29 SEP 2026 @CopernicusCMS #Sentinel2# 🛰️📷 Strait of Hormuz Seven months ago, maritime chokepoints and contested logistics became hot topics for all those not previously paying attention. Who remembers when Congress tried to get DoD to submit a report on Maritime Chokepoints as part of the #FY22NDAA#? Seems like ages ago. I wonder if it would have made a difference if DoD had not blown off this Congressional requirement and actually complied, studied the problem and informed the public? -- See the @UANI Iran Shipping Update: -- @JemimaShelley @mercoglianos @TankerTrackers @brentdsadler @cdrsalamander @HunterStires

PCG challenges AIS-spoofing Chinese research vessel loitering off Batanes; no response to radio challenges The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) has confirmed the presence of the Chinese research vessel (CRV) JIA HAI KE 7 lying-to at Lat 21.151335, Long 121.282907, approximately 37.84 nautical miles northwest of Itbayat, Batanes, within the Philippine exclusive economic zone (EEZ). During this morning's Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) flight, ordered by PCG Commandant Admiral Ronnie Gil Gavan, the PCG aircraft visually confirmed JIA HAI KE 7 at approximately 38 nautical miles off Itbayat and challenged the vessel multiple times over radio, asserting Philippine sovereign rights and demanding that it state its intentions and cease any unauthorized activity. The CRV did not respond to any of the challenges. The vessel's behavior is not that of a ship in innocent passage. Rather than steaming on a steady course and speed, JIA HAI KE 7 has been loitering and holding position in the same area — the movement pattern of a vessel conducting marine scientific research (MSR), not transit. The vessel was detected not through its Automatic Identification System (AIS), but by the PCG Monitoring Station in Itbayat. Verification with the Canada-provided Dark Vessel Detection (DVD) system showed a physically impossible AIS trail: JIA HAI KE 7 reported departing Xiamen, Fujian at 0059H on 21 September 2026 and, by 2010H the same day, was broadcasting from off Bindari, Papua New Guinea — more than 2,000 nautical miles away. By 0655H today, it was transmitting from northwest of Itbayat. The PCG assesses this as deliberate AIS spoofing to conceal the vessel's true movements from Philippine authorities. Without the vigilance of the Itbayat monitoring station, its presence would have gone unnoticed. Under SOLAS, vessels must transmit accurate AIS data at all times; falsifying position data, combined with silence on the radio, points to a vessel that does not want its activity known. JIA HAI KE 7 (MMSI 413618110, Call Sign BQBD5) is a 2,000-ton, 70-meter vessel built for Zhuhai Jiahai Marine Technology Co. and placed in service in April 2025. Open sources describe it as China's first privately owned research ship fitted with a DP-2 dynamic positioning system and quiet electric propulsion — designed to hold station precisely over a fixed point on the seabed for marine geological survey, and it has operated alongside seabed-drilling ships. Its loitering pattern off Itbayat is consistent with exactly this kind of operation. The waters off Batanes and the Luzon Strait host critical submarine cable corridors linking the Philippines to Northeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific. A seabed-survey vessel hiding its position while holding station in this corridor raises serious concern over the security of the country's undersea communications infrastructure and the potential military use of the data collected. The PCG will continue tracking JIA HAI KE 7 through its monitoring stations, the DVD system, and follow-on MDA flights, and will take all necessary measures under Philippine law and UNCLOS to challenge and drive away vessels conducting unauthorized activities in our maritime zones. This deployment is in accordance with the guidance of President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. to protect the country's maritime domain and not to tolerate any unauthorized foreign research within Philippine waters.

@UNODC_BMB with funding from Japan 🇯🇵 @JapanMissionVie is delivering a Regional Workshop on Maritime Sanctions Compliance and High-Risk Indicators in Manila to officials of shipping registries from 🇰🇭 🇲🇾 🇵🇭 🇹🇭 🇻🇳 to strengthen awareness and understanding on UN maritime sanctions.

In 2025, at the 15th Anniversary ADMM-Plus Summit in KL, China joined in the joint statement which, among other things, committed to: 🔹PRIORITISE inclusivity and multilateral engagement by maintaining an open and inclusive ADMM-Plus 🔹INCREASE capacity-building initiatives 🔹STRENGTHEN the ADMM-Plus framework and deepen defence cooperation as a means for confidence and capacity-building; 🔹REAFFIRM the importance of mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of our nations, maintaining and promoting peace, security, stability, prosperity, safety and freedom of navigation and overflight, as well as the need to enhance mutual trust and confidence, exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities and avoid actions that may further complicate the situation, and pursue peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); 🔹CONTINUE exchanges, interactions and confidence-building measures to address current and emerging security challenges; ➡️This year, China did not join in the 2026 ADMM-Plus EWG Maritime Security Sea Phase, hosted by 🇵🇭 Will this divergence between words and actions be noted by all the ASEAN member states? ➡️ Next year, 🇨🇳 will host the 2nd ASEAN-China Maritime Exercise. Will is be used to challenge or support the principles expressed by ASEAN, ADMM and ADMM-Plus? -- @BDHerzinger @CollinSLKoh @graham_euan @TangAnZhu @ChongJaIan @MarSec_Bradford @JeffreyOrdaniel

