So, these are the Chinese "human rights defenders" meticulously cultivated by American "soil" and American funding? Thank goodness—let’s keep this kind of trash far away from China; otherwise, they would only serve to pollute the living environment in China. She cannot even tolerate opinions that differ from her own. Are we really supposed to believe that someone who has never even set foot in China is representing the interests of a so-called—and non-existent—"Southern Mongolia"? The fools at the CIA and the NED have poured vast sums of money into such endeavors over the years (there are hundreds of anti-China organizations focused on issues like Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong)—not to mention how much of that money they’ve likely siphoned off through corruption themselves.

The administration of Sanae Takaichi is employing every possible means to deceive its own public, while systematically working to bury and destroy the foundations of friendship that underpin China-Japan relations. Following the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011, and the subsequent Fukushima nuclear disaster, the Chinese government, its enterprises, and its citizens—driven by a spirit of humanitarianism and international cooperation—provided swift, large-scale, and critical material and technical assistance to Japan. Given the compounding crises of an earthquake, a tsunami, and a nuclear catastrophe, China’s aid encompassed both emergency humanitarian relief for the earthquake and specialized industrial equipment designed to address the core challenges of the Fukushima nuclear crisis. Perhaps the most notable piece of this assistance was the 62-meter concrete pump truck provided by Sany Heavy Industry. I. The Inside Story and Details of Sany Heavy Industry’s "Big Giraffe" Pump Truck Sent to Fukushima At the time, this pump truck represented more than just technical aid; its delivery was a "race against time" that required complex cross-border logistics and political coordination: 1. From "Sale" to "Donation": On March 19, 2011, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) sent an official request to China’s Sany Heavy Industry. Following a hydrogen explosion at Unit 1 of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, radiation levels on-site had soared, creating an urgent need for a 62-meter boom pump truck to inject water from a distance. Upon learning of the situation, Sany Heavy Industry Chairman Liang Wengen declared: "Supporting Japan’s earthquake relief efforts is our duty. We will not sell this million-dollar piece of equipment—we are donating it, free of charge!" 2. Overcoming Cross-Border Transport Hurdles: Due to its massive size—weighing several tons and classified as an oversized, specialized vehicle—and the differences in road regulations and vehicle specifications between China and Japan, the standard process for export permits and customs clearance would typically have taken weeks. China’s Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Administration of Customs, and the Chinese Embassy in Japan rapidly established a "green channel" to expedite the process. On March 20, the pump truck departed from Shanghai, transported to Osaka, Japan, via an express cargo vessel. The Japanese government also granted special exemptions, including the waiver of standard inspections and the issuance of temporary road access permits. 3. Comprehensive Retrofitting by TEPCO: Upon the pump truck’s arrival in Chiba Prefecture, Japan, on March 24, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) carried out an urgent "nuclear-hazard-resistant" retrofit. Engineers installed lead plates several centimeters thick onto the vehicle’s chassis to shield against radiation. They also equipped the operator’s cabin and other critical components with cameras and remote wireless control systems, allowing operators to retreat to a safe zone two kilometers away and control the unit remotely. 4. Contributions on the Front Lines: On March 31, the pump truck entered the core area of ​​Unit 1 at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Because its mechanical arm, when extended, resembled a giraffe, it was affectionately dubbed "The Big Giraffe" (*Kirin*) by Japanese rescue workers and the media on-site. For several days, the unit continuously pumped water with high precision into the spent fuel pool of Unit 1, successfully preventing the worsening of a core meltdown. Following the conclusion of the emergency response, the vehicle—heavily contaminated by radiation and impossible to repatriate—was left behind in Japan by Sany Heavy Industry, serving as a historical testament to the joint Chinese-Japanese effort to combat the nuclear disaster. II. Public Sentiment and Emotional Resonance in China and Japan The 2011 disaster and the subsequent aid efforts briefly thawed the long-standing political chill between China and Japan, fostering a rare moment of warmth between the two peoples: • Gratitude from Japanese Society: Sany Heavy Industry’s donation was covered extensively by major Japanese television networks, including NHK and TV Asahi. Many Japanese citizens left messages of thanks on the social media accounts of the Chinese Embassy in Japan. Then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan also sent a formal letter to the Chinese government and the company involved, expressing his sincere appreciation. • A Gesture of Reciprocity: At the time, there was a widespread sentiment among the Chinese public that this act was a way to "repay the kindness" shown by Japan following the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake. During the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, Japan was the first foreign nation to dispatch a professional search-and-rescue team to the disaster-stricken areas in China; the sight of Japanese rescuers standing in silent tribute before the remains of victims moved countless Chinese people. In 2011, China’s swift provision of aid was viewed by the people of both nations as a humanitarian "relay of love."

