This isn’t how things work in any other incident reporting regime. Not aviation, not nuclear, not medical devices, not securities. Even in cyber (where the victims have valid reasons to keep the vulnerability quiet), they get max 90 days. Even in confidential reporting regimes (like CIRCIA and ASRS), they still release anonymized info. We’ve worked through these questions before, and the answer is never ~we defer to the wishes of the company.

My toxic trait is loving even-handed, ecumenical takes. And @sayashk and @random_walker supply them in spades. A few thoughts and reactions: (1) This is what virtue looks like. Actual humility, a deep appreciation for uncertainty, openly updating their beliefs, and finding actionable areas of common ground. (2) Best line in the whole piece: “we do not need consensus on worldviews to have agreement on policy” — I’d put it even more strongly, such consensus is not possible; we have to work within that constraint. (3) Luckily many policies are robust to different assumptions. Their policy recs hold up, and that’s largely because they choose the right focus areas—Managing uncertainty and building resilience. I wrote more on the original policy recs in another post; I’ll link in the comments. (4) It’s striking how much their policy recs parallel the major AI policy proposals to date (including newer additions like embedded auditing and additional emphasis on liability reform). That still surprises many. (5) Despite these policies being chosen specifically for their robustness, most are hotly contested when actually proposed. I think the authors ought to ask why policies they’ve selected specifically for being agreeable no-brainers have not gotten traction amongst policymakers who like and cite their work. (6) I want to challenge the authors to consider whether they have unique leverage in unsticking some of these policies, and to act on it. (7) I do wonder if the AI as normal tech meme obscures the policy recs and encourages misreadings. I’d be curious for the authors to at least try writing some work that leads with the policy recs, and presents them in pithier form. The authors recognize this issue: “we are often mistaken as downplaying Al risks, though we have repeatedly clarified that that is not our position. Still, it is important for us to be explicit about how much urgency there is.” — but even now, I don’t think the urgency comes through to the average skim reader. (7) I’d like to see them incorporate ~adaptation/flexibility into their policy recs. Uncertainty = surprises and updates, and so many policies are too rigid to adapt. Maybe I’m just being a lawyer, but I’d like to see them stump for rulemaking authority, updating mechanisms for standards, etc. This is one of the most frequent errors in current policymaking and it seems very consistent with their thesis. (8) I think the authors, at times, underestimate how widely their takes are held amongst people they lump into the “AI Safety” category. I think a much larger portion of those folks agree with the diagnosis that the Hugging Face incident displayed large cultural and procedural safety lapses and an under-investment in control. There are legitimate disagreements, but I see the authors reaction as closer to the modal reaction than they seem to think. (9) I see this policy portfolio as highly overlapped with that of @law_ai_, and the emphasis on robustness to different assumptions has strong overlaps with both my own way of thinking and Radical Optionality

I found this coverage largely misleading. AI acceleration of bioweapon development is a plausible near term risk, but the evidence in this report doesn’t show uplift in bio capabilities or support the existence of “plots.” 🧵