Malaysia is a lifeline for Iran Support vessels and facilities sustain a fleet of sanctions-evading ships in the South China Sea at the Malaysia Eastern Out of Port Limits (EOPL) anchorage. Read the WSJ Op-Ed here: -- See the @UANI Iran Shipping Update for more details: -- @JemimaShelley @mercoglianos @TankerTrackers @KasraAarabi

At the same time as the current Trump-Xi 2026 Summit and State Dinner in Washington DC.... Today is 1️⃣1️⃣th anniversary of infamous 2015 #RoseGarden# 🥀speech by 🇨🇳 Xi Jinping: "China does not intend to pursue militarization" in #SouthChinaSea# Also, two years ago, 🇨🇳 launched a test Inter-continental Ballistic Missile over #SouthChinaSea# into the Pacific (which they recently did again in July) -- @BDHerzinger @TangAnZhu @CollinSLKoh @GordianKnotRay

The fact that the tankers are running through the Hormuz Strait in daylight, and during coverage by commercial satellite is a good indicator that volume of oil will continue to increase. What we are missing is information from @CENTCOM and @US5thFleet on the details on how these escorts are being performed - which for obvious reasons they do not wish to diverge. The other piece of evidence has been the lack of attacks on ships in the Gulf of Oman conducting ship-to-ship transfers. While we may not see US Navy warships in the Strait, they may be present on the GoO protecting these anchorages and catching the outbound tankers from Hormuz and providing coverage for the return ships. If you want am idea of what ships are codnucting these passages, they are probably the ships on @PGSA_IRAN Non-Compliance list. The Tanker War of 2026 is evolving into a major naval campaign that will force the @USNavy and @POTUS to rethink the role of commercial shipping, Sea Power and trade defense.

24 SEP 2026 @CopernicusCMS #Sentinel1# 🛰️RADAR📷 Kharg Island ~24 Tankers anchored near Kharg Island But no tankers with 🇮🇷 Crude Oil from Kharg have been observed bypassing the US blockade. -- See the @UANI Iran Shipping Update for more details: -- @JemimaShelley @mercoglianos @TankerTrackers @brentdsadler

🇪🇺 EUNAVFOR ASPIDES wishes our partners in the global shipping community and @IMOHQ a Happy #WorldMaritimeDay# . Whether operating at sea, upholding maritime law, or contributing to maritime security, we share a common purpose: turning policy into practice.

COLUMN FORMATION | ADMM-PLUS SEA PHASE Eleven naval vessels from eight countries 🇵🇭🇺🇸🇦🇺🇯🇵🇳🇿🇮🇳🇸🇬🇧🇳 took part in division tactics during the ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Maritime Security Joint Cooperative Activity in the West Philippine Sea, including a column formation led by the Philippine Navy’s BRP Jose Rizal. (Courtesy: PHILIPPINE NAVY) @ABSCBNNews

The Philippine Navy issued a radio challenge to a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) warship monitored about 10 nautical miles from participating vessels during the ADMM-Plus Sea Phase in the West Philippine Sea. But unlike usual radio challenges, the PH Navy invited the Chinese warship to join the formations, given China’s membership in the ADMM-Plus. “We have a warship that is a country part of our ASEAN and Plus countries. We are always ready to accommodate them during the exercise,” Combined Task Force Commander Capt. Miljun Peñaflorida told reporters aboard the BRP Jose Rizal. The Chinese warship never responded. @ABSCBNNews

The 🇮🇷 container ship FLEXI 2 (IMO 9246322) transited the North Sea toward the Skagerrak, with its destination listed as the 🇷🇺 port of Bronka, near St. Petersburg. While transiting the Dover Strait, FLEXI 2 made two unusual U-turns for unknown reasons. It will soon transit the Danish Straits into the Baltic Sea. EU Directive 2025/811 requires Mandatory Ship Reporting of key safety information, including insurance certificates due to substandard ships that pose substantial risks to maritime safety and marine ecosystems. -- See the @UANI Iran Shipping Update for more details: -- @JemimaShelley @mercoglianos @brentdsadler @TankerTrackers @imannasseri @YorukIsik @SONARROW_OSINT @steffanwatkins @auonsson

H.R. 5334, the "Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026’’ was signed into US Law. Regarding 🇮🇷: it extends the existing "Iran Sanctions Act of 1996" until 2031. Regarding 🇷🇺 dark fleet ops, the Act: ☑️Requires identification and blocking of foreign vessels used by Russia or Russian persons to move crude oil, LNG, coal, arms, or other goods to circumvent U.S. or international sanctions (including those exhibiting unsafe maritime behavior, lacking adequate insurance, or violating oil price caps). ☑️Targets foreign persons who knowingly own, operate, manage, underwrite, insure, reinsure, or serve as a captain or senior leader on a sanctioned vessel. ☑️Imposes sanctions on foreign persons conducting ship-to-ship transfers of sanctioned Russian goods with sanctioned vessels, or providing supportive services to them. ☑️Penalizes owners and operators of foreign ports that allow vessels sanctioned for supporting Russia to dock or receive services. ☑️Defines countries facilitating Russian oil sanctions evasion to include those engaging in transactions or services connected to shadow fleet vessels transporting Russian oil. -- @JemimaShelley @mercoglianos @TankerTrackers @ed_fin @MarcusHand1 @darshanabaruah