Some people are interpreting this as a way for OSS models to bypass encryption of closed model APIs. If that is what you are taking away from this, please understand that the title is a massive overstatement in this context.
The point of encryption here is to keep the inference protocol stateless; I assume labs are fully aware of some side channel implications and do not care about preventing replay (why would they?) Encrypted traces offer a stateless inference protocol so inference backend can be distributed across hundreds or thousands of data centers without the need for coordinating sessions.
If your side channel is to ask the LLM "true or false" questions for the universe of words that might be contained in a trace, you'd go broke decoding a single trace. So you'd have to assume there's some super special magic trace that lived within some encrypted blob that's worth attacking in this way.
Overall definitely an interesting limitation of the encrypted vs stored traces, but you aren't going to be able to steal traces this way to train a competing model. That would cost more than building the model with the standard training arsenal.
We can finally talk about it:
We found a way to extract hidden reasoning of frontier models using a vulnerability in the APIs of every frontier AI company.
We verified that our reasoning token count matches billed API thinking tokens 1:1 for most of the prompts we queried.