🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 💸 @SetProtocol Loss: ～9.6K USD 🔍 Root Cause: Index Coop `ExchangeIssuance.issueSetForExactToken` trusted arbitrary SetToken state without locking. The function read components and units for quoting, but allowed a malicious manager pre-issue hook to inflate `positionMultiplier` via NAV `issue`/`redeem` with a fake valuation. `BasicIssuanceModule.issue` then read inflated real units from `ExchangeIssuance` via `transferFrom`, causing TOCTOU-based asset drain. 📌 Attacker: 0x0736930ae35eafefa789f11edf41d7b799e7c99d 📌 Victim: 0xc8c85a3b4d03fb3451e7248ff94f780c92f884fd (ExchangeIssuance) 📌 Malicious SetToken: 0xf7c2d0a2bf81bf803ed6e1d97c89fe3b30b06948 📌 Malicious Manager/Hook: 0x8f449d85f728c1dd6596880ba28a0b80b6a26c58 📌 Malicious Valuer: 0x388a3da33825e1f44ac71b8fd543523cdf994802 ⚠️ Impact: ExchangeIssuance lost real assets after attacker issued BHSET with 0.05 WETH, then abused hook to inflate component units ~93.66x, allowing excessive `transferFrom` during issue. Powered by Tx:

🚨 Job Scam Alert: Interview Software Used to Deliver Info-Stealing Malware MistEye has identified a job scam campaign targeting Web3 professionals. Threat actors are impersonating recruiters and luring victims into installing a malicious application disguised as an AI meeting tool called “Relay”. The malware targets both macOS and Windows users, attempting to steal sensitive data including browser credentials, wallet-related information, Keychain data, Telegram sessions, and more. We analyzed the samples and revealed how this attack chain was built. Please remain cautious when installing software during online interviews or recruitment processes. Avoid executing unverified applications and carefully review unexpected installation requests or system password prompts. Read the full analysis 👇

🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 💸 @42dao_official Loss: ~ 912k USD 🔍 Root Cause: Attackers exploited an abnormally low BTCB oracle price from Median Oracle via Spotter `poke` and Dog `bark`. The spotter lacked price deviation checks, max drawdown limits, and minimum price protections, allowing immediate write of the low spot into Vat. The dog module then used this updated spot without any liquidation delay or oracle price validation, enabling instant liquidation of multiple BTCB vaults. 📌 Attacker: 0x9d8dd9f2d734675e2bfcc142d1c7a45609ca213c 📌 Victim: 0x973a722fd8bcd4b81f4c5c1ac687073e44aa9a0c 📌 Vulnerable Contract: 0x849dc2416cbe54995a1d725afe526c0e38829228 (Spotter) & 0x00101ae4467d72e83ef68df447c41de0c71f634e (Dog) Impact: A single-transaction combo exploited the missing price protection and liquidation delay in Maker-style system, allowing an attacker to liquidate multiple BTCB vaults using an abnormally low oracle price and profit from the arbitrage. Powered by Tx:

🚨 Threat Intelligence | On-Chain Backdoor in a Malicious TRAE Extension Following @Will42W’s warning about TRAE IDE extension supply chain risks, SlowMist investigated the malicious extension juannegro.solidity. Although removed from Open VSX, the extension was still available through the TRAE marketplace as of July 18, 2026. It impersonated a legitimate Solidity plugin and acted as a cross-platform malware dropper. Our analysis found that it: 🔹 Impersonates a legitimate Solidity extension and uses the marketplace as the initial malware delivery channel 🔹 Automatically executes after IDE startup and establishes persistence across platforms 🔹 Uses an Ethereum smart contract to store and retrieve dynamic C2 configurations 🔹 Allows attackers to update C2 endpoints and payload delivery without republishing the extension This incident highlights how extension marketplaces can become initial infection vectors, while blockchain infrastructure can be abused for dynamic C2 management. Users who installed juannegro.solidity should remove the extension and check their systems for potential compromise. Full analysis👇

Previously, we analyzed Grok CLI’s data upload behavior and found that its repository upload mechanism could send git bundles containing sensitive files such as .env files and RSA private keys. Following that analysis, we continued auditing Grok Build CLI’s security model after it was open-sourced. Within 24 hours, we identified two attack chains that can lead to arbitrary code execution without explicit user approval. The root cause is not a single bug, but a fragmented trust model: project-level files can influence AI Agent instructions and permission decisions without sufficient validation. Key findings: 🔹 cargo check was incorrectly classified as a safe command. Combined with malicious AGENTS.md instructions, attackers can trigger execution and achieve code execution. 🔹 .claude/settings.json with bypassPermissions can override permission checks and enable unrestricted tool execution. 🔹 Grok Build CLI inherits Claude Code CLI’s permission configuration model, exposing similar risks. 🔹 .mcp.json introduces additional project-level attack surfaces through MCP configuration. These findings highlight a broader issue: When #AI# coding agents trust project-level files too much, opening a project can become equivalent to granting shell access. 📖 Full technical analysis: 👉 Previous analysis:

⚠️ALERT: SlowMist warns new malware targeting Apple Mac users can steal Telegram accounts, passwords and crypto. The security firm found a macOS malware that allows hackers to steal Telegram sessions, encrypted wallet databases, and passwords saved in Apple Keychain, browsers and Notes. They can then access chats, unlock wallets offline, and show fake wallet apps (Ledger and Trezor) to steal recovery phrases.

🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 💸 @Ostium Loss: ~11,862,445 USDC 🔍 Root Cause: An authorized oracle signer was used to submit malicious price reports through a registered forwarder. The attacker provided validly signed but manipulated oracle data, which was accepted by the oracle verification mechanism. By repeatedly opening and closing trades with artificially favorable prices, the attacker generated artificial profits and drained funds from the OstiumVault. 📌 Attacker Address: 0xd1794196f0fc99c7f27970e661597d77d9a85869 📌 Victim Address: 0x20d419a8e12c45f88fda7c5760bb6923cee27f98 (vault) 📌 Vulnerable Contract: 0x0aebc4094b60ea4e21e937e80dafdd58c07c5ebb (OstiumPrivatePriceUpKeep impl) & 0xd456939e54f68ef9b0be62abb2ec4a37397cb814 (OstiumVerifier) Impact: The attacker exploited compromised oracle privileges to submit manipulated price reports and execute repeated profitable trades, draining ~11.86M USDC from the vault. Powered by Tx:

✍️ Technical Analysis Published: Telegram Account Compromised, Wallet Swapped: How Does macOS Malware Break Through Your Defenses? Our latest investigation reconstructs how a single malware sample chains together Telegram session theft, wallet database exfiltration, offline decryption and fake wallet applications into a complete account takeover workflow. Our analysis shows: 1️⃣Stolen Telegram Desktop and Telegram for macOS session files can be restored on another Mac without re-entering a phone number, verification code or 2FA password 2️⃣For Telegram for macOS, even after server-side security mechanisms respond, cached chat history may remain accessible instead of being cleared by a forced logout 3️⃣Wallet databases can be paired with passwords collected from Keychain, browsers and Apple Notes for offline decryption, without interacting with the victim's device 4️⃣Fake Ledger and Trezor desktop apps are actually WKWebView-based loaders that replace trusted wallet interfaces with attacker-controlled phishing pages The malware doesn't rely on a single technique—it combines authenticated sessions, encrypted wallet data and credential material into one attack chain. 💡 Defense tip: Protect your local Telegram session by enabling a Telegram Passcode and using a strong, unique password. Full analysis and practical mitigation guidance👇

🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 💸 @dripsnetwork Loss: 24,882.99 DAI 🔍 Root Cause: Integer type conversion flaw in `DaiDripsHub`'s `give(address,uint128)` function. The function converts `uint128 amt` to `int128` without validating `amt <= type(int128).max`. Attackers pass `2^128 - reserveBalance` (exceeding int128 max), causing `int128(amt)` to become a negative value. `-int128(amt)` then becomes positive, flipping the transfer direction from "user pays" to "reserve withdraws to user," draining DAI. 📌 Attacker: 0x84da7a5e2315eb798f04b75554aeb15047269cce 📌 Victim Contract (DaiReserve): 0xf9bbb2df44cfe46e501cf91c99b2f8fef9d9d44a 📌 Vulnerable Contract (Hub Proxy): 0x73043143e0a6418cc45d82d4505b096b802fd365 📌 Attack Contract: 0x00c64b5a926ba1fcec30efad88c344c619f54f12 Summary: Missing input validation allows a crafted `give()` call to reverse fund flow, draining the reserve. Powered by Tx:

🚨 SlowMist presents the 2026 Mid-year Blockchain Security & AML Report! 1/ In H1 2026, blockchain security entered a new phase. AI-driven scams, supply chain attacks, and cross-chain infrastructure exploits expanded the attack surface beyond smart contracts, while global regulation around stablecoins, #AML#, and VASPs continued to mature. 📊 Stats: 🔺 182 security incidents, ~$956M in losses (vs. 121 incidents / ~$2.373B in H1 2025) 🔹 By ecosystem: #Ethereum# $134M > #BSC# $36.35M > #Arbitrum# $4.93M 🔹 By project type: #DeFi# 116 incidents / ~$490M > Cross-chain bridges 20 incidents / ~$346M (Kelp DAO: ~$292M single loss) 🔹 By attack vector: 85 contract & logic vulnerabilities > 17 private key/credential compromises > 12 supply chain attacks ⚠️Note: Data is calculated using token prices at the time of each incident. Due to price fluctuations, undisclosed incidents, and the exclusion of individual user losses, actual losses are likely higher. Full report 👇

🚀 SlowMist has officially launched three security Agent Skills on @OKX AI ！ 🔹 SlowMist Agent Security Skill — Comprehensive protection for Agent interactions and execution 🔹 MistTrack Skill — On-chain address risk analysis and AML tracing 🔹 MistEye Skill — AI Agent security detection and dependency risk identification All Skills can be accessed through the OKX Onchain OS standardized interface, enabling on-chain automated settlement with near-instant execution. Ready to try them? 🧵👇

We're closely monitoring the Ill Bloom wallet weak randomness risk alert from @coinspect . Please check whether any of your historical wallet addresses are affected👉 Thanks to @coinspect for the responsible disclosure. Stay safe!

🚀MistTrack Crypto AML x402 API is now live! To make address analysis more convenient, we have launched the MistTrack Crypto AML x402 API, supporting blockchain address labeling and risk detection. 🌟A boon for AI Agents and developers: No registration required, no API Key needed. Simply call the API on-demand through the x402 payment protocol — flexible and efficient! 💰Address labels start at just $0.10 per call 🛡️Full suite of features including Risk Scoring, Transaction Investigation, and more ⚡Perfectly suited for AI Agent automation workflows Try it now👇

🥳Congrats to @OKX on the launch of OKX AI! 🚀 SlowMist will join the OKX AI ecosystem as a security capability partner. Our Security Agent Skills will be integrated and made available on the platform in the next phase, bringing trusted security capabilities to AI Agent users. Stay tuned for more updates. 👀

🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 AIDC token on BSC has been exploited. 💸 Loss: 220.12 WBNB (~$120929.35) 🔍 Root Cause: AIDCToken's `_sellTransfer()` accumulates a 30% burn amount without deducting it from the seller. Subsequently, any non-Pair transfer triggers `_executeAccumulatedBurn()`, which incorrectly burns tokens from the `uniswapPair` balance instead of the seller. After burning, `sync()` is called, artificially deflating the AIDC reserve in the AMM, allowing the attacker to drain WBNB. 📌 Attacker: 0x89eb2c99e970d831525c7a52badc290afa116b63 📌 Victim: 0x2725033282b3bd4be8873b7f0f622c18e3b7cbd8 (Pancake V2 AIDC/WBNB Pair) 📌 Vulnerable Contract: 0x5021d71859f81b4c905b573591db8f9cc4a0c6fe (AIDCToken) The attacker exploited a flawed burn mechanism where sell-induced burn debt is wrongly imposed on the liquidity pool, enabling repeated reserve manipulation and a final swap that drained nearly all WBNB from the Pair. Powered by #SlowMist#.AI

