China has now released its official press release of today's Xi-Trump meeting at the White House. At the moment, the US side's press release is not out yet. I read the Chinese version as soon as it came out. It is not particularly long, but it is surprisingly dense. And one thing stood out to me: Beijing is not simply talking about "cooperation." It is laying out a framework for how China and the United States can compete and win together. And the structure of Xi's remarks is revealing: Trade: cooperate. AI: compete, but cooperate. Taiwan: red lines. Read together with the written statement Xi issued upon arriving in Washington yesterday, today's readout may offer the clearest explanation yet of what Beijing means by a "constructive relationship of strategic stability." Here is how I read it. As in my previous posts, the italicized text comes from the Chinese official release, the bolded text highlights key points, and everything else is my analysis. -- Xi pointed out that the exchange of visits between the heads of state of China and the United States in less than half a year is unprecedented in the history of China-US relations. President Trump and I have maintained communication through various channels and have jointly been steering the great ship of China-US relationship. In May this year, President Trump and I jointly agreed to work toward building a constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability. The new vision reflects the realities of China-US ties, embodies our aspirations for the future, and represents an important step toward finding the right way for the two countries to get along with each other. We need to work toward a relationship featuring cooperation as the mainstay, competition with bounds, manageable differences, and promises of peace, so as to find the right way for two major countries to coexist. China and the United States should, and fully can, achieve mutual benefit and win-win results through practical cooperation, help each other succeed through healthy competition, properly manage differences by seeking common ground while respecting differences, and build peace by fostering mutual trust, so that a constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability can better benefit the two peoples and people around the world. There is a lot packed into these three paragraphs. First, the reference to the "unprecedented" frequency of leader-level exchanges is notable. Xi's framing moves from his personal communication with Trump, to sustained communication between the two presidents, and then to something much larger: a mechanism for stabilizing the bilateral relationship itself. Then comes the metaphor of the "great ship." This is not new. Xi has used the ship metaphor in previous meetings or phone calls with Trump. A ship this large does not turn quickly. And if it veers badly off course, the consequences can be enormous. I think the stage on which this "ship" is sailing is the broader Pacific. The ship may encounter storms and rough seas, but the two countries' top leaders are presenting themselves as jointly responsible for keeping it on course. And then there is a phrase that appears twice: "finding the right way." I don't think that repetition is accidental. Beijing is trying to define what coexistence between two competing major powers should actually look like. And the next sentence gives us the formula: "cooperation as the mainstay, competition with bounds, manageable differences, and promises of peace" was already included in Xi's statement after arriving in the United States the day before. It provides a concrete framework for managing the competition and building this new type of relationship. In many ways, this is an attempt to answer a question that has long complicated China-US relations: Do China and the United States have to choose between cooperation and confrontation? Beijing's answer is no. And more importantly, it is beginning to spell out what that alternative might look like. -- Xi stressed that the economic and trade teams of the two countries held a new round of consultations and reached a new joint arrangement, which is good news for industries and people of both countries, as well as the global economy. Cooperation is a two-way street. The stability of US-China economic and trade relations requires both sides to expand the list of cooperation, while shortening the list of problems. As long as the two sides uphold the spirit of equality, mutual respect and mutual benefit, a way out of problems can be found. Xi expressed his hope that the two sides will work in the same direction, stay committed to the principle of mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, and promote the sustained, stable and sound development of China-US economic and trade relations. And this is where the broader idea of "strategic stability" starts becoming concrete. How do you prevent competition from turning into confrontation? Beijing's answer begins with two lists: The cooperation list. The problem list. In my view, expanding the cooperation means continually broadening the areas in which both sides can achieve tangible results. Reducing the problem list, meanwhile, means preventing new disputes from continuously piling onto the bilateral relationship. This is very pragmatic to manage the relationship. The goal is not to build a relationship completely free of friction-that is clearly unrealistic. The real goal is this: To keep increasing the number of areas where the two sides can cooperate, while preventing disputes from expanding to the point where they overwhelm the entire bilateral relationship. And that helps explain why Xi repeatedly emphasizes equality, mutual respect, and mutual benefit. In addition, the phrase "cooperation is a two-way street" carries a significant message: Beijing is signaling that it is willing to cooperate, but it does not believe strategic stability can be built by