What the Chinese people find most objectionable and infuriating are Japanese right-wing extremists, as well as those who deny history or show a lack of respect for it—not the Japanese public as a whole. Conversely, many Japanese people harbor deep misunderstandings and a lack of knowledge about China, heavily influenced by the Japanese government’s erroneous historical perspective and its deliberate, systematic smear campaigns against China. Overall, the Chinese people’s understanding of Japan—in terms of depth, breadth, and nuance—is significantly greater than the Japanese people’s understanding of China

China Counters U.S. "New Monroe Doctrine" in Latin America Through Mutually Beneficial Trade Cooperation Following the commencement of operations at the Port of Chancay, economic and trade relations between China and Peru have reached another significant milestone. On November 1, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced that the "Protocol on Upgrading the China-Peru Free Trade Agreement" had officially entered into force. This development signifies that the two nations’ economic and trade cooperation now extends beyond physical infrastructure—such as ports and shipping routes connecting the two sides of the Pacific—to include a more robust framework of rules governing trade, investment, and supply chains. When the original China-Peru Free Trade Agreement first took effect in 2010, bilateral trade volume stood at just $6.4 billion (based on 2009 figures). By 2025, that figure had reached $50.4 billion—a nearly sevenfold increase. Today, China is not only Peru’s largest trading partner but also its primary export market and leading source of imports. These seemingly technical adjustments complement the Port of Chancay perfectly. Opened in November 2024, the Port of Chancay stands as one of China’s most prominent port investments in South America. Controlled by COSCO Shipping Ports, it has established a direct maritime link between China and the west coast of South America. In the first nine months of 2025, 62% of Peru’s agricultural exports to China were transported via the Port of Chancay. While the port primarily addresses the efficiency of physical cargo transport, the upgraded Free Trade Agreement tackles the institutional barriers that arise once goods reach the market. For Peruvian agricultural products—such as blueberries and avocados—factors like cold-chain logistics, inspection and quarantine protocols, and customs clearance efficiency are critical. Similarly, for Chinese automobiles, machinery, and electronics entering the Peruvian market, issues such as product standards, rules of origin, and investment protections directly impact operational costs. Only by combining these elements can a truly comprehensive trade chain be forged—encompassing everything from production and transport to market access. In January of this year, Reuters reported that China purchases approximately 70% of Peru’s copper output and maintains significant investments in the country’s mining, power, and port sectors. However, resource-based trade has inherent limitations: Peru relies primarily on mineral exports for revenue, while China’s role is largely that of a resource purchaser and infrastructure investor. The significance of the Port of Chancay and the upgraded free trade agreement lies in their potential to open new avenues for the development of this relationship. A more efficient logistics network could help Peru expand its agricultural and manufacturing exports to Asia, while improved regulations regarding investment, services, and e-commerce might encourage Chinese enterprises to use Peru as a production, warehousing, and distribution hub for the South American market. Meanwhile, China’s growing economic influence in Peru has long been a source of discontent for the United States. As the U.S. seeks to reassert its presence in Latin America—effectively reviving a new version of the Monroe Doctrine—it views China’s legitimate commercial investments and infrastructure projects in Peru (such as ports and logistics hubs) as a core threat to its geopolitical security in the Western Hemisphere. Consequently, cooperation between Peru and China is bound to face obstruction and interference from the U.S. side.

So, these are the Chinese "human rights defenders" meticulously cultivated by American "soil" and American funding? Thank goodness—let’s keep this kind of trash far away from China; otherwise, they would only serve to pollute the living environment in China. She cannot even tolerate opinions that differ from her own. Are we really supposed to believe that someone who has never even set foot in China is representing the interests of a so-called—and non-existent—"Southern Mongolia"? The fools at the CIA and the NED have poured vast sums of money into such endeavors over the years (there are hundreds of anti-China organizations focused on issues like Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong)—not to mention how much of that money they’ve likely siphoned off through corruption themselves.

