The Chinese government has now clearly and unmistakably rejected serious collaboration with the United States on AI safety. This was a predictable development. It is also a clarifying moment for the importance of U.S. export controls on AI chips and other technologies, which are now indisputably a necessary element of any AI safety regulatory regime—and must be an urgent policy priority. The Chinese government is now explicitly saying it views any U.S. proposal that would constrain its AI capabilities as an effort to lock-in U.S. technological dominance over China—which is unsurprising because that is the exact same way it has historically viewed U.S. arms control proposals. And particularly given President Trump has stated that staying ahead of China in AI is basically an existential issue for the United States, it is understandable that China would have little willingness to put any constraints on its own AI labs so long as it feels like they still have a chance to overtake the U.S. AI labs. China is unlikely to change this posture unless it perceives it cannot catch up to the United States in AI, or there is a catastrophic event that shocks the Chinese government into changing its perspective (à la the Cuban Missile Crisis). If China will not agree to any negotiated restraints on its AI labs, this leaves the United States with two options if it wishes to stay ahead of China in AI: (1) slow China’s AI development ourselves by strengthening export controls on U.S. AI chips and other relevant technologies, which China needs to stay competitive with the United States in AI; or (2) race ahead of China as fast as possible by refusing U.S. labs’ requests to impose regulations that slow their development of AI to ensure it is safe, and hope that the labs’ warnings about the potential for catastrophic risk if AI development moves too fast are wrong. Those are the only two options. There is no longer any middle ground. As long as China is a pacing threat, the United States will be limited in its ability to impose meaningful AI safety regulations on its own AI labs given maintaining AI leadership is existential. This means it is no longer an intellectually consistent position to support AI safety regulations but oppose export controls on China. If you oppose export controls, you either oppose AI safety regulations, or believe the Chinese government is lying when it says it rejects U.S. proposals to slow AI development. And China has no incentive to lie about that. This is a dangerous situation. If you do believe that AI leadership is existential and that domestic AI safety regulations are necessary and urgent, the time for half-measures on export controls is over. China has shown us its cards and told us it will not cooperate on AI safety. If China will not slow itself down in the near-term, we have no choice but to take steps today to slow China down ourselves. Not doing so is irresponsible.