An important and useful perspective from
@davidmarcus on PayPal and how they ultimately stopped an exploit and the insight:
“Approval policy that no laptop or vendor login can reach.”
In 2014 I went nearly a week without sleep. I was running PayPal and attackers were inside our corporate network. They'd compromised an eBay employee's laptop, got onto the VPN, taken over a domain controller and made themselves domain admins. eBay and PayPal were one company then, on one Windows network. They stole 145M eBay user records, then came for the segregated vault holding PayPal's card credentials. We fought them off. They never got in, but they got close. Too close.
Yesterday Binance lost ~$6.3B in what looks like the same way. A DevOps engineer's laptop, then a service inside the withdrawal stack, then withdrawals the signer approved because they came from a trusted source. Hot wallets emptied in under four hours. No key was stolen.
Nobody broke cryptography or a ledger. They found someone with access and used the trust that came with it. Banks get hit exactly the same way.
2016: attackers inside Bangladesh Bank used its own SWIFT access to send $951M of payment orders to the NY Fed. $81M was lost. The rest was held because an unrelated sanctions filter tripped on the word "Jupiter". That was luck, and it only worked because wires took days to settle.
June 2025: an IT employee at C&M Software, which connects Brazilian banks to Pix, sold his credentials for about $2,700. Attackers used them to send fake Pix transfers out of six institutions' reserve accounts at the central bank. ~$140M in under three hours.
August 2025: stolen vendor credentials at Sinqia, another Pix connector. ~R$710M out of HSBC and one other institution in a single afternoon. The central bank froze most of it, after it had already moved.
Same attack every time. Speed is what changed. When settlement took days, a filter, a correspondent bank or someone in ops could catch a bad payment. Pix, FedNow, SEPA Instant and blockchains settle in seconds. Payment security was mostly built for the slow world.
PayPal's card and user data survived 2014 because domain admin on the corp network couldn't unlock it quickly enough, and our alerting caught the unusual activity on the network. That's the model. Approval policy no laptop or vendor login can reach. Velocity and anomaly limits enforced outside the system that sends. Dynamic caps on what any one wallet, account or service can move per hour. All of it in real time.
About $3B of what left Binance has been frozen, almost all of it stablecoins. The $1.4B in bitcoin is sitting in 19 wallets and nobody can touch it. I don't think that's the problem. For decades the ability to reverse a wire or a card charge let a lot of weak security slide. You either stop the transfer before it's signed or you eat the loss.
Nothing about the technology failed here. The chains processed exactly the transactions they were handed. Binance's own systems handed them the wrong ones because an engineer's laptop was compromised. That's operational security. eBay in 2014, Bangladesh Bank and two Pix connectors all failed at it on their own rails.
In 2014 the attackers never reached the vault. If they had, the fraud losses would have been the small part. PayPal existed so people could pay without handing their card details to every merchant on the internet. We held those details so they didn't have to. Losing them would have broken the one thing the company was built on, and I'm not sure we would have recovered.
I expect blockchains and digital assets to become the standard way money moves. Every custodian of digital assets, or of fiat on a real-time rail, is in that position now. The controls have to adapt to settlement in seconds, crypto or not.
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Quick notes on 7702 to dispel fud and keep your funds safe.
First thing first -- 7702 itself isn't broken. Don't panic if you are using a wallet that supports 7702 (MetaMask, Uniswap, Ambire, etc.).
To recap, 7702 is an account abstraction EIP that allows an EOA to sign a special message, called a "7702 authorization," that would insert a smart contract into the account, which enables the account to do powerful things like transaction batching, e.g. doing "approve" and "transfer" in one transaction so you can swap on Uniswap with one click.
But unfortunately the same feature also allows a hacker to efficiently move all your tokens in one single transaction. In the Binance hack, the hacker moved ETH, USDT, and 62 other tokens in one transaction, whereas without 7702 they'd have had to send one transaction per token. In this particular case, many of those transactions would've failed because Binance was still using the hacked wallet for withdrawals, so all transactions sent by the hacker would've had to compete with the legit transactions for nonces. So using 7702 did help the hacker steal as much funds as possible, as quickly as possible. Ouch!
However, in order for the hacker to use 7702, they must have either 1) had access to the private key, or 2) tricked Binance into signing a 7702 authorization. The latter is very unlikely, as it's hard to imagine Binance being so incompetent as to expose an endpoint for signing 7702 authorizations or (even worse) for signing raw messages which the hacker could've repurposed for 7702 authorizations. But I can't rule that out until the official postmortem.
What does all this mean for you?
- If you are a wallet developer, do NOT, under any circumstances, expose a way for third parties to request 7702 authorizations. This is just handing your users a giant footgun to shoot themselves with. No wallets I know of do this, so don't worry if you are a user.
- If you are a user, use a well-known wallet. 7702 does let wallet developers screw up in more ways than before, so use only well-known wallets whose developers' competence you can trust.