China alone. One side cannot keep extending the cooperation list if the other side keeps extending the problem list. Meaningful progress requires both sides to engage, compromise, and reciprocate. -- Xi said that while China and the United States, as both major powers in AI, compete in AI, they have even more reasons to cooperate. The two sides should leverage respective strengths in AI rather than guarding against each other. We can continue to engage in dialogue on AI, exchange views on its risks and benefits, and work together to prevent the misuse and abuse of AI. The two sides should maintain human control over AI technologies, uphold a people-centered approach and the principle of using AI for good, and ensure that AI serves human progress. What happens when an issue belongs on both lists at the same time? That is where AI becomes particularly interesting. The AI competition between the two countries are obvious. But the risks of AI do not respect national borders. Misuse, loss of human control, safety risks, and broader questions of governance cannot necessarily be contained within China or the United States alone. Two countries can compete fiercely over who develops the most advanced AI systems while still sharing an interest in preventing those systems from creating risks neither side can control. This is why Xi said the two countries have even more reasons to cooperate. And the remark also echoes President Trump's statement on social media that he would discuss "super intelligence" today. Trade is about expanding the cooperation list. AI sits on both lists. But Taiwan is different. Let's move on. -- Xi stressed that the Chinese side's position on safeguarding national reunification and territorial integrity is clear-cut. It is hoped that the US side will adhere to the correct position of opposing "Taiwan independence," and handle the Taiwan question with caution, so as to lay a solid foundation for China-US strategic cooperation and the development of bilateral relations. The Taiwan question finally came into focus. It's different from the previous topics. There had previously been speculation in the United States that Xi's asking Trump to stop arms sales to Taiwan based on the 1982 US-China Communique. I do not know whether that report was accurate. But the language of the communique is quite explicit: "Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution. " Clearly, 44 years is long enough to qualify as a long term. Yet US policy has failed to follow through on the promise made in that document. Looking at the structure of Xi's remarks, Taiwan has surely been placed within the boundaries of strategic stability. After outlining substantial areas for cooperation, the Chinese side is also sending Washington a clear message: Strategic stability does not mean stability without red lines. -- Trump said that the state visit of Xi to the United States is a great visit. China and the United States are both major countries, and he and Xi are good friends who maintain in-depth and close communication. The US-China relations will surely be handled well under the leadership of the two heads of state. The latest round of economic and trade consultations between teams of both countries achieved new outcomes, and both sides should continue dialogue to reach a better agreement. Artificial intelligence concerns the future of humanity, and China and the United States should maintain dialogue and strengthen cooperation on this issue. Trump's response, as presented in the Chinese readout, is notable for what it reinforces. He described the visit as "great." This effectively signaled to the outside world that the meeting did not need to be portrayed as a tense, difficult, or deeply divided encounter. Judging from the narrative presented in the Chinese readout, the two sides have established fairly clear areas of common ground on several fronts: - High-level communication should continue. - Economic and trade negotiations should continue. - Dialogue on AI should continue. - The overall stability of bilateral relations needs to be maintained. At the same time, it is equally important to note that Trump's remarks were relatively broad and general, while Xi's remarks played a more substantial role in defining the broader framework of the relationship. -- Both heads of state also exchanged views on major international and regional issues including the Middle East situation, Ukraine crisis and Korean Peninsula. The two leaders also confirmed that the two countries will support each other in hosting the 2026 APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting and the G20 Leaders' Summit. I would not pass over this final section too quickly. The Middle East. Ukraine. The Korean Peninsula. None of these issues is simply about China-US bilateral relations. Their inclusion reminds us that the relationship between Washington and Beijing does not exist in isolation. China and the United States are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, two of the world's largest economies, and leading technological powers. Whether they can maintain channels of communication therefore has implications far beyond trade, technology, or Taiwan. Both are deeply embedded in a broader multilateral system. The immediate references to the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in China's Shenzhen and the G20 Leaders' Summit in America's Miami reinforce that point. They place the bilateral relationship in a wider context: even as China and the United States compete with each other, they must also continue engaging within institutions and forums where their decisions affect countries far beyond their own. How will Beijing and Washington manage the competition in a healthy way? When the cooperation list and the problem list are both on the table, which one will Washington choose to make longer? There is no answer to that question tonight. What comes next will.

