YES. And this is one of the most important things most people do not understand about account security. Changing your password invalidates future login attempts using the old password. It does not invalidate sessions that already exist. Here is how session management actually works. When you log into an account the server generates a session token, a long random string, and stores it in your browser as a cookie. Every subsequent request you make sends that token to prove you are authenticated. The server validates the token, not your password, for every request after the initial login. Your password is only checked at the moment of authentication. Once a session token exists the password becomes irrelevant to that session. An attacker who stole your session cookie before you changed your password still holds a valid token. They are authenticated. Your password change happened at the credential layer. Their access exists at the session layer. Those are two different things and most platforms treat them independently. This is why session hijacking is such a powerful attack. The attacker does not need your new password. They do not need to log in again. They are already inside with a token that the server considers perfectly valid. The attack scenario plays out like this. Attacker steals your session cookie through malicious browser extension, public WiFi interception, XSS vulnerability, or malware. They import that cookie into their browser. They are now authenticated as you. You notice something wrong and change your password immediately. The attacker's session continues uninterrupted because the server never invalidated the existing token. Some platforms invalidate all existing sessions when a password change occurs. Google does this by default. Many platforms do not. Banking apps tend to handle this correctly. Consumer web applications are inconsistent. OAuth tokens and remember me tokens are a separate category that persist independently of password changes entirely. Third party applications that were granted access to your account through OAuth maintain that access through tokens that have their own expiry, often 30, 60, or 90 days, regardless of what happens to your main password. The correct response to a suspected account compromise is not just changing your password. It is changing the password and explicitly revoking all active sessions, reviewing and removing OAuth application access, and checking for any forwarding rules, recovery email changes, or account settings modifications the attacker may have made while inside. Most platforms offer a sign out of all devices option specifically for this reason. That action invalidates all existing session tokens and forces every device to reauthenticate with the new password. Password change stops future logins. Session revocation stops current access. You need both.

Browser extensions are one of the most underestimated attack surfaces in everyday computing. The reason comes down to what permissions the browser grants them by default. When you install an extension and click Add to Chrome or Add to Firefox you are presented with a permissions dialogue that most people dismiss without reading. Those permissions are not cosmetic. They are binding access grants that determine what the extension can touch inside your browser. The most dangerous permission is tabs and activeTab combined with access to all URLs. An extension with this permission can read the full content of every webpage you visit. Every form field. Every input box. Everything rendered on screen. A password manager extension needs this to function legitimately. A malicious extension uses it to silently capture credentials, banking details, and session cookies as you type them. webRequest and webRequestBlocking permissions allow an extension to intercept, inspect, and modify network traffic before it leaves your browser and before responses reach your page. A malicious extension sitting in this position can strip HTTPS from redirects, inject content into pages you visit, redirect specific requests to attacker controlled servers, and read unencrypted traffic in transit. Cookie access is a separate and critical vector. Session cookies are the tokens that prove to a website you are already logged in. An extension with cookie permissions can read every session cookie in your browser for every domain you are authenticated to. The attacker does not need your password. They take the cookie and they are you. This is called session hijacking and extensions make it trivial. Clipboard access allows extensions to read everything you copy. Copy a crypto wallet address to paste it somewhere and a malicious extension can swap it silently for an attacker controlled address before it reaches the destination field. This specific attack has drained significant amounts of cryptocurrency from users who watched the paste happen and never noticed the substitution. The supply chain angle is the most dangerous evolution of this threat. Legitimate extensions with established user bases get acquired by malicious actors who push an update containing new functionality. The extension you installed two years ago from a trusted developer now belongs to someone else. The browser auto updates it silently. Your 200,000 user extension just became a data collection tool overnight with no indication to any of those users that anything changed. The Chrome Web Store has removed thousands of malicious extensions but the review process relies heavily on automated scanning that sophisticated attackers have learned to evade by activating malicious functionality only after a time delay or only on specific domains. The practical defence is treating extensions like you treat app permissions on your phone. Install as few as possible. Review what permissions each one requests before installing. Periodically audit installed extensions and remove anything you no longer actively use. Check the developer behind an extension before trusting it with access to your browsing session. An extension you forgot you installed three years ago sitting with access to all site data is not a passive piece of software. It is a privileged process running inside your browser with more access to your digital life than most applications on your computer.

Anthropic just told the world to slow down AI development. The same day they disclosed Claude wrote 80% of their own codebase. The same week they filed for a $1 trillion IPO. The same month they gave a self-escaping AI to the EU’s cybersecurity agency. Their engineers now ship 8x more code per quarter than they did last year. The AI is building the AI that builds the AI. Anthropic’s solution is a globally coordinated pause. Requiring China to agree. Voluntarily. The company that cannot stop building faster is asking everyone else to stop building faster.