ISW is seeking an Education Program Manager to advance ISW's mission of educating the next generation of national security leaders! The Education Program Manager will be responsible for the planning and execution of ISW's Internship Program, assisting the General H. David Petraeus Center for Emerging Leaders throughout the Hertog War Studies Program, and maintaining ISW's vast alumni network. An ideal candidate possesses 3-5 years of professional experience working in educational programming or in national security, demonstrated experience managing significant projects and programs, and a strong ability to coordinate with ISW's multimedia experts. Interested in working closely with ISW’s staff, students, interns, and alumni? Apply now:

PRC South China Sea Construction: The PRC will likely use environmental monitoring as a pretext to enhance and automate maritime domain awareness and enforcement of PRC territorial claims in the South China Sea. The South China Sea Institute of Oceanology (SCSIO), an institute of the PRC state-run Chinese Academy of Science (CAS), announced on August 18 that the PRC approved plans for a marine environmental observation station in the South China Sea that would monitor the “Zhongsha Islands.” The “Zhongsha Islands” is the PRC name for the grouping of the Scarborough Shoal, which the PRC seized from the Philippines in 2012, and the underwater Macclesfield Bank. The SCSIO said that the new station will establish a “three-dimensional marine observation network” covering the entirety of the “Zhongsha Islands” and collaborating with existing monitoring stations in the PRC-occupied Paracel and Spratly Islands. The SCSIO did not disclose the location of the new monitoring station but said it would include a “sea-based dual-core” and “land-based overall support.” The PRC may construct the land-based portion of the monitoring station on the nearby Paracel Islands because constructing directly on Scarborough Shoal — the only above-water feature in the “Zhongsha Islands” — would be unprecedented and potentially provoke a response from the Philippines. Read more in the full update ⬇️

NEW: Russian President Vladimir Putin used his August 22 speech at the United Russia Party Congress to further establish United Russia as the war party, thus setting conditions to use the party’s inevitable victory in the upcoming State Duma elections as evidence that the Russian people support a protracted war in Ukraine while further solidifying the party’s pro-war stance as a central part of Russia’s informal state ideology. Other Key Takeaways: Putin framed Russia’s ongoing combined strike campaign against Ukraine as a victory to the Russian public in order to offset Russia’s lack of tactical success on the battlefield and present Russia as having the capability to formulate kinetic responses to Ukrainian actions. Putin acknowledged the effects of Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russia’s fuel infrastructure and emphasized the need to improve Russia’s air defense systems. Putin reiterated his continued unwillingness to engage in any meaningful peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian port, oil, and dual-use logistics infrastructure. Russian forces launched an unspecified number of ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles, three cruise missiles, and 271 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Kostyantynivka, northeast of Oleksandrivka, and west of Orikhiv.

NEW: Russian President Vladimir Putin used his August 22 speech at the United Russia Party Congress to further establish United Russia as the war party, thus setting conditions to use the party’s inevitable victory in the upcoming State Duma elections as evidence that the Russian people support a protracted war in Ukraine while further solidifying the party’s pro-war stance as a central part of Russia’s informal state ideology. Other Key Takeaways: Putin framed Russia’s ongoing combined strike campaign against Ukraine as a victory to the Russian public in order to offset Russia’s lack of tactical success on the battlefield and present Russia as having the capability to formulate kinetic responses to Ukrainian actions. Putin acknowledged the effects of Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russia’s fuel infrastructure and emphasized the need to improve Russia’s air defense systems. Putin reiterated his continued unwillingness to engage in any meaningful peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian port, oil, and dual-use logistics infrastructure. Russian forces launched an unspecified number of ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles, three cruise missiles, and 271 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Kostyantynivka, northeast of Oleksandrivka, and west of Orikhiv.

The Kremlin is expanding state-run international journalism training initiatives, building a global media recruitment pipeline, and expanding training that specifically targets young media professionals abroad. Kremlin-run media is increasingly incorporating AI media training curricula, likely to scale production of content that aligns with Kremlin narratives. The Kremlin seeks to expand the scale, reach, and longevity of Russia’s information influence through its growing journalism training initiatives abroad. Read more in ISW's special report ⬇️

MORE: A senior Russian official reiterated the Kremlin’s continued unwillingness to engage in any meaningful negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. ⬇️ Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on August 21 that Russia will only accept a peace proposal that aligns with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war aims and reflects the “ground realities.” Putin’s maximalist and often-repeated war aims include Ukraine’s complete capitulation, the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv, and severe limitations on the Ukrainian military and Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations. Russian officials’ continued invocation of “battlefield realities” fails to address Russia’s declining rate of advance and incremental and gradual tactical successes and instead requires that Ukraine concede to Russia’s unwavering demands. Ryabkov’s statement confirms Putin’s commitment to continue the war in Ukraine despite the growing economic and military strain. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly reiterated his commitment to peace negotiations and a willingness to make meaningful compromises to end the war, despite Russian efforts to falsely paint Ukraine as the intransigent party in peace efforts.

