The Islamic Republic regime is so fractured that even who has the authority to negotiate has become a public power struggle. Ahmad Alamolhoda, the Friday prayer leader in Mashhad, says Mojtaba Khamenei did not authorize negotiations with the United States. He says the delegation was ordered only to present seven conditions, and that officials who negotiated went against the Leader’s orders. That is a stunning admission from inside the system. Iran’s foreign minister and parliament speaker can meet mediators and discuss terms, but hardliners are publicly disputing whether they have the authority to negotiate at all. The fight is already spreading. Hardline lawmakers have moved to impeach Abbas Araghchi over the New York contacts. MPs have accused Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf of crossing Mojtaba’s red lines on the nuclear file and the Strait of Hormuz. A senior official said the delegation had full authority; IRGC-linked outlets and hardliners insist it did not. The regime cannot even agree on who is allowed to speak for it. The confusion deepened when Bloomberg reported that Araghchi had offered restored IAEA access to bombed sites in exchange for sanctions relief. An Iranian source then denied the report. Offer, deny, disown. A negotiator whose words can be repudiated overnight cannot credibly close a deal. President Masoud Pezeshkian has described a small group of senior officials handling war and negotiations. But even that process does not settle the central question: who has the final authority to commit the regime? Under the Islamic Republic’s system, any agreement ultimately depends on the Supreme Leader. That is where the crisis becomes more serious. Mojtaba Khamenei was named Supreme Leader after his father’s death, but he has not appeared publicly. No authenticated video or audio of him as leader has been produced. Officials say he is issuing orders and meeting leaders; hardliners invoke his authority to veto negotiations. His continued absence leaves the regime’s negotiators unable to prove whose mandate they carry. Alamolhoda’s intervention is not just opposition to one diplomatic move. It shows how the leadership vacuum lets hardliners challenge every concession as disobedience while negotiators claim authority they cannot demonstrate. The result is a regime that can announce conditions, float proposals and denounce talks, but struggles to produce anyone empowered to make a binding agreement. The Islamic Republic is not merely divided over what to negotiate. Its factions are fighting over whether anyone has the right to negotiate in the first place.