🔥Glad to support @HTX_DAO’s HTX Genesis Hackathon as a security partner! Hosted by HTX DAO & this global hackathon focuses on AI × Web3 innovations in smart finance, AI Agents, and on-chain infrastructure. $20,000 prize pool + $100k compute power and strong ecosystem support. Top projects can enter HTX DAO accelerator.✨ Register by July 5! Wishing all hackers a great experience and groundbreaking innovations! 🚀

🚨 MistTrack Illicit Fund Analysis — Taiko Exploit 🕵️ On June 22, 2026, the Taiko protocol was exploited. Stolen funds were distributed across multiple attacker-controlled addresses. The main attacker EOA 0x7506DeA0c38ca0B55364B22424374c5A1ae1B76a received various ERC-20 tokens (USDC, USDT, crvUSD, CRV, WBTC, wEETH, TAIKO, iZi) and quickly swapped most non-native assets for ETH via DEXs, accumulating ~615 ETH. Separately, 277.97 ETH was bridged out directly. Total stolen: ≈ $1.74M (at incident-time prices). ✅ 777.977 ETH (~$1.35M) moved to: 0xa98035081fb739ebe9c8f80904668fb11438a846 ✅ 1.99M TAIKO (~$194K) deposited to MEXC via: 0x5FBc60A12Bc6635E7d587d8DaC52e4b1388b4990 ⚠️ Attacker EOA still holds: 117 ETH + 2.14M iZi + 0.531 wEETH Key address to monitor: 0xa98035081fb739ebe9c8f80904668fb11438a846 We have blacklisted the related addresses and are actively monitoring them.

🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 @aztecnetwork has been exploited again. 💸 Loss: 1,158 ETH+150,000 DAI+0.4696 renBTC (~$2,209,704.23 USD) 🔍 Root Cause: The `RollupProcessor.escapeHatch()` function (`0x737901bea3eeb88459df9ef1be8ff3ae1b42a2ba`) lacks access control: no `onlyOwner`, no `rollupProviders` authorization, and no provider signature verification. When `rollupSize == 0`, the TurboVerifier accepts an escape hatch proof, and `processDepositsAndWithdrawals()` directly trusts the `proofData` public inputs (`publicOutput`, `outputOwner`, `assetId`) without independent validation of fund ownership or withdrawal balance, executing `withdraw(1158 ETH, attacker, 0)`. 📌 Attacker EOA: `0x6952d9246e9afe8b887b2877225163436f78e97f` 📌 Victim Contract: `RollupProcessor` at `0x737901bea3eeb88459df9ef1be8ff3ae1b42a2ba` 📌 Verifier Contract: `TurboVerifier` at `0x48cb7ba00d087541dc8e2b3738f80fdd1fee8ce8` Impact: Attacker drained 1,158 ETH from the `RollupProcessor` by submitting a valid escape hatch proof with spoofed public inputs, exploiting validation in the escape hatch withdrawal path. Powered by #SlowMist#.AI

🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 💸 @LittleBoyPlus has been exploited. Loss: ~377,642 USDT (~610.555 BNB) 🔍 Root Cause: The `LBPHashrate._update()` function (in `0x5e3c...85fe`) is triggered by zero-value `transferFrom` calls, which bypasses OpenZeppelin's allowance check. This allows an attacker to call `LBPHashrate.transferFrom(pair, DEAD, 0)` without pair authorization, triggering `_harvest(pair)` which mints LBP tokens directly to the PancakePair address via `LBP.mintReward(pair, reward)`. The minted LBP increases the pair's balance but not its reserve, enabling the attacker to drain USDT via `PancakePair.swap()`. 📌 Attacker: `0x5449ded887576f43fc339851e942ebc1e6f8118b` 📌 Victim Pair: `0x00e3ea08fd8cbad955ec5d2292ad637670c31524` 📌 Vulnerable Contract (LBPHashrate): `0x5e3cbc82d020be91a989eb747934104e9ab585fe` Impact: Zero-value `transferFrom` on LBPHashrate allows unapproved harvest & mint to PancakePair, leading to reserve imbalance and immediate USDT drain. Powered by #SlowMist#.AI