Over 3,200 years ago, China had a queen unlike any other. Her name was Fu Hao (妇好). She is remembered as one of the earliest known female military commanders in Chinese history. She led troops into battle, presided over important rituals, and held extraordinary status at the Shang Dynasty court. You could take her as China's Nefertiti, who lived abt 100 years ahead of her in Egypt. We may never know exactly what happened when Fu Hao died. But judging from the way she was buried, it is not hard to imagine that King Wu Ding (武丁), her husband, was devastated by her loss. Fu Hao was given an exceptionally prestigious burial in the Shang kingdom's last capital Anyang (安阳). Located in central China, it's one of the cradles of early Chinese civilization, where a tremendous amount of exquisite bronzes and oracle bones, the earliest known body of mature Chinese writing. Usually, unlike many Shang kings and queens, who were buried in the royal cemetery, she was laid to rest within the palace complex. And that has inspired an irresistibly romantic thought: Perhaps the king simply could not bear to have her too far away. Perhaps, in some sense, he still wanted to "see" her every day. What the king could have imagined was that this closeness would become the perfect protection. Over the next three millennia, the Shang royal cemetery was repeatedly looted. Most of its grand tombs were robbed, leaving very few intact. But Fu Hao's tomb was different. In 1976, when it was discovered by the female archaeologist Zheng Zhenxiang, it had remained undisturbed. Perhaps, by accident, the king's grief had protected her all along. The tomb itself was not particularly large. But inside was something like a time capsule, sealed for more than 3,000 years. The burial objects had been packed into the tomb in layer after layer, seven in all: bronze vessels. Jade. Bone carvings. Ivory. Pottery. Over a thousand objects emerged before the archaeologists, astonishing not only in number, but in the extraordinary skill with which they had been made. Together, they transformed our understanding of the Shang Dynasty. But among all these treasures was something even more remarkable, which has allowed us, for a moment, to look across 3,000 years and actually "see" the people of ancient China. 15 human figures carved from jade and stone were discovered in Fu Hao's tomb. Tiny as they are, they offer a rare glimpse of how people in China dressed more than 3,000 years ago. This jade figure stands just 8.5 centimeters tall. He sits low to the ground, leaning slightly forward, with a surprisingly serious expression. The carving is remarkably detailed. His eyes, nose, and mouth are clearly defined-even his nostrils are visible. And then there is the hairstyle. At first glance, it looks almost like a modern bowl cut. But on top of his head is a small tied braid. A hole runs through the center of the head, suggesting that the figure may once have been worn or suspended as an ornament. In the Shang Dynasty, silk was associated with the elite, while hemp was a much more common textile for ordinary people. Look closely at this figure's clothing, and it is anything but plain. Across the front is a striking animal-mask design, somewhat bovine in appearance. And on both sleeves are snakes. Their bodies curl along the arms, while their heads rise all the way to the shoulders. It is hard not to pause here and wonder: Centuries later, Chinese emperors would famously wear dragons across their robes. Could this much earlier fascination with powerful, serpentine creatures worn on the body have been a distant aesthetic prelude to that tradition? One thing is clear: More than 3,000 years ago, people in China already understood that clothing could do more than cover the body. It could display status. It could carry symbols. And it could make power visible. Three thousand years ago does not feel quite so distant anymore. People then, just like us, took time to arrange their hair, choose what to wear, and adorn themselves. Most of their names are gone. Their voices are gone. The world they knew has vanished. But somehow, their faces remain. Three thousand years later, we are still looking at their faces. And, they are still looking back.

