The Binance incident exposed at least three mistakes that were entirely avoidable: 1. Development and operations environments were not fully isolated. Anyone with production access should operate from a dedicated machine used for nothing else, with no third-party software installed on it — coding, chat, and web browsing all belong on a separate device. 2. The operations stack had no meaningful 2FA. A single key was enough to operate production services, which means that once the key leaked, the attacker had full production access. The right approach is to run production operations through something like AWS's browser-based Session Manager, with a hardware security key enforced as a second factor, so that a single leaked credential is never enough to constitute a breach. 3. The MPC multisig existed in name only. The signing parties performed no substantive independent verification, so compromising one node brought down the entire scheme — a multisig that behaves no differently from a single signature. Multisig only works when the signers are mutually distrustful: each party must independently verify the transaction itself, rather than trusting whatever request comes from upstream. None of these require sophisticated technology. What was missing was discipline.