- If you are a company (e.g. an exchange) operating hot wallets, do NOT, under any circumstances, expose an endpoint (even if it's an internal endpoint) for signing 7702 authorizations or raw messages.
As a contributor to AA, I feel partially responsible for hacks like this, since by increasing the power of accounts, we've indeed also empowered hackers (not unlike how any new technology empowers both the good guys and the bad guys). That said, it's important to note that 7702 was only a transitional EIP, and "endgame AA" such as Frame Transactions (EIP-8141) would allow wallet owners to set up their wallets much more securely. For example, if Frame Transactions were available today, Binance could've:
- Set up their wallets as multisig contracts only (not EOAs).
- Set up "post conditions" for their `transfer()` functions, so that even if the multisig got hacked, the contract itself would perform sanity checks such as "no transfers of more than 1000 ETH without additional signers."
In short, the endgame of Ethereum UX is one with both optimal security and optimal UX, and users never have to trade off between the two. But we still have a long way to go until we get there. Back to work!
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AI is enabling even more sophisticated hacks into financial institutions
- one solution is employ ‘proof of human’ in the loop
- to prevent agents/ password infiltration
Not a guarantee to mitigate
$WLD
@worldnetwork is the only proven proof of human platform
$ORBS
@Iamhuman_ORBS
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🚨 BREAKING: Hackers are hitting banks in 7 countries at the same time.
This is what Covid looked like in week 1. A few countries. Small numbers. Nobody called it a crisis.
1/ South Korea: hackers used a Chinese AI tool to break into at least 7 financial firms. 68,000 people's data stolen. 16 firms breached by mid-October. This week Daishin Securities reported 38,490 customers' data leaked, bank account numbers included.
2/ Latin America: one gang ran AI agents built on Claude, Grok and Kimi against 400+ targets, banks and payment firms included. They stole passwords and got into customer bank accounts.
3/ Italy: a fake WhatsApp from "the CEO" and an AI-cloned voice got Intesa Sanpaolo's private bank to send out €95 million. €36 million is still MISSING, turned into crypto.
4/ India: small lenders lost ₹300 crore (about $31 million) in 2 months. 150 cases. Hackers copied bank logins and sent the money out as fake loans. One firm was hit twice.
5/ Crypto: $351 million drained from Bitget's hot wallets. North Korean hackers are suspected.
6/ Japan: hackers hit GMO Internet's currency trading service and demanded $50 million in crypto. The prime minister promised an emergency anti-cyberattack package.
7/ Australia: the regulator warns AI attacks put more than A$4.5 trillion in retirement savings in the firing line. Government cyber alerts jumped 80% in a year.
Now zoom out.
AI hacking tools are now easy to get. Smaller firms have weak security. The money moves in minutes. It jumps across banks, through rented accounts, out as cash or crypto. The bosses are often abroad.
Covid locked the streets. Nobody is calling this a crisis yet. But the central banks already plan for the day the hackers get in.
The G7 agreed to run drills that simulate AI attacks on banks. The ECB reportedly gave eurozone banks 4 months to hand in their defence plans.
If your savings sit in a bank, hit follow. I'm tracking where the hackers strike next and how much they take.
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Well said by
@RickRieder
➡️ Higher rates cannot fix supply shock of oil
➡️ Higher rates worsens housing supply shortage
➡️ Higher rates creates more investment income = demand increase
Thus, calling for Fed to hike might be creating more inflation
@FundstratDirect
@FundstratCap
@BitMNR
$BMNR
$BMNP
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The Federal Reserve held interest rates steady today, and we think patience is the right approach. Inflation remains high, but the question isn't simply whether rates should go higher. It's whether higher rates would actually address the inflation that remains.
The challenge is that parts of the economy, and of inflation itself, are moving at very different speeds. Growth remains remarkably resilient in aggregate, supported by a powerful investment cycle, but beneath the surface, parts of the economy that are more sensitive to borrowing costs are feeling considerably more restraint. We see a similar divergence in inflation. Many of the cyclical components that respond to higher interest rates appear relatively well controlled. Meanwhile, persistent pressures across energy, insurance, healthcare and education are unlikely to be meaningfully affected by another 25-basis-point rate increase.
In some ways, the Fed is operating a house with one thermostat, but very different temperatures in every room. Turning it down further may make the rooms that are already cool even colder, without doing much to cool those that remain hot.
That doesn't mean the Fed should become complacent. Inflation is still above its 2% objective and the Fed should retain the option to tighten further if the underlying inflation trend deteriorates. But hawkish rhetoric and patient policy can comfortably coexist, particularly when the bond market has already done some tightening of its own through higher Treasury yields.
For investors, we think this environment argues for humility rather than making a heroic directional call on rates. Real yields remain attractive, and there's considerable income available across high-quality fixed income markets. We continue to favor a moderate duration posture, taking advantage of today's income opportunities while remaining patient as this unusually divergent economy evolves.
The Fed doesn't need to ignore the heat. It just needs to be thoughtful about where it's coming from.
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