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John Spencer
@SpencerGuard
War Scholar | Chair of War Studies Madison Policy Forum | Executive Director @urbanwarfareins | UWP podcast | Thoughts/Posts my own RT/Quote/Like ≠ Official Gov
Joined October 2016
1.5K Following    358.4K Followers
Thank you @BillAckman I would add several concerns. - Any uprising would need resilient communications writ large: satellite internet, burner phones, radios, and other systems that can survive regime blackouts. - The regime’s ability to communicate and coordinate its response could also be targeted. - An information and influence campaign would need to focus on Iran’s regular armed forces, especially the Army and Air Force, and press them to side with the population or remain in their barracks instead of defending the IRGC and Basij. - Protest movements need leadership, clear instructions (both active and protective guidance), and organization, both during an uprising and for the day after. - On top of arms, protective gear ballistic vests/helmets some of which can be gathered from the environment if there is leadership and planning on the ground. - The historical record of popular revolts producing stable post-regime order is poor. Removing a regime and replacing it with something better are two different problems. - Direct outside assistance could also cause this desperate regime to strike neighboring countries, civilian infrastructure. Any action would therefore have to account for/target Iran’s remaining missile, drone, and other military capabilities. - Popular revolt is messy business. A lot can go wrong. Communications, leadership, the day after, regional escalation, and whether regular military units choose the Iranian people over the regime’s hardline core are not secondary concerns. They are the central political and strategic questions.
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