đ Editing my paper "Is an Unamendable Constitution Undemocratic?," coming soon in the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, with thanks to its outstanding editorial leadership.
đ In the paper, I make the case that unamendability is not a technology worth encoding in any constitution. I draw from the results of a first-of-its-kind global survey of constitutional experts to show that there are costs to legality and legitimacy when incumbents exploit the mechanisms of law to overcome an unamendable constitution.
đ My principal purpose is to steer constitution-makers away from designing constitutions that induce incumbents to follow the path of illegality when they feel handcuffed to an unamendable constitution. I offer detailed recommendations for designing constitutions to be always amendable while simultaneously: (1) protecting the core of the constitution and its highest values; (2) achieving the expressive benefits of unamendability; and (3) respecting the rule of law.
đ° Read an earlier draft here: