The bridge is OPEN! When you exit, the site will ask you to input a wallet to receive the chicken (and eth payout). Make sure you do NOT input an AGW. Anything sent to an AGW on ETH is lost forever. My first chicken granted me ~0.00566 ETH for bridging. The payout grows with each chicken bridged, so it pays to be last. But wait too long, and you won't get out at all. Abstract is slated to shut down 12/15, so you have until then. LayerZero is also a dependency, so if they shut off before Abstract does, then that's the deadline. However they've stated they will continue to support until the 15th as well. Who will be the last to escape the coop?

ok so looks like the largest crypto hack of all time, here's where we're at: Stolen: • ~$5.57B across Ethereum, Bitcoin, and Tron: ~$3.51B ETH, ~$1.44B BTC, ~$630M Tron. Frozen: • ~$2.39B in stablecoins: ~$1.567B USDT, ~$823M USDC • Aave froze V3 and V4 on eth mainnet, precautionary but prevents the attacker from causing bad debt with illicit funds leaves residual exposure at ~$2.6–$3.2B, beating out Feb 2025's $1.5B Bybit hack for the largest crypto heist of all time.

ok safe to say binance is pwned The biggest assets were approximately: • 1.615B USDT • 62.6M RLUSD • 29,934 wBETH • 11,372 XAUt • 6.19M UNI • 198.4M ENA • 7.175T PEPE • 27.8M USD1 • 2.26M LINK • 127,853 AAVE about $2.5B at the explorer’s prices. 1. The attacker deployed a delegate contract, 0x63e842b0...73e9c6fAe, from the relayer at 15:59 UTC. 2. About four hours later, the relayer submitted an EIP-7702 authorization transaction That installed the malicious 7702 delegate code on Binance 14. 3. The relayer then made a call to Binance 14, executing the delegate code, and transferring Binance 14’s ETH and token balances. 4. The calldata is labeled sweep(address, address[]). The second argument is a list of recognizable token-contract addresses plus the zero-address (eth). 5. The same relayer later used the same delegate to move 780M USDC from Binance Hot Wallet 34 into the same pool • The relayer 0x7C... was funded by three Tornado Cash 0.1 ETH withdrawals over the prior two days. • The same pool also received 28,005.6 ETH from Binance 16 24 seconds after the main sweep. • The pool then forwarded 195,460 ETH to a fresh, unlabeled EOA • That EOA has only one transaction and currently holds the 195,460 ETH. What's a bit unclear is why the relayer was needed in the first place. If they had the private keys to the Binance wallets, they could have just sent the assets out in an atomic bundle without needing a relayer at all. So it seems likely that they didn't have the private keys and instead just had the 7702 auth signatures, which must have been phished somehow. I think we can go ahead and assume DPRK.

PoolSwapper is live Swap your ape, pudgy, CDB, toad, birb, or meeb for another from the pool 50% of swap fees buy and burn the collection's Strategy token Thanks @token_works for providing one of each collection to use as bait so users don't have to

Coop status update 🐔 Floor is sitting around 0.034 ETH, with less than 6% listed. And the Ethereum chapter hasn't even begun yet. Despite broken bridges, @0xQuit managed to move ~1 ETH onto Abstract and placed the highest bids across every trait category. Exits begin on Dec 8. The later you exit, the more you can earn, but miss the shutdown and you're cooked. Plus, the Ethereum reveal is still ahead. Fun fact: While gold is one of the rarest traits in most NFT collections, it's actually the most common feather color in Chickens. Rarity follows Abstract tiers: Ethereal → Obsidian → Diamond → None (F&F) → Platinum → Gold Turning a chain shutdown into a game this interesting deserves some credit. My only regret? Not owning an Obsidian or Diamond egg heading into the reveal. 🥚

Now that ApeSTR is effectively bricked and can't resell apes, people have been asking if they can swap for apes in the pool, so I built a tool to do just that. Live now at Works for apes, pudgys, CDBs, meebits, moonbirds and cryptoadz. Squigs are there too but that contract does not hold any squigs anymore, so no real opportunities to swap. Note that you'll need 2 of a given NFT to swap for a new one. One is used as the "bait" and returned to you after the swap. Tomorrow, @Rhynotic will gift bait NFTs to the contract so that swappers do not need to provide one themselves. It will also be added to the NFTStrategy frontend (I think). There is a small fee, half of which goes towards buying and burning the strategy tokens. Note: the tool also supports the 10 BAYC that are in the BAYCExchange contract by @machibigbrother, and those do not require bait NFTs at all. Happy swapping.

While most NFT collections have solid gold as a rare trait, for Chickens it is actually the most common feather color. That's because feather rarity follows Abstract tier, so it goes ethereal -> obsidian -> diamond -> none (F&F) -> platinum -> gold. Still a grail though.

The naming of safeTransferFrom is perhaps the worst naming of any function ever, almost criminally bad. If we were to rewrite ERC721 today I'd be ok with totally omitting the function, and if we must include it, instead name it transferFromWithDangerouslyAllowedReentrancy

A quick note on this because it's maybe interesting: These 21 apes are not truly bricked forever. They can be swapped for other apes using the same mechanism run this morning. But all of the listings are cleared - ApeSTR effectively thinks it owns 0 apes - so nothing can be purchased. So to you purists saying this is a deflationary event - it kind of is? There are net-new 21 apes that can never be purchased, but which 21 those are can change from day to day.

gm gm here we go again. This morning somebody abused a bug in ApeStr to swap 21 apes for 21 ApeStr-owned apes. This was a known exploit (see the SQUIGSTR exploit from ~1 year ago) but incentive to run it was never there. The bug lies in buyTargetNFT: it forces a strategy contract to send arbitrary calldata to any target. Afterwards it checks only three things: its BAYC balance rose by exactly 1, it owns expectedId, and "cost" equals its ETH balance drop. This was patched in later NFTStrategy releases, but affects the original 6 (PunkSTR not affected). The attacker bought 2 BAYC to use as bait. Using a helper contract, they prep the strategy contract by selling an ape to it for 5 wei and immediately buying it back for 6 wei. That primes the contract's ethToTwap with 6 wei. They then call buyTargetNFT and pass the calldata to transfer an ape from ApeSTR to the helper using safeTransferFrom. This in turn hands execution over to the helper (remember, safeTransferFrom is NOT safe), which transfer TWO apes back to ApeSTR to satisfy the balance check (1 out, 2 in leaves ApeSTR at +1). It also calls processTokenTwap, which converts the 6 wei, setting the cost of one of the newly deposited apes to 7 wei (6 * 120%). The helper contract buys it back in the same tx. example flow: - Attacker has BAYC #1# and #2#. ApeSTR has BAYC #3#. - Attacker "sells" BAYC #1# to ApeSTR for 6 wei and sends BAYC #2# to it for free, but steals BAYC #3# in the process. - ApeSTR relists BAYC #1# for 7 wei, which the attacker buys. - Attacker now has BAYC #1# and BAYC #3#, and ApeSTR has BAYC #2# (but doesn't even know it). The attacker ran this for all 21 BAYC in the ApeSTR contract, resulting in them being able to claim packs for all of those BAYC. Total net proceeds: $14k. This previously affected SQUIGSTR because of their shared contract - any art blocks NFT sent in would satisfy the balance check, allowing the attacker to drain the contract of squiggles in exchange for basically valueless art blocks NFTs. It was known to be possible on ApeSTR as well, so I guess it was just a matter of time before we saw it happen. The unfortunate consequence is that now, ApeSTR has 21 apes that it is completely unaware of, so they cannot be bought from the contract. And 210 attacker-owned mudwater packs were dumped into bids.

First of all, thank @0xQuit for saving the NFT space and everyone assetssssss!!! 1000% respect!!!🫡 and the love 🥰from @frostyz remember my 112 Island, and told me that it was moved out from my wallet, which i TOTALLY not notice untill he told me few days ago!!!!! i checked my Ape only on day1 and didnt notice my otherdeeds were affected too🥶 !!! thanks again now we are safe, Apes Together Strong💪💪💪

ELECTRUM BITCOIN WALLET CONFIRMS CRITICAL SECURITY VULNERABILITY EXPLOITED IN THE WILD Electrum has disclosed a high-severity vulnerability allowing malicious servers to trick users into sending Bitcoin to an attacker when increasing a transaction fee. The attack works by intercepting a broadcast transaction and replacing it in the wallet’s history with a fake transaction redirecting funds to an attacker-controlled address. If the user attempts to increase the fee using Replace-by-Fee (RBF), Electrum can sign the malicious transaction, sending the Bitcoin to the attacker. Electrum confirmed two reported incidents, including one user who lost funds. Attackers even generated addresses matching the last four characters of the intended recipient’s address. The vulnerability affects versions before 4.8.3 and has been patched in the latest release. Users are urged to update immediately and verify all destination addresses and amounts before signing transactions.

Trying to get myself more chickens. Went to use relay, slippage is too high. Went to official abstract bridge, routes to relay. Went to the official-but-hidden native abstract bridge, frontend misquotes gas so bridging is broken. Hand built a tx with proper gas and bridged ~1 eth. Everyone who wanted a chicken went through hell and back to get one, thank you guys for that. Anyway, I'm now the highest offer among any given trait, so if you were going to sell your chicken please do it now. And man I can't wait until these things are on Ethereum.

Railway is compromised and reports are that attackers are actively draining keys. Rotate any API keys stored in railway immediately. Deployments are down so unfortunately this means many deployments will wind up broken, but it is better than the alternative. Internet D-Day