critical for contemporary warfare. Other Key Takeaways: Ukrainian forces are adapting their tactics and domestically developing technological solutions to target Russia’s ballistic missile launchers and jet-powered drones in ways that circumvent the need for foreign materiel assistance amidst global air-defense interceptor shortages. A senior Russian official reiterated the Kremlin’s continued unwillingness to engage in any meaningful negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces struck Russian military airfields and oil infrastructure. Russian forces launched 135 long-range strike drones against Ukraine. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances.

NEW: There is no indication that economic pressure on the regime has changed the anti-concessions position of some top Iranian officials, even while a group of Iranian officials responsible for managing the economy (“realists”) are increasingly warning that worsening economic pressure could threaten regime stability. These officials also appear to openly advocate ending the war to reduce the economic cost to the regime. Other Key Takeaways: The failure of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) appears to have further weakened the pro-concession, “realist” camp relative to Vahidi and other anti-concession officials. Regime decision-making may therefore take a long time to react, even as the economy gets much worse. Vahidi and other anti-concession officials appear to have a higher tolerance for domestic unrest because they may calculate that the regime can contain and suppress renewed protests without changing course. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is resisting US efforts to economically isolate Iran, but Chinese economic engagement cannot offset the blockade if Iran cannot physically supply its largest oil customer.