NEW: The Alabuga Special Economic Zone, a key drone production facility for the Russian military, has begun recruitment efforts aimed directly at teenagers from occupied Ukraine. Other Key Takeaways: Russian and occupation officials are highlighting Russian efforts to militarize schools in occupied areas in advance of the 2026-2027 school year. The Russian security apparatus is artificially manipulating border laws to create the impression that occupied Ukrainian territories have been fully integrated into Russia. The Luhansk Oblast occupation administration is reckoning with significant medical staffing shortages, including in part by relocating Russian doctors to work in occupied areas. Occupation administrations continue to profit from the seizure and sale of stolen Ukrainian assets.

ISW is hiring! We’re seeking a full-time Russia Researcher to join our premier analytical team studying Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This role will contribute to ISW’s work providing timely, open-source analysis of the war in Ukraine and Russia’s domestic and foreign policy, with a focus on understanding how Russia’s evolving political and geostrategic dynamics affect U.S. national security interests. The ideal candidate will bring strong analytical skills, professional working proficiency in Russian, and a demonstrated ability to produce exceptional, timely research in a fast-paced environment. Interested in joining ISW’s Russia & Ukraine team? Apply today:

MORE: The PRC began the island construction in late 2025. Satellite imagery from @planet also shows piers, a helipad, and various buildings on the reef as of August 2026. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (@CSIS) Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative reported on August 14 that the PRC may now be building a runway on the artificial island that could measure up to 9,000 feet long. PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times published an article on August 20 claiming that recent construction was carried out to improve the quality of life for residents and fishermen, citing a March statement by a PRC foreign ministry spokesperson. Antelope Reef is part of the Paracel Islands, which the PRC administers but Vietnam also claims. The PRC has used other Paracel Islands outposts as surveillance and administrative hubs. Antelope Reef’s large lagoon offers a protective harbor for PRC surface vessels and submarines, and its runway and future infrastructure, such as missile launchers and radar, may make it a useful base for the PRC to exert sea and air control over the South China Sea. PRC efforts to militarize the South China Sea may complicate US and coalition efforts to reinforce and defend Taiwan during a war.

MORE: Sources told The Financial Times on August 21 that Ukraine is seeking approval to use Starlink-equipped drones to strike Russian ballistic missile launchers up to 200 kilometers inside Russia. Authorization to access Starlink over geographically defined segments of Russia would allow Ukrainian forces to conduct more accurate strikes against Russian mobile ground-based ballistic missile launchers, given Ukraine’s integration of Starlink-equipped drones during the intermediate-strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Ukraine. Russian combined drone and missile strike packages have shifted in Summer 2026 to rely on ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles to exploit Ukraine’s Patriot and ballistic missile interceptor shortage. Ukraine’s request for restricted Starlink use demonstrates an alternative approach to countering Russian ground-based ballistic missiles that does not require the actual shipment of missile interceptors from the United States and other Ukrainian partners. Reliable low-latency satellite access over Russia could also allow Ukraine to effectively and accurately target mobile ground-based missile launchers in Russia and offset the wider surface-to-air missile shortage.

MORE: The failure of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) appears to have further weakened the pro-concession, “realist” camp relative to Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and other anti-concession officials. Vahidi’s faction therefore remains in a stronger position to argue that continued pressure on the United States, rather than Iranian concessions, can secure the regime’s objectives.

NEW: North Korea reportedly deployed drone operators to Kursk Oblast to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, which will allow North Korean forces to gain valuable tactical and technological skills critical for contemporary warfare. Other Key Takeaways: Ukrainian forces are adapting their tactics and domestically developing technological solutions to target Russia’s ballistic missile launchers and jet-powered drones in ways that circumvent the need for foreign materiel assistance amidst global air-defense interceptor shortages. A senior Russian official reiterated the Kremlin’s continued unwillingness to engage in any meaningful negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces struck Russian military airfields and oil infrastructure. Russian forces launched 135 long-range strike drones against Ukraine. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances.

NEW: There is no indication that economic pressure on the regime has changed the anti-concessions position of some top Iranian officials, even while a group of Iranian officials responsible for managing the economy (“realists”) are increasingly warning that worsening economic pressure could threaten regime stability. These officials also appear to openly advocate ending the war to reduce the economic cost to the regime. Other Key Takeaways: The failure of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) appears to have further weakened the pro-concession, “realist” camp relative to Vahidi and other anti-concession officials. Regime decision-making may therefore take a long time to react, even as the economy gets much worse. Vahidi and other anti-concession officials appear to have a higher tolerance for domestic unrest because they may calculate that the regime can contain and suppress renewed protests without changing course. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is resisting US efforts to economically isolate Iran, but Chinese economic engagement cannot offset the blockade if Iran cannot physically supply its largest oil customer.

