On 30th September 2025, the Netherlands intervened at chipmaker Nexperia to protect European supplies. Two weeks later, its minister was reporting Chinese export restrictions on the company's Chinese sites.
Vincent Karremans's 14th October letter to parliament described the distinction. His order allowed him to block company decisions that threatened its production capacity and continuity. In separate proceedings, an Amsterdam court had suspended the chief executive and appointed a temporary director with decisive authority. Chinese export controls remained a matter for discussions with Beijing.
Dutch authorities could change who directed the company. That did not give them control over every permission its deliveries required.
On 19th November, Karremans announced that he was suspending his ministerial order following talks, welcoming Chinese measures to secure chip supplies. The government expressly distinguished its intervention from the independent court proceedings.
The dispute exposes a limit to treating ownership as a measure of economic independence.
In their June 2025 International Monetary Fund working paper, Tatjana Schulze and Weining Xin compared Vietnam with a weighted combination of other economies. By 2022, the share of value created domestically in its electrical and machinery exports to America was an estimated 10 percentage points higher than in that comparison. The authors interpret this as evidence of production moving to Vietnam.
Their investment analysis estimated 8 additional projects from China in that sector relative to its comparison model. The records included announced projects, and ultimate ownership was incompletely identified. The investor's location in China did not establish Chinese ownership.
The OECD's multinational-enterprise database already links production to the ultimate owner's country, filling gaps with estimates. That supplies information conventional trade totals omit. Knowing who owns a factory still does not identify everyone who could interrupt its deliveries.
The 2025 US country-of-origin marking rule in 19 CFR 134.1 generally looks to production and substantial transformation. That label cannot certify independence from foreign pressure. Moving production can nevertheless change which government's laws apply. Geography can change the distribution of power.
A factory outside China with no Chinese shareholders could still depend on a Chinese input it cannot replace. A Chinese-owned factory abroad is also subject to the host country's authority. Nor does a shareholder's nationality, by itself, establish state command. Neither its address nor its shareholders alone settle who could stop it.
The practical test concerns a particular interruption. Would alternative suppliers still have the inputs, permissions and capacity to deliver before inventories ran out? Two suppliers exposed to the same restriction may offer little protection against it.
The Nexperia episode does not establish that relocating production is futile. It shows why changing authority over a company and securing its supply chain are separate achievements.
Keeping production running may require cooperation from several actors. Disrupting an indispensable stage can take only one refusal.
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In 2025 the United States imported $309 billion of goods from China, down from $539 billion in 2018. China's share of American imports fell from 21.2 percent to 13.4 percent by 2024.
Freund, Mattoo, Mulabdic and Ruta traced ten-digit import lines from 2017 to 2022 for the World Bank. The countries replacing China tended to be deeply integrated with China. "To displace China on the export side, countries must embrace China's supply chains." Schulze and Xin at the IMF, June 2025, value-added tables to 2022. "Chinese value added has been increasingly exported to the US through other countries".
The one place decoupling looks real is Vietnam. Its domestic value added in strategic exports to America ran 10 and 12 percentage points above the counterfactual by 2022, Chinese value added fell, and the authors call it reallocation, not rerouting. Real factories.
And who built them. It counts eight more greenfield projects committing Chinese capital to Vietnam's electrical and machinery sector than the counterfactual by 2022, and offers that "Chinese firms relocate their production to Vietnam through greenfield FDI". Then what it cannot see. "Due to the lack of information on the ultimate ownership of these FDI projects, we caution that the effects on FDI could include those from Chinese firms and non-Chinese firms in China."
American origin rules cannot see it either. Under 19 CFR 134.1 another country becomes the country of origin only if work there effects a "substantial transformation". Ownership is not in the definition.
So the two instruments that would tell a government whether decoupling worked, the customs rule and the value-added table, both record place. Neither records command. A tariff can move a production line across a border. It cannot move the line out of anyone's reach, and the accounts that certify success cannot ask.
Sovereignty is a relation to territory. Coercion is a relation to command. A backup supplier is a backup only if no one can order both lines to stop at once, and that is the one variable the ledgers do not carry. A state can decouple its map and keep its exposure, and cannot know which it has done.
Two counterweights. Over 80 percent of American industrial inputs are sourced at home, and American, Japanese and Korean investment into Vietnam rose alongside Chinese.
If an ownership-resolved series shows the Chinese-controlled share of Vietnam's strategic exports to America falling, the claim dies.
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