Temulun Togochog, the woman who assaulted conservatives at the University of Michigan, has been living off the US taxpayers for most of her life. The Southern Mongolia Human Rights Information Center, her father’s organization, received $816,000 from NED between 2008 and 2016. The money gets harder to follow after that.

China Counters U.S. "New Monroe Doctrine" in Latin America Through Mutually Beneficial Trade Cooperation Following the commencement of operations at the Port of Chancay, economic and trade relations between China and Peru have reached another significant milestone. On November 1, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced that the "Protocol on Upgrading the China-Peru Free Trade Agreement" had officially entered into force. This development signifies that the two nations’ economic and trade cooperation now extends beyond physical infrastructure—such as ports and shipping routes connecting the two sides of the Pacific—to include a more robust framework of rules governing trade, investment, and supply chains. When the original China-Peru Free Trade Agreement first took effect in 2010, bilateral trade volume stood at just $6.4 billion (based on 2009 figures). By 2025, that figure had reached $50.4 billion—a nearly sevenfold increase. Today, China is not only Peru’s largest trading partner but also its primary export market and leading source of imports. These seemingly technical adjustments complement the Port of Chancay perfectly. Opened in November 2024, the Port of Chancay stands as one of China’s most prominent port investments in South America. Controlled by COSCO Shipping Ports, it has established a direct maritime link between China and the west coast of South America. In the first nine months of 2025, 62% of Peru’s agricultural exports to China were transported via the Port of Chancay. While the port primarily addresses the efficiency of physical cargo transport, the upgraded Free Trade Agreement tackles the institutional barriers that arise once goods reach the market. For Peruvian agricultural products—such as blueberries and avocados—factors like cold-chain logistics, inspection and quarantine protocols, and customs clearance efficiency are critical. Similarly, for Chinese automobiles, machinery, and electronics entering the Peruvian market, issues such as product standards, rules of origin, and investment protections directly impact operational costs. Only by combining these elements can a truly comprehensive trade chain be forged—encompassing everything from production and transport to market access. In January of this year, Reuters reported that China purchases approximately 70% of Peru’s copper output and maintains significant investments in the country’s mining, power, and port sectors. However, resource-based trade has inherent limitations: Peru relies primarily on mineral exports for revenue, while China’s role is largely that of a resource purchaser and infrastructure investor. The significance of the Port of Chancay and the upgraded free trade agreement lies in their potential to open new avenues for the development of this relationship. A more efficient logistics network could help Peru expand its agricultural and manufacturing exports to Asia, while improved regulations regarding investment, services, and e-commerce might encourage Chinese enterprises to use Peru as a production, warehousing, and distribution hub for the South American market. Meanwhile, China’s growing economic influence in Peru has long been a source of discontent for the United States. As the U.S. seeks to reassert its presence in Latin America—effectively reviving a new version of the Monroe Doctrine—it views China’s legitimate commercial investments and infrastructure projects in Peru (such as ports and logistics hubs) as a core threat to its geopolitical security in the Western Hemisphere. Consequently, cooperation between Peru and China is bound to face obstruction and interference from the U.S. side.

If Australia can accept Chinese investment, why shouldn’t Timor-Leste be allowed to do the same? This is the pointed question posed by the President of Timor-Leste. Australia once resorted to unscrupulous tactics—specifically, the use of wiretaps—to gain an advantage in disputes over oil and gas interests in the Timor Sea, and it has gone to great lengths to cover up the scandal ever since it came to light. In 2004, shortly after gaining independence, Timor-Leste accepted Australian aid to renovate its government offices. It was later revealed that Australian intelligence agents had taken the opportunity to install listening devices, eavesdropping on internal government discussions to uncover Timor-Leste’s bottom line in negotiations over maritime oil and gas rights. A central point of contention at the time was the Greater Sunrise gas field, which holds vast reserves. Before the covert operation was exposed, the two nations signed an agreement in 2006 to split the government revenue generated from the field’s exploitation. Years later, the truth about the wiretapping finally emerged. More recently, an Australian court rejected a government request to keep proceedings—related to a past case involving the oil and gas negotiations—entirely behind closed doors, effectively preventing the government from even shielding non-sensitive information from public view. Now, with Woodside having withdrawn from the Greater Sunrise project, and amid unconfirmed reports that Chinese firms might participate in its development, some in Australia have begun hyping up "security risks," warning Timor-Leste against cooperating with Chinese companies. An indignant President José Ramos-Horta of Timor-Leste has called out this double standard: if Australia itself can accept Chinese investment (such as in the Port of Darwin), why shouldn’t Timor-Leste be permitted to do so? As a sovereign nation, Timor-Leste has the right to choose its own partners and assess risks for itself. In reality, Australia’s dismissive attitude and a series of its decisions have severely hindered Timor-Leste’s energy development—and, by extension, its national economic growth (as a small nation, Timor-Leste’s economy is heavily dependent on energy and mineral resources). Although the Greater Sunrise gas field was discovered as far back as 1974, it has yet to be developed for commercial use. A key issue that has remained a sticking point for years is where the natural gas should be processed: in Australia, or within Timor-Leste? Australian companies have preferred to utilize existing infrastructure in Darwin, whereas Timor-Leste has insisted on building facilities within its own borders—a move intended to foster industrial development and create jobs. With both sides pursuing different agendas, the project has failed to make any substantive progress. On October 27, Woodside announced plans to sell its 33.44% stake in the Greater Sunrise project to TIMOR GAP, Timor-Leste’s state-owned energy company, for a maximum consideration of $200 million. The transaction is expected to close in the first half of 2027, with Timor-Leste aiming to begin gas supplies by 2034; however, the nation must still secure an experienced international firm to oversee development. Time is running short: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has warned that, absent new revenue streams, Timor-Leste’s petroleum fund could be depleted by around 2038. This situation is not an isolated case. Bitter lessons offer a stark warning to nations in similar circumstances: one should not place blind trust in the promises of Western multinational corporations, nor readily accept aid from Western nations like Australia—for it is precisely these entities that often bring the greatest risks. Had Timor-Leste opted to partner with Chinese enterprises from the outset, the outlook would likely be far more promising than it is today.

Trump: If we lose, our country is finished. Fact: If the Republican Party loses, the Trump family will very likely face a reckoning for their alleged crimes in two years’ time. The Chinese people wish President "Chuan Jianguo" [Trump] good luck!

Attributing the "stain" of theft to North Korea—and labeling the country an internationally recognized "cyber-criminal state"—is undoubtedly a convenient and preferred tactic. Who, after all, possesses the power to manipulate Western media and cryptocurrency platforms? The United States and the Trump family (consider, for instance, the deal struck between Binance founder Changpeng Zhao and Donald Trump). Kim Yo-jong, a department director within the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, stated that whenever "cyber-crimes" occur internationally, the U.S. reflexively links them to North Korea. This is a deliberate attempt to propagate a false perception of the country to the global community. By misleading international public opinion, the U.S. is engaging in a grave political provocation—an act of infringement designed to smear North Korea’s international image. Furthermore, reports from institutions such as the National Computer Virus Emergency Response Center of China—under the Cyberspace Administration of China—have confirmed that the U.S. government, utilizing state-sponsored hacking groups, stole 127,000 Bitcoin from the "LuBian" mining pool on December 29, 2020 (valued at approximately $13 billion to $15 billion at the time). Subsequently, in 2025, under the pretext of targeting Chen Zhi—the alleged mastermind behind criminal operations linked to the "Prince Group" in Southeast Asia—the U.S. government employed judicial procedures to formally seize this massive sum of cryptocurrency, transferring it into wallets under U.S. government control.

