NEW | Iran likely used its meeting with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey to pressure the trio of countries to help forge a US-Iran deal that would achieve key Iranian objectives. Iran is presumably attempting to exploit regional concerns that renewed fighting and US-Iran tensions could embroil regional countries in the future and is aiming to portray the United States as the source of the problem. (1/4)

NEW I The Houthis almost certainly captured a major roadway segment that links Houthi frontlines on the outskirts of Taiz City to other frontlines in central Taiz Governorate on October 22. The Houthis posted footage of fighters in vehicles at various geolocated positions along a segment of the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC) in the al Dhabab valley between al Misrakh District and Taiz City's southwestern limits. (1/3)

NEW | Ongoing Houthi advances in Taiz Governorate demonstrate that the Yemeni government’s recent counteroffensives failed to sufficiently pull Houthi reserves in order to relieve pressure around Taiz Governorate and enable Yemeni government offensive operations in other areas of the country. Houthi forces have advanced north and eastward in Taiz Governorate since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 6, seizing territory that encircles Yemeni government-aligned forces in Taiz City.

NEW | The Yemeni government, backed by Saudi air power and international coalition military support, launched an offensive to capture Mokha city and secure the coastline along the Bab al Mandeb Strait on October 4. This offensive will likely succeed in capturing Mokha in the short term. Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government likely launched the offensive to accomplish the limited objective of securing the Bab al Mandeb. Yemeni government-aligned forces will likely stop offensive operations within the next seven to 14 days to rest, resupply, and consolidate their positions to prevent a Houthi counteroffensive. The Yemeni government will need to secure its own defensible line before its offensive culminates in order to ensure it can repel Houthi attacks combining drones and ground forces, which the Houthis employed in early September. Allied air and intelligence support almost certainly made this offensive possible. Over 100 Saudi aircraft provided air support to Yemeni government-aligned forces during the initial assault, and US intelligence is reportedly supporting the air campaign. Saudi’s allies in the Mecca Pact are providing military aid to Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia announced on October 5 that Pakistan and Turkey are taking “practical measures” to defend Saudi Arabia pursuant to the Mecca Pact requirements.

NEW | The Ethiopian military (ENDF) has largely repelled the rebel offensive in northern Ethiopia and launched a counteroffensive along three axes toward the TPLF–controlled Tigrayan regional capital, Mekele. The Alliance for Survival rebel coalition has simultaneously launched a drone strike campaign across Ethiopia, including the capital, Addis Ababa, to degrade and stretch Ethiopian forces and demonstrate its ability to expand the conflict across the country. 🧵

NEW | Some observed indicators suggest that the Iraqi federal government is considering a major crackdown on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including by entering and retaking militia-controlled strongholds. Such an effort would require major mobilization, and the militias would likely be aware of any pending crackdown. Previous Iraqi administrations, particularly under former Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi, have conducted limited crackdowns on militia activity, but the combination of the Iranian infiltration of Iraqi government institutions and the strength of the Iraqi militias limited the scale of such efforts. The US’ pressure on Zaydi to disarm the militias could compel him to act against the militias despite these limitations. US efforts to compel Baghdad to disarm the groups have only increased due to militia attacks against US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region in March and April, as well as in recent months. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani warned Iraqi militia leaders against armed confrontation with the Iraqi government and to reach a settlement to avoid handing over militia weapons to the state during an August 10 visit to Baghdad, according to informed sources speaking to Iraqi media. Ghaani likely discussed Iranian-backed Iraqi militias' recent attacks on Gulf states, namely Saudi Arabia, during his visit to Baghdad. Iranian leaders, including Ghaani, are likely attempting to draw the Iraqi government away from developing alternative oil export corridors to the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian leaders also almost certainly intend to preserve Iran’s leverage over regional states, the United States, and the global economy by promoting an arrangement that would offer Iraq short-term economic relief and reduce Iraq’s incentive to develop alternative oil export corridors to the Strait. A sustained US naval blockade could increase economic and political pressure on Iran and may eventually compel at least some regime officials to accept greater concessions in negotiations. The Iranian regime’s recent appointments suggest that the officials who currently dominate decision-making may be less responsive to that pressure and more inclined to maintain maximalist positions, however.