I must say, I am genuinely surprised. Compared with the hesitant silence we have often seen in the past, Japan's decision to issue a direct and public counter-response this morning to China's letter at the United Nations is unexpected. I have read Ambassador Yamazaki's letter carefully. While the document is tidy and follows diplomatic conventions, there is substantial room for improvement, logically, historically, and legally. I studied China-US-Japan relations at Stanford for three years, and have conducted extensive archival research in multiple presidential libraries such as FDR, Nixon and Reagan, where I handled original correspondence between Japanese leaders, US presidents, and White House memos. I also reviewed a large volume of primary documents at Hoover and in Taipei. My Stanford thesis focused on the Ryukyu and Diaoyu disputes and was published in the leading Chinese studies journal of the United States. Let me, as a serious IR scholar rigorously trained in this field, respond point by point. 1. If Japan is truly "exclusively defense-oriented," why deploy military assets to the Taiwan Strait? Japan repeatedly claims its defense posture is strictly defensive. But if Japanese Self-Defense Force vessels can cross national boundaries and operate in the Taiwan Strait, then: "Defense" becomes "projection." This fundamental contradiction is never explained in the letter. It is not simply a question of where a ship travels, but a question of how Japan justifies extraterritorial military deployments under the framework of a supposedly passive defense doctrine. 2. Japan's rapid remilitarization: still "self-defense"? Over the past decade, Japan has taken major steps: -Defense spending at new highs, placing the country among the world's top ten -Acquisition of "counterstrike capability (in reality, long-range strike capability)" -The 2015 Security Legislation enabling collective self-defense, a major constitutional controversy -Increasing military presence oriented toward Taiwan -Deepened operational integration with the United States A fundamental question arises: Did the 2015 reinterpretation of collective self-defense violate Japan's Constitution? Many constitutional scholars in Japan say yes. Ambassador Yamazaki avoids this entirely, while speaking at length about "international law." But he should also note Japan's domestic legal inconsistencies are far more serious. 3. Since Ambassador Yamazaki cites the 1972 Joint Communique, let's review what it actually says. In the statement, the Japanese government declares its adherence to Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation, which states that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." The Cairo Declaration of 1943, jointly issued by the major Allied leaders, explicitly stipulated: "All the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China." Under international law, states, not governments, are the subjects of sovereignty. Governments merely represent the state. After 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) replaced the Republic of China (ROC) and succeeded to its corresponding rights and obligations. Since the Ambassador presents Japan as a country that respects and upholds the authority of the United Nations so much, let's remind him of what was affirmed by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758: "Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and that the People's Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council." Therefore, Japan's statement that it adheres to Article 8 of Potsdam is, in effect, confirmation that Taiwan belongs to China, and indirectly confirms that Taiwan falls within the sovereignty of the PRC. I encourage the Ambassador to address all relevant clauses, not just the ones that suit his narrative. 4. Peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question? Japan must first examine its own policies. I, like many others, sincerely hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. But if certain Japanese politicians threaten military intervention, and mislead the Japanese public by framing such actions as "cool" or "righteous" to boost their approval ratings, then how exactly can peace be achieved? I FEEL worried. Japan's actions contradict its rhetoric. You cannot escalate military posture while preaching "de-escalation," Mr. Ambassador. 5. Accusing China of "stifling" people-to-people exchanges? This claim is puzzling I honestly fail to see the evidence. In the past few years, China has repeatedly funded youth exchange programs, covering airfare, accommodation, and all activities for young Japanese to visit China. I myself have been invited many times to speak with Japanese youth participants and made some really good friends. China has taken such active steps to encourage next-generation understanding. So what, then, is being "restricted"? Could Ambassador Yamazaki provide a concrete example? I am willing to investigate it personally and respond. Also, I genuinely want to know if Japan provides a similar opportunity for Chinese? 6. On Japanese fishery products: refusing imports is not "coercion" The discharge of treated water from Fukushima remains controversial. Many Japanese citizens themselves avoid Fukushima products too. Every sovereign state has the right to maintain food-safety standards. China is simply exercising its consumer rights. Is Japan demanding compulsory acceptance of its products? A deeply flawed argument. 7. Has Japan never taken coercive action against states with differing views? Japan itself: -Joined US export-control measures against China -Imposed screening and restrictions on Chinese enterprises -Engaged in political pressure campaigns in regional security forums If Japan cannot faithfully answer whether it has ever applied pressure on others, then its claimed stance of opposing coercion lacks credibility. 8. Since Mr. Ambassador emphasizes respect for international law, then two questions must be answered: -Japan's status as a defeated state matters The post-1945 international order clearly assigned Taiwan to China. No international legal instrument grants Japan any role in the Taiwan question. -Was the "reversion of Okinawa" fully compliant with international law? Okinawa was originally designated for United Nations trusteeship after WWII. Japan seemingly bypassed the intended framework. If Japan invokes international law, it should explain the legality of its own postwar territorial processes. 9. A country that consistently denies wartime history cannot claim moral leadership in peace A truly peace-loving nation does not: -Deny historical atrocities -Embrace revisionist narratives -Allow its politicians to visit Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines Class-A war criminals. If this is considered a contribution to peace, then the word "peace" is being used in a rather creative sense. Japan has yet to resolve these issues. It is therefore difficult for Japan to position itself as role model of peace in the region, or in the UN. Tone matters, but facts matter more. I welcome Japan speaking openly in the United Nations. But open statements must accept open responses, grounded in international law, historical documents, policy consistency, regional realities. Rhetoric cannot substitute for facts. Domestic reinterpretations cannot replace international consensus. Unhalted march toward military normalization cannot count as pursuit of peace. Perhaps the research intern who drafted the letter deserves a second look, Ambassador Yamazaki.