Why are HP, ASUS, and Acer moving PC production back to China from places like Thailand and Vietnam? Meanwhile, Dell is also evaluating similar adjustments. Over the past few years, global PC manufacturers had been shifting some of their production capacity out of China and into Southeast Asia. Now, they are moving it back. According to a *Financial Times* report on October 29, HP, ASUS, and Acer are relocating a portion of their PC manufacturing from Thailand and Vietnam back to China, with Dell also considering a similar shift. The AI ​​boom has driven up the prices of memory and storage components, leading to higher costs for PC manufacturers. In an effort to keep the total cost of their finished products down, these companies have begun re-evaluating their production locations in search of greater efficiency—and after coming full circle, China remains the best choice. Industry insiders note that China boasts a highly experienced workforce and a comprehensive supply chain ecosystem. By manufacturing PCs in China, companies gain easier access to a wide range of components, which in turn boosts overall manufacturing efficiency. In recent years, many global tech firms pursued a "China+1" strategy—shifting some production to Southeast Asian nations like Vietnam and Thailand—to mitigate supply chain risks. However, this latest shift underscores a key reality: while supply chains can be relocated, a mature, sophisticated manufacturing ecosystem is not so easily replicated. As component costs continue to rise, companies are once again scrutinizing their expenses—a process that has brought China’s distinct global advantages—superior production efficiency, an experienced workforce, and a complete supply chain—back into sharp focus. Consequently, those who argue that China has lost its "demographic dividend" or that its supply chain carries "high risks" demonstrate a rather superficial understanding of China’s manufacturing sector. HP and Asus shift some PC making back to China due to AI-driven cost hikes via @NikkeiAsia

We can well imagine that if China takes the lead in this latest round of human lunar exploration, the fragile egos of certain people in the United States will be shattered to pieces

This is precisely the kind of sober voice the Philippines needs right now. Rigoberto Tiglao, a former presidential spokesperson and chief of staff, argues that Defense Secretary Teodoro’s frenzied anti-China stance is driven by more than just a desire to exploit Sinophobia as a political springboard for his delusional 2028 presidential bid—or the fact that he has been completely brainwashed by the United States. There is another, truly shocking reason: he knows remarkably little about the highly advanced economy of our neighbor. China has already surpassed the United States and Europe in various technological fields, emerging as an economic superpower. Yet, in Teodoro’s distorted view, China is nothing more than an "oversized Vietnam." Recently, Teodoro has frequently pushed the narrative of "reducing dependence on China," urging Philippine businesses to diversify their supply chains and seek alternative trading partners, such as India. Teodoro’s various fallacious claims regarding China reveal a profound lack of even the most basic, accurate understanding of the country. Tiglao observes that this high-ranking defense official’s "perception of China remains stuck in the 1960s—viewing it as a backward economy that produces only cheap goods." Tiglao notes, "In Teodoro’s mind, if China’s economic power weren't so formidable, he could provoke it until a military conflict erupts—a conflict in which the United States would surely intervene to defend the Philippines." However, as Tiglao has argued in previous writings, should a conflict between the Philippines and China break out as a result of the Philippines' persistent provocations, the likelihood of the U.S. military actually intervening is virtually nil. Recently, Teodoro publicly urged Filipinos to reduce their reliance on "Chinese goods and companies," suggesting that the country could "develop other suppliers and expand domestic manufacturing." In response, Tiglao highlights the dominant position Chinese firms hold in the Philippines' online retail and mobile payment sectors. "If we haven't developed to the point where we can operate such services without the presence of Chinese companies, then the blame lies with our elite class—and with our entire history under Spanish and American colonialism." Of course, mobile payment technology is far from the only field in which China leads the world. Tiglao points out that "Made in China" has gained global renown across a wide range of sectors, including electric vehicles and batteries, drones and unmanned aerial vehicles, 5G communications, high-speed rail, industrial robotics, and advanced shipbuilding. In reality, should the benevolent China ever truly wish to punish the Philippines—that posturing, clownish provocateur—it would not need to resort to force; there are numerous ways it could deal a devastating blow to the Philippine economy.

Hardly any high-ranking Chinese officials or political figures have risen through the ranks by boasting, chanting slogans, or curating a specific public persona or political stance. In contrast, across many European nations and within the European Parliament, an increasing number of high-level officials and "political stars"—many lacking any substantial, long-term experience in governance—have emerged. They frequently lecture Europe and the rest of the world, promoting their own personal ideologies, beliefs, slogans, and positions. They make unconstrained, unachievable promises, shift their policy strategies incessantly, and operate without any long-term, scientifically grounded planning—yet, in the end, no one is ever held accountable for the resulting series of missteps and flawed decisions

