ๆณจๅ†Œๅนถๅˆ†ไบซ้‚€่ฏท้“พๆŽฅ๏ผŒๅฏ่Žทๅพ—่ง†้ข‘ๆ’ญๆ”พไธŽ้‚€่ฏทๅฅ–ๅŠฑใ€‚

Nicholas Brown
@nchlsbrwn
Cofounder at @techstatecraft Prev: Senior Policy Advisor @CommerceGov, @RANDCorporation, @Google
ๅŠ ๅ…ฅ August 2026
5 ๆญฃๅœจๅ…ณๆณจ    392 ็ฒ‰ไธ
While AI chip exports get more attention, whether China can continue to import ASMLโ€™s DUV immersion (DUVi) lithography machines will be the decisive factor in US-China AI competition over the next decade. @techstatecraft has published a 30,000-word report that models how continued DUVi exports may let Huawei and other Chinese chipmakers scale AI chip production to compete with leading US AI chipmakers like NVIDIA. Our core findings: (1) ๐—–๐—ต๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ฎ ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐—ฒ๐—ฑ๐˜€ ๐——๐—จ๐—ฉ๐—ถ ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐—ต๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐˜€ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐—ธ๐—ฒ ๐—”๐—œ ๐—ฐ๐—ต๐—ถ๐—ฝ๐˜€, ๐—ฏ๐˜‚๐˜ ๐—ถ๐˜€ ๐˜‚๐—ป๐—น๐—ถ๐—ธ๐—ฒ๐—น๐˜† ๐˜๐—ผ ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—บ๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ฐ๐—ถ๐—ฎ๐—น๐—ถ๐˜‡๐—ฒ ๐—ถ๐˜๐˜€ ๐—ผ๐˜„๐—ป ๐—ฎ๐˜ ๐˜€๐—ฐ๐—ฎ๐—น๐—ฒ ๐˜‚๐—ป๐˜๐—ถ๐—น ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—บ๐—ถ๐—ฑ-2030๐˜€. This gives the United States and its allies, the sole producers, extraordinary leverage over Chinaโ€™s AI ambitions. (2) ๐—ฌ๐—ฒ๐˜ ๐˜๐—ผ๐—ฑ๐—ฎ๐˜† ๐—”๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐—ฎ ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฑ ๐—ถ๐˜๐˜€ ๐—ฎ๐—น๐—น๐—ถ๐—ฒ๐˜€ ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ ๐—ด๐—ถ๐˜ƒ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐—ฎ๐˜„๐—ฎ๐˜† ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฎ๐˜ ๐—น๐—ฒ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐—ด๐—ฒ ๐—ฏ๐˜† ๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—บ๐—ถ๐˜๐˜๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐—–๐—ต๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ฎ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐—ถ๐—บ๐—ฝ๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐˜ ๐——๐—จ๐—ฉ๐—ถ ๐˜€๐˜†๐˜€๐˜๐—ฒ๐—บ๐˜€ ๐—ฐ๐—ฎ๐—ฝ๐—ฎ๐—ฏ๐—น๐—ฒ ๐—ผ๐—ณ ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐—ธ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐—›๐˜‚๐—ฎ๐˜„๐—ฒ๐—ถ'๐˜€ ๐—”๐—œ ๐—ฐ๐—ต๐—ถ๐—ฝ๐˜€. China has aggressively capitalized on this opening, amassing a large, growing stockpile of these systems as of 2026. If Chinese DUVi imports continue, China could accumulate enough lithography capacity over the next five to ten years to narrow or even erase the currently sizable US-allied advantage in AI chipmaking. (3) ๐—ง๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—จ๐—ป๐—ถ๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐—ฆ๐˜๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ฒ๐˜€ ๐—ฐ๐—ฎ๐—ป ๐—ฝ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ถ๐˜€ ๐—ผ๐˜‚๐˜๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—บ๐—ฒ ๐˜„๐—ถ๐˜๐—ต ๐—ฎ ๐˜€๐—ถ๐—บ๐—ฝ๐—น๐—ฒ ๐—ฝ๐—ผ๐—น๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐˜† ๐—ฐ๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ด๐—ฒ: ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—ฝ๐—น๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐—ฒ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ฐ๐˜‚๐—ฟ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜, ๐—ฝ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ฎ๐—น ๐——๐—จ๐—ฉ๐—ถ ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—ป๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐—น๐˜€ ๐˜„๐—ถ๐˜๐—ต ๐—ฎ ๐—–๐—ต๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ฎ-๐˜„๐—ถ๐—ฑ๐—ฒ ๐—ฏ๐—ฎ๐—ป ๐—ผ๐—ป ๐—ฎ๐—น๐—น ๐——๐—จ๐—ฉ๐—ถ ๐—ฒ๐˜…๐—ฝ๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐˜๐˜€, ๐˜„๐—ถ๐˜๐—ต ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—บ๐—ฝ๐—น๐—ฒ๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐˜† ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—ป๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐—น๐˜€ ๐—ผ๐—ป ๐˜€๐—ฝ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ ๐—ฝ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐˜๐˜€ ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฑ ๐˜€๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐˜ƒ๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด. This action would secure the US advanced AI chip production advantage (see Figure)โ€”and resulting AI capability advantageโ€”for at least a decade and ensure that the next wave of advanced fabs is built in the United States and its allied countries, not China. The MATCH Act, now before Congress, would establish China-wide controls on DUVi exports. Passing MATCH is arguably the single strongest step the US government can take to ensure a long-term AI advantage over China. We also develop analysis on: - China's lithography indigenization trajectory - The regulatory structure of US, Dutch, and Japanese export controls on SME - China's DUVi imports and installed base - Yields and throughputs obtainable with Chinaโ€™s installed DUVi systems - US and Chinese AI chip production under a range of scenarios See the full report at
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