NEW: New satellite imagery shows that the PRC finished the construction of an artificial island on Antelope Reef, a disputed South China Sea feature in the Paracel Islands. The PRC is also constructing a runway, piers, a helipad, and various buildings on what could be the PRC’s largest South China Sea naval base. The PRC could use this base for surveillance, exerting its sea and air control over the South China Sea. (1/2) Other Key Takeaways: The PRC approved plans for a maritime environmental observation station in the South China Sea that would monitor the “Zhongsha Islands,” which include Scarborough Shoal. The PRC has used environmental protection to enhance its operations in the South China Sea and as a pretext for limiting non-PRC vessels’ access to disputed waters. This new station would likely serve a dual-use purpose benefiting PRC military and law enforcement operations in the South China Sea. Taiwan’s military conducted its first live-fire FPV drone exercises on August 17, likely in an effort to integrate lessons learned from the war in Ukraine. Taiwanese drone procurement efforts are facing legislative gridlock, which will make it more difficult for Taiwan to procure the necessary systems to conduct drone-enabled defense operations.

MORE: Sources told The Financial Times on August 21 that Ukraine is seeking approval to use Starlink-equipped drones to strike Russian ballistic missile launchers up to 200 kilometers inside Russia. Authorization to access Starlink over geographically defined segments of Russia would allow Ukrainian forces to conduct more accurate strikes against Russian mobile ground-based ballistic missile launchers, given Ukraine’s integration of Starlink-equipped drones during the intermediate-strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Ukraine. Russian combined drone and missile strike packages have shifted in Summer 2026 to rely on ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles to exploit Ukraine’s Patriot and ballistic missile interceptor shortage. Ukraine’s request for restricted Starlink use demonstrates an alternative approach to countering Russian ground-based ballistic missiles that does not require the actual shipment of missile interceptors from the United States and other Ukrainian partners. Reliable low-latency satellite access over Russia could also allow Ukraine to effectively and accurately target mobile ground-based missile launchers in Russia and offset the wider surface-to-air missile shortage.

MORE: The failure of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) appears to have further weakened the pro-concession, “realist” camp relative to Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and other anti-concession officials. Vahidi’s faction therefore remains in a stronger position to argue that continued pressure on the United States, rather than Iranian concessions, can secure the regime’s objectives.

NEW: North Korea reportedly deployed drone operators to Kursk Oblast to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, which will allow North Korean forces to gain valuable tactical and technological skills critical for contemporary warfare. Other Key Takeaways: Ukrainian forces are adapting their tactics and domestically developing technological solutions to target Russia’s ballistic missile launchers and jet-powered drones in ways that circumvent the need for foreign materiel assistance amidst global air-defense interceptor shortages. A senior Russian official reiterated the Kremlin’s continued unwillingness to engage in any meaningful negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces struck Russian military airfields and oil infrastructure. Russian forces launched 135 long-range strike drones against Ukraine. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances.

NEW: There is no indication that economic pressure on the regime has changed the anti-concessions position of some top Iranian officials, even while a group of Iranian officials responsible for managing the economy (“realists”) are increasingly warning that worsening economic pressure could threaten regime stability. These officials also appear to openly advocate ending the war to reduce the economic cost to the regime. Other Key Takeaways: The failure of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) appears to have further weakened the pro-concession, “realist” camp relative to Vahidi and other anti-concession officials. Regime decision-making may therefore take a long time to react, even as the economy gets much worse. Vahidi and other anti-concession officials appear to have a higher tolerance for domestic unrest because they may calculate that the regime can contain and suppress renewed protests without changing course. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is resisting US efforts to economically isolate Iran, but Chinese economic engagement cannot offset the blockade if Iran cannot physically supply its largest oil customer.

NEW: New satellite imagery shows that the PRC finished the construction of an artificial island on Antelope Reef, a disputed South China Sea feature in the Paracel Islands. The PRC is also constructing a runway, piers, a helipad, and various buildings on what could be the PRC’s largest South China Sea naval base. The PRC could use this base for surveillance, exerting its sea and air control over the South China Sea. (1/2) Other Key Takeaways: The PRC approved plans for a maritime environmental observation station in the South China Sea that would monitor the “Zhongsha Islands,” which include Scarborough Shoal. The PRC has used environmental protection to enhance its operations in the South China Sea and as a pretext for limiting non-PRC vessels’ access to disputed waters. This new station would likely serve a dual-use purpose benefiting PRC military and law enforcement operations in the South China Sea. Taiwan’s military conducted its first live-fire FPV drone exercises on August 17, likely in an effort to integrate lessons learned from the war in Ukraine. Taiwanese drone procurement efforts are facing legislative gridlock, which will make it more difficult for Taiwan to procure the necessary systems to conduct drone-enabled defense operations.

The Kremlin is expanding state-run international journalism training initiatives, building a global media recruitment pipeline, and expanding training that specifically targets young media professionals abroad. Kremlin-run media is increasingly incorporating AI media training curricula, likely to scale production of content that aligns with Kremlin narratives. The Kremlin seeks to expand the scale, reach, and longevity of Russia’s information influence through its growing journalism training initiatives abroad. Read more in ISW's special report ⬇️