This is precisely the kind of sober voice the Philippines needs right now. Rigoberto Tiglao, a former presidential spokesperson and chief of staff, argues that Defense Secretary Teodoro’s frenzied anti-China stance is driven by more than just a desire to exploit Sinophobia as a political springboard for his delusional 2028 presidential bid—or the fact that he has been completely brainwashed by the United States. There is another, truly shocking reason: he knows remarkably little about the highly advanced economy of our neighbor. China has already surpassed the United States and Europe in various technological fields, emerging as an economic superpower. Yet, in Teodoro’s distorted view, China is nothing more than an "oversized Vietnam." Recently, Teodoro has frequently pushed the narrative of "reducing dependence on China," urging Philippine businesses to diversify their supply chains and seek alternative trading partners, such as India. Teodoro’s various fallacious claims regarding China reveal a profound lack of even the most basic, accurate understanding of the country. Tiglao observes that this high-ranking defense official’s "perception of China remains stuck in the 1960s—viewing it as a backward economy that produces only cheap goods." Tiglao notes, "In Teodoro’s mind, if China’s economic power weren't so formidable, he could provoke it until a military conflict erupts—a conflict in which the United States would surely intervene to defend the Philippines." However, as Tiglao has argued in previous writings, should a conflict between the Philippines and China break out as a result of the Philippines' persistent provocations, the likelihood of the U.S. military actually intervening is virtually nil. Recently, Teodoro publicly urged Filipinos to reduce their reliance on "Chinese goods and companies," suggesting that the country could "develop other suppliers and expand domestic manufacturing." In response, Tiglao highlights the dominant position Chinese firms hold in the Philippines' online retail and mobile payment sectors. "If we haven't developed to the point where we can operate such services without the presence of Chinese companies, then the blame lies with our elite class—and with our entire history under Spanish and American colonialism." Of course, mobile payment technology is far from the only field in which China leads the world. Tiglao points out that "Made in China" has gained global renown across a wide range of sectors, including electric vehicles and batteries, drones and unmanned aerial vehicles, 5G communications, high-speed rail, industrial robotics, and advanced shipbuilding. In reality, should the benevolent China ever truly wish to punish the Philippines—that posturing, clownish provocateur—it would not need to resort to force; there are numerous ways it could deal a devastating blow to the Philippine economy.

Why are HP, ASUS, and Acer moving PC production back to China from places like Thailand and Vietnam? Meanwhile, Dell is also evaluating similar adjustments. Over the past few years, global PC manufacturers had been shifting some of their production capacity out of China and into Southeast Asia. Now, they are moving it back. According to a *Financial Times* report on October 29, HP, ASUS, and Acer are relocating a portion of their PC manufacturing from Thailand and Vietnam back to China, with Dell also considering a similar shift. The AI ​​boom has driven up the prices of memory and storage components, leading to higher costs for PC manufacturers. In an effort to keep the total cost of their finished products down, these companies have begun re-evaluating their production locations in search of greater efficiency—and after coming full circle, China remains the best choice. Industry insiders note that China boasts a highly experienced workforce and a comprehensive supply chain ecosystem. By manufacturing PCs in China, companies gain easier access to a wide range of components, which in turn boosts overall manufacturing efficiency. In recent years, many global tech firms pursued a "China+1" strategy—shifting some production to Southeast Asian nations like Vietnam and Thailand—to mitigate supply chain risks. However, this latest shift underscores a key reality: while supply chains can be relocated, a mature, sophisticated manufacturing ecosystem is not so easily replicated. As component costs continue to rise, companies are once again scrutinizing their expenses—a process that has brought China’s distinct global advantages—superior production efficiency, an experienced workforce, and a complete supply chain—back into sharp focus. Consequently, those who argue that China has lost its "demographic dividend" or that its supply chain carries "high risks" demonstrate a rather superficial understanding of China’s manufacturing sector. HP and Asus shift some PC making back to China due to AI-driven cost hikes via @NikkeiAsia

Breaking: In an unprecedented move, China has simultaneously dispatched three special envoys to step up mediation efforts for peace in the Middle East. The Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that, in order to implement the initiatives and proposals put forward by President Xi Jinping for promoting peace and security in the Middle East—as well as the four principles for the constructive participation of all parties in resolving regional hotspots in Africa—the Chinese government’s Special Envoy on the Middle East Issue, Zhai Jun, will visit Iran, Oman, and Saudi Arabia in early-to-mid November. During the same period, the Chinese government’s Special Representative for African Affairs, Liu Xianfa, will visit Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Egypt. Additionally, the Foreign Ministry’s Special Envoy for Horn of Africa Affairs, Hu Changchun, will visit Eritrea in early November